by Yoav Limor
Barring an unexpected twist, the Syrian army is only days away from winning the civil war that has been ravaging the country for seven years
Barring an unexpected twist, the Syrian army is days away from victory in the civil war
that has been ravaging the country for over seven years. Once the
rebels hunkered down in Syria's south are defeated, Syrian President
Bashar Assad will have regained control of almost the entire country,
including the Golan Heights border with Israel.
This scenario, which only a few years ago seemed utterly imaginary, has many advantages, but also significant disadvantages.
On the upside, Israel will again be dealing
with one clear leader after years during which it had to contend with a
host of elements, from the Syrian army through the Druze minority to
various insurgent groups, including the local proxies of Islamic State
and al-Qaida. This posed a serious headache for Israel that required
complex maneuvers to ensure that the fires raging north of the border
would not turn against us.
In that respect, Assad will again be the
sovereign leader and as such will be held solely responsible for
anything that transpires in Syria and affects Israel.
While Israel maintained this policy
throughout the Syrian civil war – retaliating against the Syrian army
whenever the fighting hit Israeli territory – the new reality means any
Israeli retaliation will now be dramatically more effective.
The Syrian Golan Heights became something
of a lawless no man's land during the war, and now it will revert to
the familiar reality that has prevailed since the 1974 cease-fire
agreement between Israel and Syria – that of two militaries, each
controlling their side of the border and each fully responsible for
whatever happens in their territory.
This familiar state of affairs, which
resulted in four decades of peace and quiet on the Israel-Syria border,
got lost in the fray of the past seven years.
But one must remember that until
mid-2011, the Syrian border was Israel's calmest and safest frontier.
So much so, that much of it comprised only a dated security fence
routinely patrolled by reservists – a testament to the low risk defense
officials attributed to the sector.
That assessment changed on June 5, 2011,
when hundreds of Syrian-Palestinians marking Naksa Day, the Arab
defeat in the 1967 Six-Day War, amassed near and then rushed the Golan
Heights border. The breach, compounded by growing concerns that the
civil war in Syria would bring thousands of refugees, including
terrorists, to the border, led to a dramatic change in the Israeli
perception of the sector.
A new, 7-meter (23-foot) fence was erected,
similar to the state-of-the-art security fence on the Israel-Egypt
border, and the troops patrolling it were substantially reinforced.
Regular forces replaced the reservists, including elite IDF units that
now operate across the sector regularly to deter and foil threats.
Things are unlikely to change in the near
future, at least until the dust settles on the Syrian Golan Heights. On
the one hand, the Syrian army's renewed presence there will likely
spell stability and a significant decrease in threats. On the other
hand, it may be clouded by the introduction of Iranian forces into the
area.
Israel's nightmare scenario is the
consolidation of Shiite militias and Hezbollah forces along the border
with Syria, where they are sure to set up operational infrastructure
similar to the one in southern Lebanon, which comprises military combat
zones in the villages, no doubt in preparation for future fighting
against Israel.
Such a scenario is not necessarily a
predetermined decree. First, Israel has learned from its mistake in
Lebanon and will not allow it to be replicated in Syria without a
fight. Second, Hezbollah's grip on southern Lebanon is based on the
support it received from Shiite villages, while most of the Syrian
Golan's residents are Sunnis, who will not easily sway their sympathies
toward Iran, certainly not after years during which the only entity
that provided them with aid – food, medicine and at times, according to
foreign media report, weapons – was Israel.
Russian utilitarianism
In their efforts to curb this pessimistic
scenario, senior Israeli officials have been jetting around the world,
especially between Washington and Moscow. IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen.
Gadi Eizenkot visited the United States last week and met with Joint
Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Joseph Dunford to discuss Syria. Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will meet with Russian President Vladimir
Putin next week and it is likely that he will reiterate what he has
said before: Israel will not allow an Iranian presence on the Golan
Heights.
Unlike in the past, Israel's assertions do
not fall on deaf ears, as Russia has been growing increasingly
displeased with Iran's activities in Syria. The fact that Iranian
attempts to transfer weapons to Hezbollah trigger an Israeli strike on
Syrian airports irks Moscow, but mostly because Russian forces in Syria
also use this infrastructure, which will also be used in the country's
future rehabilitation efforts.
Israel's policy has prompted Iran to ground
its arms shipment routes. It no longer tries to deliver weapons to its
regional proxy in Lebanon and militias in Syria via the air, but
rather in convoys making their way from Iran to Syria via Iraq.
One of these convoys was destroyed two
weeks ago in a strike attributed to Israel and the incident reflected
four things: That Iran is in distress and is willing to let its convoys
risk the three-day land journey; that despite the complex domestic
situation and the growing criticism of the regime, Quds Force
activities, including ongoing weapon shipments to Lebanon and Syria,
continue as usual; that Israeli intelligence-gathering efforts reach
far beyond its borders; and that the IDF is willing to take
considerable risks to enforce the red lines Israel has set.
It seems, however, that this already
complicated reality is about to get even more complex. The Israeli
position is clear – no to Iranian military entrenchment in Syria, and
the Iranian position is equally clear – efforts will continue to
establish a new front against Israel. The Russians are currently
favoring Israel's position, but this has nothing to do with sympathy
for Zionism and everything to do with pure utilitarianism: the Russians
want to rehabilitate Syria in order to preserve their regional
interests and they understand that nothing can get done until stability
is reintroduced.
Better the devil you know?
The main question is, what will Syria do?
There is no doubt that Assad is not looking for a war with Israel. The
IDF's recent reinforcement on the Golan Heights is intended to generate
deterrence and convey a clear message that, while Israel is not
interested in intervening in what is going on north of its border, it
will not allow any violation of the 1974 cease-fire.
Tactically speaking, this means that unless
the Syrians try to infringe on the demilitarized zone, Israel will not
take any action or aid the rebels. From a strategic standpoint, this
means that Israel is prepared for the Iranian tail that is expected to
follow the Syrian army's return to the country's south.
It is unclear to what extent Assad can
control Iranian activities on his soil. Iran propped up his regime
through years of savage fighting, sending its own troops as well as
Hezbollah to his aid – the Shiite terrorist group still has 6,000
operatives in Syria – and he is indebted to both.
The fact that Assad will begin rebuilding
Syria from Damascus outward and will focus his attention on the
country's center for the next few years will leave the Golan Heights
relatively vulnerable, certainly in terms of its civilian
infrastructure.
Israel has invested considerable resources
in this infrastructure over the past few years, and if seven years ago
every resident of the Syrian Golan Heights thought of Israel as the
devil, most have had a change of heart as most of them were kept alive
thanks to Israeli humanitarian aid or aid delivered through Israel.
Currently, Israel is trying to formulate a
plan that will allow continued assistance. Talks with U.N. officials
are designed to establish a humanitarian aid mechanism that will ensure
support for the civilian population in the coming years. This plan is
good for Syria, as the regime will be unable to meet the demand; it is
good for the Syrians living on the border, who will be able to
rehabilitate their communities, and it is good for Israel, which will
be able to maintain a sympathetic base across the border.
There are likely to be factors that try to
sabotage this process and certainly try to compete with it, especially
Iranian money that will be surely poured into the Syrian Golan in favor
of the military infrastructure and to pacify the residents. Israel
will fight it in every way possible – militarily, politically,
financially and humanitarianly. Its success depends on quite a few
variables, especially in its determination to persevere, but it also
depends on Assad's understanding of the price he may pay for giving the
Iranians free rein in southern Syria.
There is nothing to suggest that Iran plans
to change course and roll back its presence in Syria, but this is true
for right now. The domestic situation in Iran is complicated: economic
unrest is growing and it is inspiring phenomena that we have not seen
in the past, mainly the growing defiance of the religious
establishment, including by women.
Western experts are divided over the
question of how vulnerable Iran is at the moment and whether this is an
opportune moment to overthrow the ayatollahs' regime, or at least to
make it agree to far-reaching concessions through an upgraded nuclear
agreement that will also include significant restrictions on Iranian
military activity in Syria, Lebanon and Yemen.
Assad will regain control the border with
Israel before these questions are answered. The Syrian army is expected
to easily overrun the rebels in the area, especially after the massive bombardments on Daraa, near the Jordanian border, which was one of the first cities he lost seven years ago.
From there, the Syrian army will continue
towards the Golan Heights, operating from south to north and eventually
reaching the area near Mount Hermon. It is doubtful that the Syrian
army's 90th and 61st divisions, deployed in the Golan Heights, will
encounter any significant resistance, if any. The rebels have no real
chance of winning and the civilian infrastructure they rely upon is
depleted.
These signs of despair can also be seen
along the Golan border. Refugee camps housing those who have fled the
fighting riddle the area and as of last weekend, about 10,000 refugees
who fled the fighting have sought refuge near the border, understanding
that proximity to Israel guarantees their safety. This influx is only
expected to grow.
Israel is giving them humanitarian
assistance but it has made it clear it will not take in any Syrian
refugee. Once the fighting is over, most will choose to return to their
destroyed villages and try to rebuild their lives, hoping for a
peaceful future – just as Israel does.
Yoav Limor
Source: http://www.israelhayom.com/2018/07/06/doubled-edged-sword-in-syria/
Follow Middle East and Terrorism on Twitter
No comments:
Post a Comment