by Prof. Abraham Ben-Zvi
Last Wednesday, the die
was cast. Following Russian President Vladimir Putin's decision to
grant political asylum (which at this point won't be just temporary) to
Edward Snowden, the leaker of classified National Security Agency
information, U.S. President Barack Obama decided to cancel a planned
upcoming meeting with his Russian counterpart. That meeting was supposed
to take place in Moscow in September after the G-20 summit in St.
Petersburg.
At first glance, this
may appear as if it was a firm American move meant to project an image
of strength and toughness. But a more thorough analysis of U.S.-Russia
relations during the Obama era leads to a completely different
conclusion.
In stark contrast to
Soviet Union leader Nikita Khrushchev's decision in May 1960 to scuttle a
conference in Paris with then-U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower (a step
that sent a Soviet message of defiance and willingness to "go all the
way"), Obama's cancellation of the meeting with Putin was evidence of
ongoing American weakness in the international arena. The decision to
nix the meeting was closer to the roar of a mouse than the battle cry of
a lion.
Obama's decision was an
unavoidable necessity after the White House recently suffered public
humiliation at the aggressive hands of the Kremlin. The Americans found
themselves as beggars at the door, pleading with the Russian president
to be so kind as to hand over a U.S. citizen wanted on grave espionage
charges.
As no breakthroughs
were expected on divisive issues during the Moscow meeting (for which
only one day was allotted), it is tough to say that the U.S. move to
cancel the meeting will have any actual global significance.
Furthermore, given the chilly, if not contemptuous attitude Putin has
regularly displayed toward Obama (evidenced by the icy winds that blew
between the two during previous meetings), it's likely that the
cancellation of the Moscow meeting merely saved Obama from another
frosty encounter (at a time when Snowden is enjoying warm Russian
hospitality).
It is only natural that
Putin has taken note of the excessive caution shown by the American
superpower in places like Libya, Syria and, of course, Iran. It appears
that Putin's defiant conduct in the Snowden affair is an inevitable
by-product of that.
If we turn our gaze
toward Jerusalem, there are undoubtedly clear and immediate consequences
for Israel from the decline of U.S. power. First, the continuing
deterioration of ties between Obama and Putin and the Kremlin's
perception of Obama as a "paper tiger" could reduce even further
America's ability to pull on levers of influence and convince Putin to
cooperate on formulating joint policies on issues like Iran and Syria.
During his time in the White House, Richard Nixon (along with his
secretary of state, Henry Kissinger) succeeded, at least temporarily, in
using a position of strength to tame the Russian bear and channel it
along a path of more restrained conduct. Today, the situation is
completely different. The implication for Israel is clear -- the chances
of Washington getting Moscow on board with an effective deterrent move
to prevent Iran from crossing the nuclear threshold are decreasing.
The second consequence for Israel
is related to the renewal of the negotiating progress with the
Palestinians. For the U.S., the initiator and mediator of the new talks,
it's extremely important that progress be made toward a peace
agreement. But given the image of weakness and helplessness America is
exuding in the international arena, it will have a very tough time
providing Israel with the credible guarantees that must accompany any
deal to reduce the risk margins and uncertainties Israel will face. So
despite the effort that U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry invested in
restarting talks, it is still not clear that he is carrying the basket
of benefits, incentives and compensation that would be so vital to the
success of his mission.
Prof. Abraham Ben-Zvi
Source: http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_opinion.php?id=5343
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
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