by Dr. James M. Dorsey
Several factors are likely to strengthen efforts to thwart an agreement that honors Saudi insistence on producing its own nuclear fuel, even though it can buy it more cheaply abroad.
Nuclear power plant cooling towers, image via Wikimedia Commons
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 1,038, December 17, 2018
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: While
making assurances about solely peaceable nuclear intentions, Saudi
Arabia continues to show interest in retaining the option of developing
nuclear weapons capabilities – an interest that could put it on a
collision course with the US.
Saudi General Khalid bin Sultan bin Abdul Aziz, a
son of the late Saudi crown prince and defense minister Sultan bin Abdul
Aziz al Saud and commander of the US-led international alliance that
forced Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait in 1991, recounted in his memoir
that it was “my task to negotiate the deal, devise an appropriate deception plan,
choose a team of Saudi officers and men and arrange for their training
in both Saudi Arabia and China, build and defend operation bases and
storage facilities in different parts of the kingdom, arrange for the
shipment of the missiles from China and, at every stage, be ready to
defend the project against sabotage or any form of attack.”
The incident, coupled with more recent Saudi
statements and the kingdom’s inability to present a credible and
sustainable version of events surrounding the killing of journalist
Jamal Khashoggi on the premises of its Istanbul consulate, is
complicating its negotiations with the US for the acquisition of designs
for nuclear power plants in a deal valued at up to $80 billion depending on how many Saudi Arabia ultimately decides to build.
Prospects of a massive deal go to the heart of
President Donald Trump’s America First policy, which is focused on jobs
and deals. But growing criticism and distrust of Saudi Arabia in the US
Congress and intelligence community as a result of the Khashoggi crisis,
as well as of the kingdom’s handling of the Yemen war, which has
sparked the world’s worst humanitarian crisis since WWII, are likely to
strengthen efforts to thwart an agreement that honors Saudi insistence
on producing its own nuclear fuel, even though it can buy it more
cheaply abroad.
The kingdom’s insistence on this has fueled
concerns that it may divert nuclear fuel for military purposes. Similar
fears coupled with Iran’s ballistic missile program drove world powers
to first sanction Iran and then conclude a 2015 international agreement
that curbed Iran’s nuclear program. Trump withdrew from that agreement
earlier this year, charging that it did not provide sufficient
guarantees that Iran would not be able to develop a nuclear weapon.
Congressional Democrats have described refusing to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear technology as proper punishment for the killing of Khashoggi, which the kingdom insists was done without the knowledge of Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman.
While the Trump administration has as yet not
abandoned longstanding strict US nuclear export safeguards to secure a
deal with Saudi Arabia, it has also not unambiguously said it would
uphold them.
As he did in his rejection of hard-hitting sanctions in the wake of the Khashoggi killing,
Trump is likely to argue that if the US does not conclude a nuclear
deal with Saudi Arabia, countries like China, Russia, and South Korea,
which have less strict controls, will step in. The argument essentially
is that the US must commit a wrong because if it doesn’t, someone else
will.
Saudi officials have repeatedly insisted that the
kingdom is developing nuclear capabilities for peaceful purposes such as
medicine, electricity generation, and desalination of sea water. They
say Saudi Arabia is committed to putting its future facilities under the
supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
However, with a $56 billion military budget for
2018, Saudi Arabia is stepping up the development of a domestic military
industry. The kingdom aims to source 50% of its military procurement domestically by 2030, up from its current 2%.
Speaking to CBS earlier this year, Prince Muhammad
appeared to put conditions on Saudi nuclear assurances by warning that
“Saudi Arabia does not want to acquire any nuclear bomb, but without a
doubt, if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible.”
In putting forward demands for parity with Iran
by getting the right to controlled enrichment of uranium and the
reprocessing of spent fuel into plutonium, potential building blocks for
nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia was also seen as potentially backing away
from a 2009 memorandum of understanding with the US in which it pledged to acquire nuclear fuel from international markets.
Nuclear energy cooperation was one of a host of
agreements concluded last year by Saudi Arabia and China during a visit
to Beijing by Saudi King Salman. The agreement included a feasibility study for the construction of high-temperature gas-cooled (HTGR) nuclear power plants in
the kingdom as well as cooperation on intellectual property and the
development of a domestic industrial supply chain for HTGRs built in
Saudi Arabia. The HTGR agreement built on an accord signed in 2012 that
involved maintenance and development of nuclear power plants and
research reactors, as well as the provision of Chinese nuclear fuel.
A report by the Washington-based Institute for
Science and International Security (ISIS) released shortly after the
king’s visit warned that the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement had “not eliminated the kingdom’s desire for nuclear weapons capabilities and even nuclear weapons.”
As they were in the era of General bin Sultan,
potential Chinese sales to Saudi Arabia of ballistic missiles and cruise
missiles remain one of the murkier areas of Sino-Saudi military
cooperation.
Military experts say that satellite imagery of
missile bases in Saudi Arabia in recent years and other open-source
circumstantial evidence, including Saudi press coverage of graduation
ceremonies at the kingdom’s Strategic Missile Force school in Wadi
ad-Dawasir, attest to ongoing transfers.
In 2014, Saudi Arabia showcased Chinese-made Dongfeng-3 missiles that have a range of up to 5,000 km. Media reports said the missiles had been purchased in 2007, possibly with US acquiescence.
“Saudi Arabia has invested heavily in conventional ballistic and cruise missiles to
provide the kingdom a shot of strategic deterrence,” said
non-proliferation expert Jeffrey Lewis. His conclusion was confirmed by
Anwar Eshqi, a retired Saudi major general and advisor to the Saudi
military.
“The Saudi military did indeed receive DF-21 missiles from China and
the integration of the missiles, including a full maintenance check and
upgraded facilities, is complete,“ Eshqi said, referring to the
People’s Republic’s East Wind solid-fuel, medium-range ballistic
missile.
BESA Center Perspectives Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family
Source: https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/nuclear-energy-saudi-arabia/
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