by Orna Mizrahi and Yoram Schweitzer
[W]ith an intensifying crisis in Lebanon and Israel’s preoccupation with its own internal affairs, Nasrallah may feel sufficiently comfortable to risk escalation in order to restore deterrence. How should Israel act?
Hezbollah's temerity seems to be
coordinated with Iran and stems from the organization's assessment that
Israel is preoccupied with its internal affairs in light of the ongoing
pandemic and political crisis, and is therefore not in a place to
conduct a risky military campaign. In addition, the organization
perceives a window of opportunity created by the change of command in
the United States. In the final months of the Trump administration, it
was clear that the organization exercised caution in its operations
along the Israel-Lebanon border, and had difficulty demonstrating the
deterrence equation that Nasrallah promised to implement by force
against the IDF. For example:
- After two failed attempts at revenge, Hezbollah refrained from the action against Israel it promised in response to the killing of one of its combatants in Syria (July 2020). The only achievement that Nasrallah could present in this context is the pressure imposed on the IDF following the ongoing tensions on the Lebanese border, which prompted reinforced deployment. Nasrallah attributed this deployment to Hezbollah's deterrent force and IDF concerns about its military strength.
- Hezbollah's lack of response to the widespread attacks attributed to Israel on its assets in Syria – attacks that were intended to thwart weapons transfers from Iran and damage Hezbollah’s infrastructure in the Golan Heights.
- Hezbollah has also refrained from any action against Israel along the Lebanese border following the killing of Iranian nuclear scientist Fakhrizadeh (November 2020), attributed to Israel, arguing that the response should come from the side targeted, namely Iran. It seems that publicizing this position was designed to calm internal criticism in Lebanon that the organization is in the service of Iran.
In a speech delivered on February 16
(commemorating the anniversary of the death of his predecessor, Mousavi,
who was killed by Israel), Nasrallah discussed the possibility of a
confrontation with Israel. His reference was to the speech by IDF Chief
of Staff Aviv Kochavi at the annual conference of the Institute for
National Security Studies (January 26), and to the Israeli intelligence
assessment published recently regarding the feasibility of "battle
days," i.e., limited rounds of confrontation. His remarks underscored
the importance he attaches to the deterrence equation vis-à-vis Israel
and the organization's determination – even though he claimed he was not
interested in war – to respond strongly to any Israeli move. Regarding
Kochavi, who insisted on the legitimacy of a "moral and effective"
attack by the IDF on Hezbollah's missile deposits hidden among the
Lebanese civilian population, Nasrallah warned that if Israel harmed
Lebanese civilians, Hezbollah would cause severe damage to the Israeli
home front – the worst since 1948. He claimed that this too is
justified, since all Israelis are military reservists. Regarding the
assessment that Hezbollah is interested in "battle days" with the IDF,
Nasrallah clarified that Israel is "playing with fire" when it thinks
that exchanges of blows between the parties will be limited and not lead
to a broad campaign. He added that although it does not want a
confrontation, his organization will fight back if it happens.
Although
the Biden administration has not yet fully formulated its policy
vis-à-vis the Lebanese theater, or specifically with regard to
Hezbollah, it seems that the organization, like its patron Iran,
identifies a window of opportunity to advance its interests in view of
Biden's expected change in policy from the Trump stance toward the
Shiite axis. The previous administration advocated "maximum pressure" on
Hezbollah, in parallel with the pressure it exerted on Iran (expanding
sanctions on its members and its supporters in the Lebanese system;
demanding a reduction in Hezbollah's influence in the new Lebanese
government, in contrast to France, which is willing to accept
Hezbollah's political status in the Lebanese system; and pressuring
Lebanon to compromise and move forward with negotiations with Israel on
the maritime border). At the same time, Hezbollah has suffered a few
blows in the international arena in the past year, reflected mainly by
the wave of 13 new countries that now recognize it as a terrorist
organization.
A policy paper was
submitted recently to the Biden administration by the Washington
International Crisis Group, headed by Robert Malley, until his recent
appointment as Biden's envoy on the Iranian issue. The paper advised the
administration to change the US perspective on Lebanon, and instead of
promoting an effort to weaken Hezbollah, adopt a new approach aimed at
strengthening the Lebanese state and preventing its collapse, by
supporting the French initiative and forming a government with
Hezbollah.
Even in the Lebanese domestic arena, despite claims that Hezbollah has benefited from the paralysis of the political system and continues to strengthen its power bases among the country's Shiite population, the dismal Lebanese reality has led to increased public criticism of the organization. This emerges from the results of a public opinion poll conducted in Lebanon (November 2020) by David Pollock of the Washington Institute, which indicated a clear decline in support for Hezbollah in recent years among the Lebanese public, including among the Shiite community. Hezbollah's extensive campaign, marking the anniversary of the killing of Qasem Soleimani (January 2020) and bordering on worship of his persona, also drew widespread criticism in Lebanon that Hezbollah was operating in the service of Iran.
Looking ahead, a possible change in US policy toward Iran (and in Hezbollah’s view, perhaps toward the organization as well) concomitant with Lebanon's continued deterioration, as well as the organization's sense that Israel is preoccupied with its internal affairs, may increase Hezbollah’s boldness vis-à-vis Israel. It may try again to carry out the promised revenge attack, which could create a round of conflict, in the spirit of the military intelligence division's assessment. The organization's immediate goal is to consolidate its deterrence equation, but it seems that the renewed tension on the Israel-Lebanon border may, in its view, also serve to improve its image in the internal arena as the "defender of Lebanon" and perhaps even indirectly provide Iran with leverage with the new US administration – at least until a resumption of nuclear negotiations. However, following any resumption of negotiations between the United States and Iran, Hezbollah will presumably restrain its activities with Israel so as not to sabotage the dialogue, which is supposed to serve Iran.
Therefore, IDF vigilance on the northern border must be maintained, and in light of the possibility that Hezbollah will try to carry out its threats to increase tensions in the coming months, Israel's reaction must be re-examined to best serve Israeli interests. The two main options are ensuring an appropriate but measured response that will limit events and prevent degeneration into large-scale fighting, or exploiting the event in order to carry out extensive action to significantly impair Hezbollah's precision missile capability, which poses a strategic threat to Israel.
It is recommended that the Lebanon issue be raised as soon as possible in a dialogue between the Israel and the new US administration. The US should be encouraged to continue its involvement in Lebanon while formulating its policy toward it, which should include two parallel efforts: continued economic-political pressure on Hezbollah, and aid to the Lebanese state, which is on the verge of collapse.
Orna Mizrahi and Yoram Schweitzer
Source: https://www.inss.org.il/publication/hezbollah-escalation/
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