by James Genn
The IDF's probe into the events of October 7, 2023, highlighted both key triumphs and failures in the battles near Yiftah Camp, Erez regional command post, and Zikim, preventing Hamas infiltration.
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The IDF found that the quick arrival and determined, courageous fighting on October 7, 2023, of soldiers from the 77th Battalion of the IDF’s 7th Armored Brigade in the border patrol area near Zikim prevented Hamas terrorist infiltrators from capturing the nearby Yiftah Camp, the military probe published on Tuesday revealed.
The probe also noted that the arrival of additional combat personnel and senior commanders to the area helped prevent further infiltration north of the Gaza Strip.
Nine IDF soldiers fell in combat in the terror attack on Yiftah Camp.
The 77th Battalion was deployed in the area from 5:30 a.m. Hamas terrorists launched a full-scale attack at 6:29 a.m., including rocket launches and infiltrations via paragliders, vehicles, and on foot.
The sector to the north of the Gaza Strip, where Yiftah Camp is located, came under a well-organized attack in which the battalion was heavily outnumbered.
Key conclusions and lessons from the investigation into the battle of Yiftah Camp
The IDF found that the Hamas terrorists, despite preparing for years to capture Yiftah Camp during an infiltration, ultimately failed to do so. This was attributed to the IDF personnel in the sector being able to thwart their terror plans.This included the quick arrival of standby soldiers who, along with others, were able to stop the terrorists from infiltrating deeper and to prevent greater damage, the investigation found.
While terrorists successfully infiltrated Yiftah Camp, they quickly decided to retreat into the Gaza Strip on a stolen military vehicle, the probe said.
The investigation noted that while combat procedures in Yiftah Camp were conducted properly, the IDF needs to reevaluate the camp’s defense infrastructure and protocols, including positioning a permanent combat force near the battalion commander’s headquarters, which would allow for a better and more effective defense.
The probe also found that assigning a non-combat soldier as a guard at the border patrol post compromised the army’s initial response ability.
Several IDF Combat Engineering Vehicle Operators were taking cover during the attack, the probe noted, adding that their absence during the fighting in the border patrol area compromised the army’s defensive abilities against an attack of such magnitude, failing to meet the IDF’s standards for a professional and ethical soldier.
The return of the battalion’s ambulances to the camp at the start of the attack compromised medical flexibility, the probe said.
Furthermore, the ambulance’s failure to return to the camp after making the correct decision to evacuate a soldier to the hospital affected the medical response within the camp during and after the evacuation.
During the ambulance’s absence, a civilian played a key role in evacuating wounded and fallen soldiers, receiving praise from the military’s investigation.
Soldiers were prompt in arriving at the area, operating tanks, and deploying to fight. This included the mobilization of soldiers from the Paratroopers Brigade, Oketz canine soldiers, and Maglan commandos, who aided in restoring operational control, preventing further terror infiltration, and stopping the terrorists from succeeding in their goals.
While the attack was ongoing, soldiers at the battalion headquarters acted admirably under fire, the probe noted. Their activities amid the attack included observers continuing their task of directing forces efficiently and professionally toward fleeing terrorists; the situation room functioning in managing the sector; and soldiers from the situation room assisting in treating and evacuating casualties.
IDF investigation into battle at Erez regional command post
The military also released the results of the battle at the Erez regional command post and the Zikim firing range. The investigation found that the reconnaissance unit, tank crew, squad commander, and additional soldiers played a decisive role in disrupting the original plan of the terrorists, delaying them from infiltrating deeper and preventing further damage.During these battles, four soldiers were murdered and 15 terrorists were killed. Two of the terrorists were killed while infiltrating the regional command post, three were killed as they embarked from a boat, and 10 were killed while fighting in the Zikim firing range area.
Key conclusions and lessons from the investigation into the battle of Erez regional command post, Zikim firing range
The investigation noted that the reconnaissance unit’s “swift actions” and decision to quickly reach the barrier, which prevented terrorists from tunneling under the border fence, and firing at terrorists trying to breach it, were a key part in stopping the attack from this route, and significantly impacted the terrorists’ plans.The mobilization of the reconnaissance unit toward Zikim Beach following reports of the infiltration by sea, as well as determined fighting at Zikim firing range, caused several terrorist casualties, thereby delaying them and significantly affecting the outcome of battles, the investigation noted.
The tank crew’s rapid positioning and firing of shells at the terrorists, without orders, halted the attack along the infiltration path and disrupted their plans, the probe found.
The decision of St.-Sgt. Ofir Zioni to accompany another soldier to fight at Zikim Beach and engage with terrorists significantly helped establish the situational picture in the area and prepare the base for the terrorists’ infiltration attempts. Zioni was ultimately killed in combat during the fighting.
The presence of the deputy platoon commander at the 5:30 a.m. patrol impacted response time and force readiness, as the command headquarters was understaffed and lacked a scout at the base.
The platoon’s forces were concentrated in two areas, with the probe noting that distributing soldiers to other areas would have assisted in quicker response times and an improved defense capability.
The investigation found that there was no understanding among soldiers that a rocket and mortar barrage, as seen on October 7, was an indicator of an impending raid; therefore, no appropriate preparatory actions were taken, such as reinforcing positions to prevent infiltration.
Soldiers at the Erez regional command post and in other parts of the sector entering a protected area during the rocket and mortar barrages negatively impacted the response time to raids, as well as any observational response, the military found.
Observation posts must be protected from incoming fire, including platoon headquarters, to allow soldiers to remain in a secure location while defending their positions without risking exposure, the investigation recommended.
The investigation also noted that the placing of a reserve platoon at the Erez border crossing meant that the 77th Battalion did not have a ready reserve force and was, therefore, limited in its ability to influence the battle.
The investigation also praised several soldiers for their actions, who followed correct operational behavior.
James Genn
Source: https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/defense-news/article-865980
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