by Prof. Eyal Zisser
The main challenge was and still belongs to the political echelon -- to specify the desired objective in a new round of fighting with Hezbollah.
The wide-scale military
exercise the IDF launched two days ago in the country's north, the
largest of its kind in two decades, is an attempt to simulate the next
war, the third Lebanon war, which everyone -- in Israel but also in
Lebanon -- fears but is preparing for in earnest.
Similar to the wars
that preceded it, the working assumption in the Lebanese arena is that
the next round, too, will begin with an isolated incident that spirals
out of control, one response followed by a counter-response, sending
both sides careening toward a skirmish, perhaps even war. This time,
however, Hezbollah's menu of surprises will not only include massive
missile barrages at Israeli cities and vital infrastructure, such as
ports, airports and power grids, but an attempt to invade Israel and
seize control of an IDF outpost; perhaps even a civilian community along
the border with Lebanon.
Ever since the summer
of 2006, Hezbollah has shied from clashing with the IDF. The blow the
organization and its Shiite supporters suffered in the Second Lebanon
War almost completely reduced their appetite for provoking Israel.
Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, scarred by the pummeling he received,
effectively became an Israeli asset, because no one was better suited
to maintain quiet and stability along the border.
With that, Hezbollah
was also able to neutralize Israel's ability to act against it,
certainly on Lebanese soil. The terrorist organization successfully sold
the equation whereby its missile arsenal could cause significant damage
to Israel, damage that potentially outweighs the threat Israel poses to
Hezbollah and its supporters. All the more so if Israel's goal remains
similar to its previous wars with Hezbollah or even Hamas, when it
merely sought to buy itself a few more years of peace and quiet rather
than fundamentally altering the reality in Lebanon.
Hence the conclusion
reached by many pundits, but also numerous statesmen in Israel, that if
Israel's objective in a future conflict with Hezbollah amounts to
preserving the status quo and restoring a tense and illusory quiet along
the border, while also coming to terms with Hezbollah's expanding
influence inside Lebanon, then it would be best to invest its efforts in
preventing the next war rather than fighting it.
This appears to be the
challenge Israel faces and it should also be the focus of the next IDF
exercise. These days, where reality is not only virtual but spurious as
well, defeat and victory are elusive concepts. But in contrast to the
prevailing assumption in Israel, Hezbollah is no longer -- and probably
never was -- an amorphous guerilla organization, devoid a physical
presence in the fighting arena, backed by nothing -- neither a
supportive public nor a state.
Hezbollah, therefore,
can not only be hit, but also brought to its knees and vanquished. And
if the organization cannot be convinced that Israel has the capability,
and most importantly the public and political desire and will to defeat
it, then any round of fighting will end like those before it, in a
complex balancing act where reciprocal damage is hard to calculate; and
which will always allow Nasrallah to sell the idea that Israel's war was
a failure.
The challenge at the center of
the IDF's current drill, therefore, is not just to train the combat
soldiers and junior officers on the ground; it is not even to help
senior IDF commanders be more cognizant of the possible scenarios, which
they were not prepared for in the summer of 2006. The main challenge
was and still belongs to the political echelon -- to specify the desired
objective in a new round of fighting with Hezbollah. In this regard, it
would be wise for cabinet ministers, not just military commanders, to
partake in such an exercise.
Prof. Eyal Zisser
Source: http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_opinion.php?id=19847
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