Sunday, February 10, 2008

The Delusion of Dealing with Virtual Abu-Mazen

By Raphael Israeli

 

One year after Gilead Shalit was kidnapped near Gaza, and his two colleagues suffered the same fate in Lebanon, which triggered a war for their release, little is known about them, there is no one to address and no authority to take responsibility for them. The heartless gangs of bandits who hold them have no other concern beyond tormenting the families of the detainees and raising the stakes for their release. There is no human consideration in their thoughts, so much so that even bits of information about the soldiers, let alone visits by the Red Cross to their jail are proscribed. And the government of Israel sheepishly repeats that it is "doing  everything possible" to release them. Does it?

 

At the same time, the same government of Israel which did not hesitate to go to war to secure their release, continues to accumulate error upon error in dealing with the terrorists, to the point that it seems that they are unwittingly "doing everything possible" to bar the return of the soldiers home. At first, the government accepted Security Council Resolution  1701 which facilitated  the termination of the Second Lebanese War and stated the need to return the two kidnapped soldiers, but  let go the only leverage it had to secure their release, namely the  presence of Israeli troops there until the Resolution is implemented in full. That would have forced the Lebanese government to take its responsibility for its territory, exactly what it did now in its confrontation with the Fateh-al-Islam in the camps near Tripoli. A forced show down with HIzbullah was the only fashion to compel it to conform.

 

The same scenario has been unfolding in Gaza . As long as virtual Abu Mazen was there, he would not use his vastly superior forces against the Hamas, the very day Shalit was kidnapped, in order to search for him, secure his release and return him home unconditionally. Instead, he joined the kidnappers in bargaining about the price for his release, and demanded that so many hundreds of Palestinian murderers should be set free by Israel. And since he was considered "moderate" and a partner for peace by Israel and all the rest, why should he risk his "unity government" and the "civil war" he was hoping to avoid if he stood to gain nothing? But then Hamas took over and he himself was ousted from Gaza. Only then, when his own rule was in jeopardy,  would he, like the Lebanese authorities, dare to confront his domestic rivals, not before, when Israel alone was paying the price of this lawlessness.

 

Hamas is now in charge of Gaza, there is no "moderate" leader there to hope for, and the whole responsibility rests on the new government which is in dire need for funds, food, medicine, services etc. Since Gaza is now operating as a state, the Palestinians can no longer claim that they are deprived of one, and the urgency is blunted for Israel and the West to achieve another for Abu Mazen. After all, it was Hamas who won the last elections, therefore they have the legitimacy to act for the entire Palestinian people. That government ought to be made to understand that  unless Shalit is returned immediately and the shelling of Sderot and the Western Negev are discontinued,  all supplies to Gaza  will be stopped and the screws would be gradually tightened. Yes, a dire humanitarian problem, but how about the humanitarian problem that Shalit's family and with it all Israel, have been suffering for the past year? Conversely, if the Hamas government conforms, Israel's borders would be opened, including labor markets for the starving population of the Strip, and the Hamas government could only benefit  from showing its mettle in maintaining order and reinstalling prosperity and security.

 

The Sharm al-Sheikh Conference, in which Israel once again found itself lone facing three Arab entities that are by definition more likely to take the Palestinian side than otherwise, could only end up in more Israeli concessions like releasing frozen moneys, freeing prisoners without any Palestinian commitment in kind, handing more weapons that are sure to be ultimately turned against Israel as happened during the Intifada that was initiated by Fateh, not Hamas. And all that in the name of "strengthening" weak and irrelevant Abu-Mazen, by creating for him a second Palestinian state, all at the expense of Israel. To the Palestinians who claim that the funds are "theirs" in any case, one should retort that  while this is basically true, Israel has the right to deduct from them all the damages in the billions caused to it by the intifadah, to compensate the families of the 1500 casualties thereof, to pay for the huge expenditure of defense and fortifications caused by the continued shelling of the Negev etc. IN that case, the Palestinians would end up in a great debt to Israel, not the other way round. They can get their money if and when their acts of terror and destruction are terminated.

 

In sum, experience has shown that it is not treaties and signed documents which will bring peace and security to the Middle East.  Roman contractual law  has not penetrated the Muslim mind, whereby obligations are mutual and have to be respected by the parties. The dozen  cease-fire "agreements" between Fateh and Hamas in Gaza, which did not hold even when Israel was not there to be accused of their violation,  amply illustrate this sorry state of mind. By making  noble and generous unilateral "gestures" of releasing prisoners and funds, lifting roadblocks and allowing for weapons to flow to the Palestinians, Israel will not, as it did not in the past, achieve anything. Its kidnapped prisoners will not return unless it squeezes the concerned authorities to return them by enforcing painful  retaliation. When it removes obstacles, this is used to increase terrorism; when it lifts money restrictions, they are  misused to finance terrorism; when it hands over power to one party, it abuses it to turn against it; when Arab prisoners are released as a move of goodwill (something that had been done before), they revert to terror and the captivity of its soldiers is not shortened by one day. Yes, Olmert , like Abu Mazen, are in desperate need to maintain themselves in power, with the support of such illegitimate rulers as Mubarak and Abdallah. But why do the people of Israel have to pay the price?

 

Raphael Israeli

 

The author is a professor of Islam at Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

 

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