by Dr. Bosmat Yefet-Avshalom
Background
Egypt recently
experienced its most serious round of violence since the election of
President Mohammed Morsi in June 2012. Violent clashes between
demonstrators and security forces began in late January 2013 during
demonstrations marking the second anniversary of the overthrow of Hosni
Mubarak and his regime. Hundreds of thousands of demonstrators in
various parts of Egypt decried the government's failure to fulfill the
promises made during the revolution and even called for the resignation
of the Muslim Brotherhood regime and Morsi. Ten people were killed and
hundreds were wounded in these demonstrations.
The most violent riots
took place in Port Said, at the northern terminal of the Suez Canal,
after a death sentence was imposed on 21 people for their roles in the
violence leading to the deaths of 74 soccer fans last year. After
violent confrontations that claimed more than 30 lives, Morsi declared a
30-day state of emergency in the governorates of Port Said, Suez and
Ismailia, all of which are situated along the canal. Morsi's resolve did
not calm tempers, however. The demonstrations continued the following
weekend, with thousands of demonstrators in Cairo, Port Said, Alexandria
and Ismailia returning to the streets.
These violent incidents
led the opposition to toughen its positions. The chief opposition bloc,
the National Salvation Front, declared its refusal to participate in
any national dialogue unless its conditions were met, including the
resignation of the present government, amendment of controversial
sections of the constitution and appointment of a new
prosecutor-general. On the other hand, the NSF's appeal for nonviolent
protest had no effect on the younger generation and exposed differences
of opinion among the government's opponents regarding the manner in
which the struggle is to be conducted.
In-depth analysis
The degree of violence
in these clashes reflects the extreme tension that developed over the
past few months between the Muslim Brotherhood government and the
opposition regarding the drafting of a constitution and its ratification
by referendum. The Muslim Brotherhood's determination to draft a
constitution without the opposition's approval, including the
president's attempt to assume certain absolute powers, galvanized the
opposition's resolve.
The violent street
demonstrations, however, are of economic and social origin. Since his
election, Morsi has dedicated most of his time to reinforcing the Muslim
Brotherhood regime rather than attempting to reach some agreement with
opposition forces that would enable him to cope with Egypt's most
pressing problems. The demonstrations reflect disappointment in Muslim
Brotherhood government performance. Two years after the revolution,
Egyptian citizens realized that their economic situation had
deteriorated and their personal security declined, with no apparent
solutions on the horizon. The intensity of violence in cities like Port
Said, the least developed of all cities in the Suez Canal region,
reflects a social and economic protest against extended neglect by the
central government.
Forecast
The extended upheaval
in the streets and the lack of legitimacy ascribed to the Muslim
Brotherhood regime prevent Morsi's government from taking the necessary
economic steps to stabilize the Egyptian economy, which is burdened by
poor growth and a massive budgetary deficit. Egypt needs loans from
international bodies that would require it to cut subsidies and increase
taxes. Such loans are not granted under conditions of internal
instability. If no means of compromise is found between the Muslim
Brotherhood government and opposition forces, public protests may well
intensify and turn into "bread riots."
Relying on recent past
experience, Morsi is waiting for the riots to die down as the
demonstrators grow weary and the legitimacy of violent protest begins to
erode. The persistence of violence in economic and social protests,
however, may increase the Muslim Brotherhood's determination to take
significant steps toward achieving stability, even at the cost of
returning Egypt to a wholly dictatorial regime.
The most serious
violence took place in three cities in the Suez Canal region. At this
stage, however, these clashes will not have any immediate effect on
economic activity at the Suez Canal and certainly will not engender its
closing. Morsi's treatment of the Port Said riots, the declaration of a
state of emergency and even the imposition of a curfew reflect the
importance of the canal as a source of income that is significant to
Egypt's shaky economy. In this context, the army's role should be taken
into account. Egypt's defense minister, Col. Gen. Abdel Fattah el-Sissi,
said recently that the conflict between political forces and the
differences of opinion concerning government performance may cause
substantive damage to Egypt's security and even to its integrity. Such
declarations constitute a reminder of the political and economic role of
the armed forces. Until now, the military judiciously avoided any
statements that could be interpreted as political intervention. Now,
however, it has clarified unequivocally that it will employ all means at
its disposal to prevent damage to the Suez Canal.
Conclusions
The outbreak of
violence all along the Suez Canal raises several pointed questions. At
this stage, it is uncertain whether any deliberate attempt has been made
to deny Egypt access to its only major strategic asset: the link
between the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea. This strategic target was
the focus of interest of the great powers, at times demanding their
military intervention. From the day the canal was opened in 1869, any
attempt at a hostile takeover — especially if it were to succeed — would
alter the balance of power in the Middle East and block the passage of
third-party warships and merchant vessels, including Israeli ships.
Dr. Bosmat Yefet-Avshalom is a
lecturer in the Israel and Middle East Studies Department and a
researcher in the Center for Policy Studies, both at Ariel University.
Source: http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_opinion.php?id=3420
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
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