by Maj. Gen. (ret.) Yaakov Amidror
Russia's increased involvement in the Syrian civil war, Moscow's warming ties with Iran and Turkey's regional strategy have eroded the Sunni-Arab axis while the Shiite axis is now stronger • Israel should focus its intelligence efforts on the latter.
Members of the Kurdish
Self-Defense Forces stand near the Syrian-Turkish border [Archive]
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Photo credit: Reuters |
Three major developments have recently taken
place in the terrible war ripping Syria apart, and all three stand to
make a true impact on the future of the Middle East: First, there is
Russia's increased involvement in the conflict; second is the
coalition's success in eroding the Islamic State group's territorial
grip in Syria; and the third is Turkey's decision to send troops into
Syria to fight the Kurds in its north under the guise of fighting
Islamic State.
Such developments are difficult to understand
and their ramifications are difficult to predict -- still, some
conclusions can be drawn even in this early stage.
Syrian President Bashar Assad, for one, most
likely just got another reprieve and will be able to remain in power for
the foreseeable future.
As eliminating an autonomous Kurdish entity is
far more important to Turkey than ending Assad's regime, Turkish
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan had relinquished his demand for Assad's
removal from power. In the new Middle East reality, there is no one left
to demand that Assad be deposed, and it looks like the U.S. -- devoid
an actual ace in the hole in its talks with Russia about Syria's future
-- will have to learn to live with it.
This change proves how adaptable Erdogan is:
Recognizing the need for a strategic change over the threat posed by the
Kurds' desire to form a buffer state on what used to be the old border
between Syria and Turkey, he came up with a plan to quash the Kurdish
aspiration -- and deal Islamic State a blow in the process.
The latter lends his actions international --
and especially American -- legitimacy, as the U.S. is actually assisting
the Kurds, and Erdogan has been able to bolster his position both
domestically and internationally, making backing down on the Assad issue
a personal, insignificant loss, minimized by the bigger strategic
gains.
The Kurds stand to lose the most from this
development, as it eroded their opportunity to promote their demand for
independence, and who knows when it will present itself again.
They had set their hopes on the U.S., but it
failed them in the moment of truth. No one knows exactly what the U.S.
promised the Kurds, but the reality is, they have been left to shoulder
the burden of fighting Islamic State on the ground, in Syria and in
Iraq.
There is no doubt that the recent U.S. support
for Turkey against Kurdish ambitions will be held against Washington
throughout the Middle East, as again it seems the U.S. has turned its
back on its friends in the region. Reality may not be as clear-cut, but
that is the impression it gives.
Recent developments have undermined the
Arab-Sunni axis, led by Saudi Arabia. This moderate axis has so far
failed to achieve any of its goals, and as a result, Iran has grown
stronger, as it has been the one to capitalize from keeping Assad in
power -- he is at Tehran's mercy.
In Damascus, Assad is a key part of the
Tehran-Baghdad-Damascus-Beirut Shiite axis that Iran has been working
very hard to set up. Iran continues to use Hezbollah as its regional
proxy but it has cost the terrorist organization dearly in operatives,
as well as compromised its legitimacy as a defender of the Shiites in
Lebanon. Prioritizing long-term interests over tactical disagreements,
Iran is more concerned with preserving the Assad regime than it is with
making life easier for Hezbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah.
Another indication that Iran's regional
position is becoming stronger is its evolving relationship with Russia,
who has been diligently expanding its reach in the Middle East.
There is nothing coincidental in the close
proximity of the Iranian nuclear deal, inked in July 2015, the
deployment of Russian forces in Syria, and the budding Russian-Iranian
collaboration in fighting alongside Assad's forces. And let's not forget
-- Moscow is providing Tehran with advanced Russian weapons.
The agreement between Iran and the West gave
way to a change in relations between Moscow and Tehran, limited only by
issues concerning the latter's nuclear program. These relations will
continue to evolve, and the prospect is already making the U.S. uneasy,
which in turn makes the Sunni Arab states wary -- all things seem to be
playing into Iran's hands.
In the long run, the results of these developments are likely to play out on two levels -- internationally and regionally.
On an international level, the U.S. has
emerged as a power unable -- or unwilling to affect Syria's fate, to the
point where it is unclear whether it wants to exercise its influence in
the Middle East. The U.S. focuses on the war on Islamic State, where it
has marked some achievements, but its regional influence beyond has
been steadily shrinking.
Russia, on the other hand, has been steadily
increasing its reach, mostly over the change in Turkey's position, as
nothing will be decided about Damascus sans Ankara's input.
On a Middle East level, the Shiite axis is
growing stronger. Turkey is busy with domestic and foreign affairs, and
in any case, it feels closer to the Muslim Brotherhood than the
Arab-Sunni axis, where Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states may be
important, but have so far proven impotent.
As for Syria itself -- while Turkey joining
the Iranian-Russian axis could, in the long run, prove useful in
weakening rebels, there is no end in sight for the raging civil war.
Israel does not need to change its careful policies when
it comes to Syria, but given the precarious Middle East dynamics, the
strides marked by the Shiite axis should be the focus of its
intelligence efforts.
Maj. Gen. (ret.) Yaakov Amidror
Source: http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_article.php?id=36111
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