by Prof. Hillel Frisch
The Shiite crescent is thus functioning as a boomerang to spread the epidemic both out of and back into Iran.
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 1,471, March 6, 2020
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Shiite
communities are regarded by the Islamic Republic as key tools with
which to penetrate and ultimately conquer the Arab world, and
pilgrimages back and forth to Shiite holy centers in Iran and Iraq are
central to the regime’s ideological identity. But the holiest city in
Iran, Qom, is now an epicenter for the spread of the coronavirus. The
Shiite crescent is thus functioning as a boomerang to spread the
epidemic both out of and back into Iran.
Iran’s Shiite crescent, which until recently
reflected its imperial reach into the Arab world, has now become
pathological with the spread of Covid-19 (the official name of the
coronavirus pathogen).
A study released on February 24 by the Center for
Infectious Disease Research and Policy at the University of Minnesota
inadvertently revealed how salient Iran’s religious ties to Shiite
communities in Arab states have been and continue to be in the spread of
the epidemic.
The five Middle Eastern countries that first
reported Covid-19 cases—Afghanistan, Bahrain, Kuwait, Iraq, and Oman—all
have substantial Shiite populations, and all the cases cited are
clearly linked to Iran. The first confirmed case in Afghanistan was
flagged in Herat province, which is in the country’s west on the Iranian
border. Another sufferer had recently returned from the city of Qom,
Iran’s Shiite religious center and, tellingly, the epicenter of the
disease in Iran. The first Bahraini to be confirmed as having succumbed
to Covid-19 had also just been in Iran, as had all three cases first
reported in Kuwait, Iraq, and Oman.
The link between Shiite pilgrimage and the spread
of the virus is to be found at its source in the region: Iran,
specifically the religious city of Qom.
As the University of Minnesota report notes, eight
of 18 new cases in Iran were in Qom compared to three in the metropolis
of Tehran, which has a population seven times greater. Qom has been the
site of 40% of the cases identified so far in Iran though it comprises
less than 3% of the population.
Iraq and other Arab states with substantial Shiite
populations have grown understandably apprehensive about pilgrimage to
Qom. Flights between Qom and Najaf, the holy city in Iraq, which
neighbors a third holy city, Karbalah, usually outnumber flights between
the capital cities of Tehran and Baghdad, indicating that most movement
between the countries has to do with religious observance and
pilgrimage rather than business and commerce. But the Iraqi authorities
have banned entry into the country by Iranian nationals and prohibited
travel by Iraqi nationals to Iran, and have ceased flights between
Tehran’s Khomeini airport (which services Qom, a three-hour drive away)
and Najaf.
Such moves might be too late. The day after the halt on Iraqi-Iranian travel, Iraq announced its first case of Covid-19.
Data for China indicate that one of around 30
cases of the virus results in death (2,873 deaths out of 79,968 cases as
of March 1). The percentage outside China is slightly lower because
most of the states in which there have been confirmed cases are more
advanced and have benefited from the opportunity to learn from the steps
China has taken to control the spread of the virus.
Iran recently announced 43 deaths out of 593
confirmed cases compared with 29 fatalities out of just over 1,128 cases
in Italy—the most afflicted European state so far. The ratio in
Italy—one death per 39 cases—roughly conforms to the ratio of fatalities
to confirmed cases in China and elsewhere. In the case of Iran,
however, the ratio is strikingly worse: it appears to be one death per
14 people infected.
This is a deeply worrying statistic, particularly
as there are concerns that Iran is failing to identify many Covid-19
cases. If true, this means some infected sufferers are not being put
into quarantine, which increases the likelihood that the virus will
spread.
There is a strong suspicion based on the quality
of the data provided by Iran’s ministry of health that the Covid-19
epidemic inside the country might be far more widespread than the regime
says it is, and doubts about Iran’s reporting and ability to act
efficiently to contain the virus are swirling both within and without
the country. A recent report filed by the London Times correspondent
from Tehran quotes Iranians as saying they believe the real number of
fatalities is four times the figure being given by regime authorities.
The ramifications of Iran’s becoming a source of
disease are more than medical. The Islamic Republic has seen wide-scale
protests in Iraq and Lebanon against regimes it warmly supports. In Iraq
in particular, Iranian consulates have become targets of protester
anger.
Iran’s failure to control its Covid-19 problem
will hardly endear it to protesters in Iraq and Lebanon, many of whom
feel their states are being damaged by Iran’s involvement in their
domestic affairs.
The recent failure of the newly designated Iraqi
PM Tawfiq Allawi to set up a government is the most recent indication of
Iran’s declining stature in the region. Allawi’s appointment, which was
presumably intended to mollify the mostly Shiite protestors in the
streets of Baghdad, Najaf, and Basra, was strongly backed by the two
most powerful pro-Iranian political forces in Iraq: the Fath coalition,
which is basically the pro-Iranian militias’ political wing; and the
Sairoon coalition headed by Muqtada Sadr. It was Sadr’s al-Mahdi army
that fought US forces in the early years of the post-Saddam era.
Despite that support, Allawi failed, because Sunni
and Kurdish political opposition figures within the Iraqi parliament
and protestors outside it vehemently opposed him.
No doubt, most of Iran’s declining fortunes in
Iraq can be attributed to the targeting of Qassem Soleimani. Iran’s
Covid-19 problem is having a reinforcing effect.
For years, the (Arab) Shiite majority in Iraq and
Bahrain and the significant Shiite minorities in the neighboring Arab
states were regarded as the pillars of Iran’s imperial designs over
those states.
The Shiite protests in Iraq and Lebanon against Iranian involvement suggest that this may no longer be true.
That imperialism comes at a price could have been
predicted. Not so Covid-19 and its ramifications, and least of all its
effect on the Iranian Shiite crescent—a crescent that, true to form, is
fast turning into a boomerang headed back into the heart of the Islamic
Republic.
Prof. Hillel Frisch is a professor of political studies and Middle East studies at Bar-Ilan University and a senior research associate at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.
Source: https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/coronavirus-iran-shiites/
Follow Middle East and Terrorism on Twitter
No comments:
Post a Comment