by Dore Gold
In light of
developments over the last few years, there has been a growing
realization in Israel that the chances of reaching a complete final
status agreement with the Palestinians are presently extremely small.
This is not just an ideological position coming out of certain quarters
in Israel, but it is also the professional view of practitioners who
have been involved in the political process itself.
Last June in an
interview in Haaretz, Professor Itamar Rabinovich, Israel's former
ambassador to Washington and head negotiator with Syria, reached this
very conclusion. He added, as part of his proof of this point, that "the
bold proposals" by former prime ministers Ehud Barak and Ehud Olmert
were not even responded to by the Palestinians. Looking back on Olmert's
far-reaching proposals, Mahmoud Abbas himself told The Washington Post
on May 29, 2009 that the gaps between the parties were just too wide.
There were other voices
that reinforced this conclusion. At the end of 2009, Hussein Agha, who
has advised Palestinian leaders over the last two decades, and Robert
Malley, who was a member of President Clinton's National Security
Council also wrote in the New York Review of Books: "As currently
defined and negotiated, a conflict-ending settlement is practically
unachievable; even if signed it will not be implemented and even if
implemented it will not be sustained."
Events since that time
have not made diplomatic movement any easier. What is called the "Arab
Spring," among other things led to the fall of President Mubarak, Abbas'
main regional source of support. Instead a Muslim Brotherhood regime
came to power thereby and also strengthening Abbas' Hamas rivals. Given
the new regional realities that Israel was facing, even Rabinovich
warned in Haaretz: "I would not advise entering into far-reaching
territorial concessions in a situation of uncertainty."
And yet there is new
push underway to move forward with new negotiations between Israel and
the Palestinians with the hope of concluding an agreement between them.
Britain's Foreign Secretary William Hague was just in Washington meeting
with Secretary of State John Kerry where he called on the Obama
administration "to inject the necessary momentum on this issue." In
December, he admitted in the House of Commons that he was consulting
with the French and the Germans on how to put pressure on the U.S. to
launch a new initiative. There was a diplomatic rumor in January that
the Europeans wanted Kerry to put down on the table the parameters of a
final settlement before Israel and the Palestinians, including a
withdrawal to the 1967 lines.
Thus Israel finds
itself in a paradoxical situation: just as international pressures are
increasing for it to make new concessions in order to restart and
advance the political process, there is a growing realization in Israel
that the kind of final status agreement that the international community
is hoping will be concluded is not about to happen. The Palestinian
side knows this as well.
Moreover, there is a
more fundamental question for Israel about how it should proceed in an
era of total uncertainty about whether half the regimes that are
currently in power in the Middle East will even be there in a few years.
The Muslim Brotherhood, which even beyond Egypt is the main beneficiary
of the Arab Spring, has been connected to plots against the governments
of Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. Its revolutionary drive in the
region is likely to gain new momentum should Islamist forces take
control of Syria.
How exactly does the
Arab Spring influence Israeli military-strategic considerations? Is
Israeli caution warranted here as well? Some try to make the argument
that the conventional military threat to Israel is undergoing a
transformation allowing Israel to make the very sort of new concessions
that the Europeans are demanding.
With neighboring
armies, like that of Syria, involved in domestic upheavals, their
conventional forces have been badly degraded. Would that mean that
Israel can withdraw from territories that in the past were regarded as
vital but whose importance may have changed? Historically, Israel based
its security on a small standing army that had to neutralize the
numerically superior standing forces of its Arab neighbors. To
accomplish this goal, the IDF was structured around its reserve
formations that would reach their full strength along Israel's front
lines after 48 hours of mobilization.
When Yigal Allon,
Israel's deputy prime minister and former commander of the Palmach,
first presented his idea of defensible borders for Israel after the 1967
Six-Day War, it was partly based on the idea of providing Israel's
small standing army the topographical conditions it needed to withstand a
surprise attack and fight against superior forces, until the reserve
formations arrived. But if Israel no longer has to contend with this
sort of threat, then could it pull out of the Jordan Valley, which
previously every Israeli prime minister from Rabin to Sharon saw as
Israel’s forward defense line?
This would be an
irresponsible conclusion. First of all, the Arab states are likely to
build up their conventional armies again in the future once their
internal political situation becomes more stable; already Egypt has no
problem seeking 200 additional Abrams tanks from the U.S., which will
bolster the strength of its armored forces. Others will follow suit in
the years ahead. After all, decisiveness in wars is still a function of
the movement of ground armies, and their manoeuvring units, and not the
employment of air power alone. America’s two wars against Iraq proved
that point conclusively in 1991 and 2003.
Secondly, in the
immediate term, there is a new ground threat to Israel from terrorist
organizations, many of which have many of the attributes of a fully
equipped army. In May 2011, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
noted that Hezbollah had more rockets and missiles than most states. The
lethality of terrorist organizations has also dramatically increased
with their acquisition of shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles,
shore-to ship missiles, and advanced explosives that are far more potent
than anything they used before.
The growing
capabilities of the international terrorist organizations in the Middle
East has reached such a scale that they have even become challenging for
the region's regular armies. In Sinai, the Egyptian army fought
regularly with al-Qaida in the area of Jabal Hilal, where an Egyptian
general was killed in one battle. The Syrian Army has been repeatedly
defeated by an al-Qaida affiliate in Syria, known as Jabhat al-Nusra,
which has been equipped through Syria's porous borders. In short, the
Arab Spring has led to a different but no less challenging security
environment for Israel that will affect how we view the question of our
future boundaries in the future.
Third, it would be a
dangerous error to dismiss the possibility that terrorist organizations
will attempt to acquire weapons of mass destruction and use them against
their adversaries. Hezbollah is an extension of the Iranian security
establishment. Should Tehran be permitted to cross the nuclear
threshold, it would be a cardinal error to simply dismiss the
possibility that Hezbollah would not eventually get to share in this
technology. Hezbollah would not need ballistic missiles; it could put a
nuclear device in the same sort of truck it used against the Marine
Barracks in Beirut during 1983 or against Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia
in 1996.
Al-Qaida in Iraq
already planned a chemical weapons attack in Amman, Jordan in 2004 that
was thwarted. Should Syria’s chemical arsenal fall into the hands of the
jihadist groups currently fighting the Assad regime, then
unfortunately, non-conventional terror attacks may become more common
against those who leave themselves vulnerable. Foreign Secretary Hague,
who just warned on Feb. 14, during a speech at the Royal United Services
Institute (RUSI) in London, about a new jihadist threat to Europe
coming out of Syria should be the first one who understands the new
position Israel finds itself in.
In the past, Israel was
able to secure its borders with deterrence against neighboring states
that were considering taking offensive action against it. But deterrence
does not apply to these terrorist organizations in the same way,
especially those that glorify martyrdom as a religious duty. Israel
needs to have a physical barrier against the new threat of terrorist
organizations so that it can neutralize their efforts to smuggle
advanced weaponry and infiltrate Israel's population centers. The stakes
for Israel in not taking into account the impact of the changing
terrorist threat on its need to maintain defensible borders could be
disastrous.
Israel learned the hard
way the significance of its withdrawal from the Philadephi Route
between the Gaza Strip and Sinai, which led to a qualitative leap in the
weaponry that Hamas could smuggle and eventually deploy. Before its
2005 disengagement from the Gaza Strip the only rocket that Hamas fired
was the short-range Qassam.
By 2006, Hamas was
using longer-range Grad rockets from Iran against Ashkelon for the first
time and enlarging the arc of Israeli cities it could target. In 2012,
that arc extended even further once Hamas was equipped with Iranian Fajr
rockets that it fired at Tel Aviv. Hamas in Gaza also acquired
shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles from Iran and later from Libya’s
arsenal, after the fall of Gadhafi. In Oct. 2012, Hamas fired its first
SA-7 against an Israeli helicopter.
Israel has three
choices given the diplomatic reality that it faces. It can just give up
and make the concessions that the Europeans are demanding that the Obama
administration impose, but that would put the Israeli population in a
precarious position that no responsible government could agree to. It
can say that given the uncertainty it faces, now is not the time for any
diplomatic initiatives.
But it could also
indicate that it is willing to explore new ideas with the Palestinians,
as long as its vital security interests are not undercut, but are fully
protected instead. Both sides should seek to reach agreements where
possible, leaving harder issues for later. Europe could play a positive
role if it encouraged the Palestinians to reach more limited
arrangements with Israel instead of insisting on the kind of Israeli
concessions for final status agreement that did not lead to a peace
treaty before and are unlikely to produce a stable peace today.
The result of all this
talk coming out of Europe about getting the U.S. to impose a solution
will be completely self-defeating as it hardens the Palestinian
readiness to come to the negotiating table — since Israel will be
delivered on a silver platter anyway — and makes any real diplomatic
progress more difficult than ever.
Dore Gold
Source: http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_opinion.php?id=3445
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.