by Dr. Doron Itzchakov
The central government’s disregard for the residents of the periphery, along with the economic hardships resulting from the allocation of considerable resources to promote the “axis of resistance” at the expense of Iranian citizens, could pose a significant challenge to the Islamist regime.
Screenshot from YouTube video of protest in Kazerun, Iran
BESA Center Perspectives No. 856, June 5, 2018
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: A
number of protests took place recently in Iran that received almost no
attention anywhere other than inside the country itself. These events
occurred in peripheral cities that suffer from rising unemployment, lack
of infrastructure, increases in the cost of living, extreme climatic
conditions, and air pollution. These cities are marginalized in Iran’s
public discourse, which is reflected in an allocation of resources that
is not commensurate with the needs of the residents – most of whom are
classified as “ethnic minorities”. In those residents’ eyes, government
policy is negligent and inattentive to their distress.
Large-scale violent demonstrations took place recently in the Iranian city of Kazerun,
which is under the jurisdiction of the Fars Province. They were the
collective response of residents to publication of a plan for a new
administrative division of Fars that intends to remove two densely
populated areas from the jurisdiction of the Kazerun municipality and
grant them independent status (a sub-province called Koh-Chenar).
Underlying the protests is the plight of many
residents of the province who have long suffered from difficult working
and living conditions. The administrative partition proposal served as a
spark that ignited flames of frustration over government neglect.
It should be noted that within the area are two
sites of religious and historical importance that serve as focal points
for pilgrimage and are sources of livelihood for the citizens of
Kazerun. The Bishapur site was built by King Shapur I and commemorates
the victory of the Sassanian warriors over the Romans in the third
century CE. The second site, Imam-Zadeh Sid Hussein, contains the grave
of the grandson of the fourth imam according to the Twelver branch
of Shiite Islam. This site is the focus of pilgrimage, prayer, and
wish-making, as is customary in Shiite tradition. There are also
significant economic benefits that stem from donations, as well as from
the fact that in the vicinity of the burial ground there is a large park
that accommodates more than 150,000 visitors during the New Year
vacation.
Kazerun is not the only region where protests
against the regime have taken place. At the end of March, large-scale
demonstrations occurred in the city of Ahvaz, capital of the southern
province of Khuzestan, in protest against the way the Iranian
Broadcasting Authority chose to represent the clothing of the local
residents. Anger erupted after the authority failed to include the
characteristics of authentic Arab dress that represent the ethnic origin
of most of the residents of the province. The stormy protests, which
continued into April, led to the arrest of about 150 civilians by the
security forces.
In this case as well, the protest reflected a deep
rift between center and periphery. Ahvaz and Khuzestan have long
suffered from high air pollution, dehydration of water sources, and
natural disasters. All this is accompanied by a housing shortage, high
unemployment rates, and low wages that do not reflect increases in the
prices of basic goods.
Parallel to the Ahvaz protest, yet another protest
broke out in another part of Iran that, like the other examples,
received almost no media attention. In this instance, the farmers of
Isfahan were protesting a policy of disproportionate and unjust
distribution of water that makes it impossible for them to maintain
their agricultural lands.
Among other means, the farmers chose to voice
their struggle within the framework of Friday prayers. They prevented
prayers from beginning by stating: “Only when our distress is heard will
the prayers begin again.”
The various protests are in fact linked by their
submission of demands to the representative of the religious
establishment in charge of Friday prayers. This is done because the
Supreme Leader directly appoints the clerics who conduct these prayers
throughout the country. Approaching the religious clerics illustrates
the centrality and importance of the Friday prayer in the
social-political agenda in Iran, as well as the common perception of the
religious establishment as responsible for the public’s distress.
The unrest in Iran is due not only to economic
distress and ethnic discrimination, but also to religious
discrimination. In February of this year, violent clashes took place
between the security establishment and members of the Ni’matullāhī
Gonabadi Order in response to severe restrictions imposed on the order’s
leader, Nur Ali Tabanda. The clashes, which lasted more than a week,
resulted in the killing of three police officers and two Basij members.
This triggered a strong response from the security services that
included arrests and prosecution of hundreds of members of the Sufi
(Shiite) Order.
The religious establishment, and especially the
religious clerics in Qom, shows no understanding towards the Sufi orders
and is acting against them forcefully. It has, for example, destroyed
prayer centers (in the cities of Qom, Borujerd, and Isfahan), made
extensive arrests, and implemented a policy of occupational
discrimination and exclusion from the field of education.
Despite the establishment’s harsh treatment of the
Dervishes of the Gonabadi Order, its members see themselves as loyal
Shiites and are considered the most moderate of the three branches of
the Order. The Order’s adherents are ordered to integrate into society
and work for a living; they are not allowed to wear different clothes,
and they are forbidden from performing rites of worship that combine
dance and the use of drugs. Despite all this, the revolutionary
establishment continues to oppress them, often leading to confrontations
and riots.
Similar discrimination is being waged against
Sunni Muslim citizens, a religious minority that has been marginalized
in Iranian society. This minority has suffered from social, economic,
and political discrimination for more than three decades, as is
reflected in its unending tension with the central government. The
revolutionary regime perceives the Sunni minority as a fifth column and a
source of militant extremism and infiltration of ideas from the Salafi
movement. As a result, it adopted a strategy of discrimination,
persecution, and lack of development as a countermove to the building of
Sunni mosques and cultural centers. It also closely monitors Sunni
community leaders, prayer directors, and public opinion leaders.
This policy encourages the penetration of radical
ideas such as those disseminated by the Jundallah organization, which
acts against the oppression of the Baluchis in Iran. They operate mainly
in the province of Sistan and Baluchestan, which has about 2.5 million
inhabitants and is a focal point for drug smuggling. The ongoing
fighting between Jundallah and the Iranian security forces has left many
casualties on both sides and did not cease even after the capture and
execution of the movement’s leader, Abdolmalek Rigi.
The mass protests that broke out in Iran in early
2018 cannot be separated from those that have taken place in recent
months in areas populated by ethnic minorities. The start of the great
wave of protest, which at its height encompassed eighty cities across
the country, was in the periphery and stemmed from frustration over the
disconnection between the government establishment and the population.
The protests included many cities that are home to ethnic minorities
such as Kurds, Azeris, Lauris, Baluchis, Arabs, and others.
The Iranian civil polity is not monolithic.
Approximately 55% of the population is of Persian origin, while 45% is a
mosaic of ethnic minorities. The central government’s disregard for the
residents of the periphery, along with the economic hardships resulting
from the allocation of considerable resources to promote the “axis of
resistance” at the expense of Iranian citizens, could pose a significant
challenge to the Islamist regime. Center-periphery relations have been
at the hub of tensions between state and society throughout history and
have often determined the fate of regimes.
BESA Center Perspectives Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.
Source: https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/iran-protests-cities/
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Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
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