by Uri Heitner
In contrast to all-out
war, low-level conflict does not provide a clear picture of victory, and
time is ultimately the deciding factor. This was the case after the
Second Lebanon War — which in retrospect has provided quiet along the
northern border — and is also the case now following Operation Pillar of
Defense in Gaza. Did we win? Were we able to build deterrence? The fact
that Hamas is celebrating isn't an indicator, and only in the long run
will it be possible to answer these questions.
For the time being, the
picture before us is rather discouraging, to put it mildly. First,
there is the fact that the cease-fire is not unconditional. Hamas would
erupt in a victory celebration even if it had agreed to an unconditional
cessation of hostilities, but those celebrations would have been
totally baseless.
However, Israel’s
agreement to a cease-fire that gives some achievements for Hamas points
to the lack of effective deterrence created by Israel that would have
forced Hamas to surrender unconditionally. In this situation, it is very
difficult to define the result of the fighting, despite the
considerable achievements Israel did obtain.
If Israel had
conditioned its willingness to discuss these matters on six months of
absolute quiet, it would have been acceptable. The demand for 24 hours
of quiet, however, is a joke. The fact that the agreement handcuffs the
Israel Defense Forces' efforts to combat terrorism is a boon for Hamas
and should not have been agreed to. Furthermore, the demand to open the
border crossings should be denied. Israel paid a dear price for its
disengagement from Gaza, but did not disengage from Gaza. Our interest
is to disengage and put an end to the anomaly of Gaza being a terrorist
entity hostile to Israel while still receiving goods from Israel. The
border today is too open already; to open it further is detrimental to
Israel's interests.
The cease-fire's major
test is tomorrow's mortar round. Our experience tells us that after a
short time, the Palestinians will begin to chip away at the cease-fire
and fire one mortar shell. Israel, following the suffering of the last
round of fighting, will fear an escalation and will avoid sending the
entire south into bomb shelters again because of one mortar. So they
will then shoot two mortars, followed by a Qassam rocket, until we
gradually find ourselves mired in yet another "round" of exchanging
fire. If this happens, the operation was a waste.
The main test is
tomorrow's mortar. Will we have the strength to respond with full,
completely disproportionate force, as opposed to our past mistakes? To
my sorrow, we have already failed the Palestinians' first test. On our
television screens, even while we were seeing headlines saying, "The
cease-fire has gone into effect," there were subtitles saying, "Alarm
sounded in Ashdod."
The cease-fire was
broken repeatedly in the hours immediately following its announcement,
and Israel sat idly by. This is how the erosion begins. The IDF needed
to respond to the cease-fire violation with an especially powerful
counter-attack (Israeli negotiators should have stipulated this from the
start). As a result, the exchange of fire would have resumed and we
would have gone back to another day of negotiations, but it would have
been clear to the enemy that “cease-fire” means only one thing.
Since the Oslo Accords, we have
grown accustomed to the Palestinians being allowed to violate agreements
— all the cease-fires, "tahadiyas" (calms) and "hudnahs" (truces).
Their intention is for Israel to cease firing. Even after Operation
Pillar of Defense, we have come to terms with this norm. This is not how
deterrence is built.
Uri Heitner
Source: http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_opinion.php?id=2959
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
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