by Michael Starr
MILITARY AFFAIRS: The SDS system is not the “deadly trap" story from Hamas’s Gaza Health Ministry data, but it’s far from perfect. For the safety of civilians, the plan needs improvement.
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The truth about Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) aid sites has been grossly distorted, with a good-intentioned but flawed project seeking to alleviate the suffering of civilians in a war zone instead being represented by news outlets and NGOs as “killing fields” in which IDF soldiers unnecessarily and indiscriminately shot Palestinians patiently queuing in lines.
For a significant portion of my third tour in Gaza as an infantry reservist, I was one of the soldiers tasked with securing the area around a safe distribution site (SDS) in the south of the Strip.
Leaving a war zone to come back to Israel means entering a different world, but I also found a completely different reality from what I knew was represented online. The narrative being circulated far from the field had familiar details warped to the point of falsehood, or factual but told without vital context.
In warfare, it is just and necessary to avoid harming civilians as much as possible while achieving one’s objectives. While it is chiefly the responsibility of the opponent to feed its population, it is righteous to try to relieve the pangs of hungry civilians – but without the counterproductive and conflict-lengthening move of providing succor to enemy forces.
I did not see mass starvation in Gaza. Of the tens of thousands of civilians, there was no one close to the emaciated state of hostage Evyatar David.
The strategy was made clear to us with briefings at the battalion and company level: With the contracting of the GHF, the IDF sought to prevent a severe humanitarian situation for civilians while avoiding resupplying enemy combatants through vulnerable and compromised aid organizations.
The IDF believed that part of Hamas’s control over the population and its remaining territory was through its near monopoly over food and other humanitarian aid items, and hoped the project would be able to disrupt the vulturous profit model of selling aid and squeezing civilians for international propaganda consumption.
The belief that the GHF threatened Hamas governance and legitimacy in the Strip seemed to have been validated not only by the flurry of hyper-fixated news coverage and hit pieces but also by the steady increase of threats and violent attacks against foreign and Palestinian GHF aid workers.
While the assessment about the need for and impact of an alternative aid system was proven, implementing the vision has been difficult because it has relied on the poor logistics of the IDF and placed soldiers in Schrodinger’s battlefield.
The area around SDS sites is still enemy territory, and there are still forces in play seeking to visit death upon our men. While Hamas and its ilk were largely routed from the area, we were still finding stashes of weapons, uniforms, and combat vests, and tunnels and suspected booby-traps were still being demolished.
An enemy force that perfidiously removed its uniforms and concealed itself among civilians was still in play. At the same time that we were supposed to secure and hold ground, as with any war, soldiers were also expected to act as policemen and security in an area populated by civilians. Such is a task that soldiers were not trained for, and it operates along rules and sensibilities that are difficult to meet under the specter of war.
Frustration of reservists
Much of the frustration of reservists about the SDS sites comes from this uncertain dichotomy. What was expected was for soldiers to turn their steel against armed Hamas fighters, but instead, the military operation with an aid side endeavor had become a humanitarian mission with uncertain security expectations.Yet while this felt like no task for a soldier, it was difficult to argue with the results of hundreds of thousands of people having more consistent access to food.
The GHF site we were tasked with securing was situated about a kilometer from an idyllic-looking seaside town that seemed to have been largely unscathed. It was also a few hundred meters from our outpost and the same distance from a bombed-out house on a hill that had been converted into a semi-occupied strongpoint.
Aid seekers were supposed to travel down a road from the town to the SDS, leaving behind vehicles beyond a security barrier that also served as a marker for what not to cross when the zone and aid site were closed.
Once at the SDS, aid seekers were intended to queue along one path to the site to receive aid and exit out a second to return to the town.
Fences, barbed wire, and warning signs were placed to prevent civilians from entering military zones. We were also promised that a biometric system would be established to ensure people would not take more than needed, and terrorist operatives would be unable to visit without being identified.
Yet no battle plan survives contact with the enemy, and more often than not, the great enemy of plans is not an opposing force but the friction of reality.
Once the GHF site opened, a daily deluge of tens of thousands – if not hundreds of thousands – of Gazans would descend upon the aid in a scene comparable to that of a zombie apocalypse film. Columns of dust accompanied more people than could fit in most stadiums as they attempted to enter the site and grab aid. Most came on foot, but others rode on bikes, scooters, peddle carts, and makeshift horse- or donkey-drawn carriage contraptions.
The road is just one avenue of approach, as, if unhindered, the Gazans would and at times did overrun the forward strongpoint and tear down barriers.
The stories told by some of the more malicious news outlets about Palestinians being shot while peacefully queuing are ludicrous not only because live-fire warning shots were only employed on the extremely rare occasion that Gazans in the aid site yard deviated toward the closed military zone that was out of their way, but also because I never once saw anything resembling a line or queue.
While it’s impossible not to feel sympathy for the people who have to gather food in such a manner, the sites are controlled chaos, with Palestinian aid seekers constantly seeking to overrun the compound, save for the intervention of armed security contractors.
The contractors use stun grenades to warn off belligerent men who attempt to enter the site in situations like when there are special distributions for women or children. Palestinian aid workers have also used mace to repel aid seekers who refused to leave the site.
Desperation was not the only driving factor leading to such behavior. War profiteering, criminality, and Hamas oppression are also driving forces. It soon became obvious during the scrums for aid that certain items were being sought out. Trades and sales were being made in the SDS forecourt yard, and at times a bazaar was opened, complete with ramshackle stalls. If such a trade was being made in front of the GHF site, it seemed likely to us that more hoarding and black market trade was going on inside the town.
While, when the SDS distribution was over, Gazans were supposed to stay beyond a concrete block boundary on the road, young men would risk the night to try to sneak as close as possible, many so they could get first crack at the best aid items. Some would dig trenches in the ground so they could sleep there without the IDF’s knowledge.
Some were probably motivated by the fear that if they didn’t get to the site first, they wouldn’t get anything, but the number of people who left empty-handed was nominal.
Many likely risked entering a military zone and approaching an IDF outpost so they could get in and out as soon as possible and avoid theft and robbery by fellow aid seekers. We saw aid seekers steal from one another, and one site had a stabbing.
Brawls over aid were not uncommon, and larger men could be seen waiting on the periphery, not joining the rush with the others. A group of boys who were detained for sneaking past the boundaries before dawn explained to interrogators that men on the edge of town would take their packages unless they came early.
It was unclear whether these were just robbers or Hamas operatives. With Hamas issuing threats to anyone who took aid from the GHF, the rush and sneaking for food was likely also informed by terror.
The safety and security concerns of tens of thousands of people barreling down on one point should be obvious to anyone living in a country like Israel, which saw both the results of a stampede crush in Meron and the human wave attack of October 7.
It is necessary to maintain order in such a situation, so that there are no stampede deaths, which did occur at one GHF site, though during a panic when a security contractor was stabbed by a terrorist. It would only take a few hundred people, let alone a few thousand, to surprise and overwhelm a dozen soldiers, security contractors, or a nearby outpost staffed only with a few dozen reservists.
This concern is even more profound at night, when Gazans attempt to sneak toward the aid site so they can be the first to get aid and secure the best products.
Among the tens of thousands of aid seekers could easily hide a cell of terrorists for a surprise attack. Indeed, GHF personnel were wounded by terrorists when one of them threw a grenade from among the throngs of aid seekers.
Near our SDS site, a Nukhba terrorist was detained from among aid seekers, along with two October 7 looters. It would only take a single terrorist to join the crowd and leave an IED in an often-used patrol route or position. If the site were to be overrun, then the safety of the aid workers would be jeopardized, as would the project.
Allowing the site to be overrun would allow hoarders to take as they please, leading to many being deprived of aid. Worse, it could mean that undercover Hamas operatives could raid the sites with the ease with which they raid UN aid trucks.
Like the need for humanitarian aid, the need for order and security was clear, but the means to achieve it were imperfect. The primary means given to our force was warning shots.
While some news outlets have misleadingly characterized the standard operating procedure as deliberately firing at crowds, shots were almost exclusively warning shots fired at sand dunes and concrete barriers.
From the first orders received until the last, it was emphasized to our reservist infantry unit that we did not want to kill any civilians, and otherwise would be counterproductive to the mission.
Yet, at the same time, this operation was occurring in a war zone, with all the dangers that this entails, a detail those stabbing soldiers in the back with pens tend to forget or ignore.
In some circumstances, if warning fire was repeatedly ignored by a person in a threatening trajectory, then live fire was directed at legs. Thankfully, I never had to employ this measure. On rare occasions, sniper teams did employ lethal force, such as against a machete-wielding man who ignored warning shots and entered our forward strongpoint.
Our experience is in stark contrast to the idea propagated by certain actors that the IDF was commonly deliberately shooting aid seekers to death.
The problem, however, is that warning shots are by nature a flawed and risky measure. Live bullets are live bullets, and any mistake or negligence can cost lives. If distance is misjudged, someone panics, the bullet skips, or the surface one fires at isn’t as solid as presumed, then a warning shot can result in a hit.
There are just too many rifles and too many projectiles in play for there not to be tragic accidents. I knew where each of my bullets fell, and never fired a shot if I thought there was a risk I would hit a civilian, but there is no doubt that at some of these SDS sites, terrible mistakes with live-fire warning shots occurred. I know of one mistake that occurred at our site.
Many soldiers don’t believe that they should be put in the situation by army brass where their only tool is so unreliable.
Yet when these warning shots ceased to be employed for a time, the results were chaos. A video circulated online showing warning shots falling close to Palestinians, and when officers in offices saw the reality of the tool they were asking infantrymen in the sands of Gaza to employ, the practice was frozen while under review.
As soon as the boundaries around the SDS sites stopped being enforced, the aid sites were overrun several times. One aid site saw GHF personnel injured in an attack.
Aid shipments to the SDS sites were delayed or halted because of the insecure situation for the drivers and workers, and aid seekers who came to the GHF compound at the appropriate hours found that everything had already been taken.
We tried to limit warning shots to designated marksmen and snipers, and the chaos was only rolled back by the resumption of warning shots.
There is also the problem of an alternative to live warning shots that is suitable to a war zone. This was not a riot in a city street or by angry farmers in the West Bank, but still a battlefield. Rubber bullets or riot shields and truncheons require extremely close range with the target.
Keeping in mind, again, the proven propensity for terrorists to hide among aid seekers and civilian populations, getting that close would put soldiers well within the sights of anyone who wished to harm them by way of rifle, pistol, knife, or grenade. Tear gas or skunk spray may come with legal problems, as they could be classified as illegal chemical weapons when used by a military force in a war.
Elements of our battalion have attempted to use sirens and quadcopters to scare people off, and while sometimes successful, this can’t be replicated on a large scale.
Some teams have been used to try to catch trespassers, but this also comes with the danger of getting too close and being encircled by massive crowds. While we gathered significant intelligence about booby-traps and tunnels from those with terrorist affiliations, there is a limit to how many people we can detain at a time.
The problems of the use of force and the aid seeking aren’t simply a matter of lack of clarity. The GHF personnel speak to the Gazans all the time, and from a distance, tell them with bullhorns not to approach. We’ve tried to send back detainees with clear messages to other Gazans about not crossing the boundaries until the SDS is open. We’ve tried raising a flag on our outpost when the SDS is open. We’ve built additional barriers in fields so that it’s more visible where the boundaries are.
The idea proposed by some of the outlets was that some aid seekers were wandering into the closed or military zone at night. This is unlikely, given the clear topographic distinction between the urban landscape of their town and the long stretches of sandy fields leading up to the well-illuminated IDF and GHF bases.
The reality is that there are profiteers, adventurers, and desperate people who are willing to risk their lives for financial gain or decent access to food. The reality is that even live-fire warning shots are treated with a cavalier attitude by some, acting as if it is a game because they know we are reluctant to shoot anyone. When the quadcopters fly over, they do little dances.
There are times when a lack of clear communication does become an issue, when the scheduling is changed. While often well-meaning, expansions and additions to the GHF operations often result in confusion among the populace.
Changing the time of distribution, even if it is multiple times a day, can create a lack of clarity on the expectations of when the Gazans can approach. When there were female hygiene product distribution hours, there was confusion by men about when they could come.
Yet there is sense in the growing pains and trials of the GHF, as it attempts to figure out the best way to feed as many hungry people as possible. Opening multiple times a day and building more aid sites would result in less congestion and chaos. Flooding the market with products and preventing scarcity could undermine war profiteering and hoarding practices.
The most vital glaring need is the biometric system that was promised, which would further prevent such practices. While the benefit of these sites is that any Hamas operatives can only grab as much food as a single man can carry, rather than commandeer and monopolize a truckload, a system to prevent access entirely would further degrade their logistical capabilities.
The answer is likely not one of tactics, but rather strategy. Soldiers do not want to harm civilians, and do not want to have to deal with them in their endeavor to fight Hamas.
This frustrating dynamic that we were never trained for should be avoided altogether by completely separating civilians from combatants. While the world might not like the idea, and it would require the IDF to reinvent logistics divisions and operations, the building of a closed humanitarian zone where civilians could be registered and filtered through without terrorists would allow them to live in peace without getting caught up in the fighting.
Without civilians in regions held by Hamas, the fighting would be significantly less complicated. In such a humanitarian zone, food could be distributed without the need to trek through temporary humanitarian corridors, and could also establish the groundwork for a new governance structure for Palestinians without Hamas.
The reality of the SDS system is not the “deadly trap” narrative that has been developed from the data of the Hamas-run Gaza Health Ministry, but it is also far from a perfect situation, and for the good of innocent civilians, the plan needs to be improved. With the more recent changes in aid shipments since I’ve left Gaza and returned to civilian life, hopefully the situation has improved.
Yet despite all the problems, people were getting fed by the SDS sites, and they appreciated it. Something that shocked me, and which the other news outlets didn’t report, was the response of Gazans to IDF soldiers as they left the GHF compound.
I don’t know if it was genuine or a type of white flag, but Gazan aid seekers were waving, blowing kisses, and performing heart signs with their hands as they left. People in a “killing field” wouldn’t act like that. With all the matters that need to be fixed, at the end of the day, I did see smiling children with food.
Michael Starr
Source: https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/defense-news/article-864268
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