by Dmitri Shufutinsky
Turkey’s invasion of Syria to protect Idlib will bog it down in a war it cannot win.
Map of Idlib ceasefire as of March 6, 2020, map by OpenTopoMap and MilitaryMaps via Wikimedia Commons
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 1,508, March 29, 2020
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Turkey’s
invasion of Syria to protect Idlib will bog it down in a war it cannot
win. At the same time, it severely weakens the Assad regime and could
help oust Iran from Syria.
Turkey’s war with the Assad regime in Syria brings
to mind the words of the late PM Menachem Begin during the 1980-88
Iran-Iraq War: “We wish both sides the best of success.”
Turkey’s recent invasion of Syria
was aimed not at the Kurds, for a change, but at the Assad regime as
well as its supporters from the “Axis of Resistance.” The ceasefire
announced between Ankara and Moscow is unlikely to last. Previous
Russian attempts at finding a diplomatic solution in Syria have all
ended in failure. Furthermore, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan needs to
achieve a complete victory on behalf of the rebellion in Idlib if he
wishes to remain in power.
Turkey’s airstrikes in Syria killed nine members of Hezbollah, several Shiite militiamen supported by Iran, and dozens of Syrian troops. In response, Iran warned Ankara
against targeting its people, noting that Turkish bases are in Tehran’s
“range of fire.” It also sent more militiamen to aid the regime in
recapturing Idlib.
Turkey’s attacks were viewed as justified by much
of the international community. They came after Syrian-Russian
airstrikes on Idlib massacred hundreds of innocent civilians and killed dozens of Turkish soldiers.
Turkey has NATO’s second-biggest army, and it is
well-positioned to deal severe damage to the Syrian regime. Given that
both Assad and Vladimir Putin are widely despised, it is unlikely that
Turkey’s venture into Syria—which has damaged Damascus’s tanks, air defenses, jets, and military bases—will come under censure.
At the same time, it is unlikely that Ankara will
go so far as to provoke Russia by killing Assad or directly engaging
Russian troops. Turkey, while a formidable military power in its own
right, cannot challenge Russia. Nor would its more influential or
stronger NATO partners allow it to take such steps. Nobody wants a third
world war, particularly over the likes of Syria. It is, however,
possible that the West and Israel would provide diplomatic support and
perhaps arms or intelligence to Ankara, as they all share common goals:
to degrade Assad’s regime, prove that Russia is still relatively
powerless in the region, and evict Iran from Syria.
Iran and its proxies are in an unenviable
position. President Donald Trump’s sanctions campaign has left its
economy in a terrible recession. Unless the coronavirus crisis upends
his prospects, Trump is unlikely to be removed from office in November,
meaning that in all likelihood, the sanctions will stay and even
intensify. Iran’s top general, Qassem Soleimani, was killed by a US
drone strike in January, along with its leading commander of the Iraqi
Shiite militias, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. The shooting down of a Ukrainian
airliner, widespread protests within the country, and the coronavirus
outbreak have worsened Iran’s isolation, further crippled the economy,
and sapped the regime’s internal legitimacy.
The Islamic Republic does not have the funds to
continue waging war in Syria. In its “near-abroad,” its forces are being
targeted in the south by the Israelis (Syria), in the north by the
Turks (Syria), in the west by the Americans (Iraq), and perhaps soon
from the east by the Taliban.
The American deal with the Taliban is likely to
see the group refocus its attention on its historic enemy—Shiite Iran.
The Iranian government may soon have to redeploy its Shiite Afghan
mercenaries from Syria to Afghanistan to fight the Taliban and other
Sunni jihadists there, further undermining its ability to fulfill its
goals in Syria.
No matter how many personnel Iran transfers from
Iraq or Lebanon, they will continually be targeted by enemy forces. The
regime has neither the money nor the manpower to sustain this kind of
indefinite upkeep, especially with anti-Iranian sentiment continuing to
simmer in Beirut and Baghdad.
With the spread of coronavirus in both Iraq and
Lebanon, the economic paralysis in Lebanon, and the Iran-related
sanctions weakening Hezbollah, the Iranian regime will have limited
capability to enter into a war with Israel anytime soon—giving the
Jewish state more time to improve its capabilities and prepare for such a
war in the future.
A combination of economic, diplomatic, and health
threats—as well as the Turkish invasion of Syria—is distracting the
attention of the Iranians, Russians, and others, which is giving Israel
cover to continue attacking Iran-related sites in Syria and Iraq. This
aligns with Israeli defense minister Naftali Bennett’s stated goal of extirpating the Iranians from Syria by the beginning of 2021.
While the Turks are busy pursuing Assad and his
Shiite allies, they will have less latitude to pursue their goals in
Libya or Kurdistan. The Kurds, like Turkey and Israel, are interested in
seeing a weakening of the Iranian presence in Syria and Iraq. If the
Turkish army is otherwise engaged, it’s possible that the Kurds will be
able to claw back some of their territory that was occupied by Ankara.
With Russia and Assad weaker and more distracted, the Kurds might be
able to either demand more from them in a deal in which they join a new
Syria, or assist the Syrian army against the Turks. Theoretically, this
could lead to Kurdish autonomy or a promise of equal rights in a united
Syria, though this is unlikely unless extremist Shiite forces are
completely expunged from the region or unequivocally defeated.
Given that Ankara is facing the entire Axis of
Resistance and must prepare for the possibility of a widening of the
conflict to include Russia, it cannot expand its plans for Libya or the
Kurds. General Khalifa Haftar is likely to take advantage of this
situation and seize as much territory as he can from the Turkish-backed
forces from Syria and Libya with whom he is battling. The fact that
Turkey is backing jihadist elements loyal to ISIS and al-Qaeda means it
is not likely to receive any concrete Western military aid in that
operation—indeed, it is more likely to face greater international
scrutiny as the operation drags on and human suffering increases.
Turkey’s expulsion of Syrian refugees from its
territory into Europe—which has so far been blocked by the Greek
military and police—is unlikely to gain it much sympathy in Brussels. It
is more likely to turn Europeans against Ankara and promote the
advancement of the kinds of far-right governments Erdoğan rails against.
In the end, it is possible that a combination of
Israeli and Turkish military force, as well as external factors, will
severely weaken the Assad regime, degrade and destroy Hezbollah and
Shiite mercenaries in Syria, and force the Iranians out of the country.
However, the Turks will probably be forced out as well. The world will
not tolerate Ankara’s backing of extremist elements, nor allow it to
drag Russia and NATO into a world war.
It is likely that Turkey will leave Assad in power
for fear of provoking Russia too much and then leave, having failing to
redesign Syria and Kurdistan in line with its neo-Ottoman aspirations.
More Turkish troops will come home in coffins on behalf of a regime that
is shunned by its own people as well as in the UN. The country’s ailing
economy won’t allow for victory in Libya either. Russia will have done
its job of keeping Assad alive, probably to retake Idlib from jihadists
in the future and allow for the repatriation of refugees.
True, Assad will be loathed by the world after
having committed terrible atrocities. His economy will be destitute and
he will have little real power, leaving him reliant on Moscow for
protection. Russia, too, will be seen as a country that could not use
diplomacy to achieve its aims and had to resort to violence and war
crimes. This will most likely propel the Arab Gulf countries back toward
the US and Europe.
Whatever the international community might think
about it, Moscow will likely end up with sole dominion over Syria,
having evicted Turkey and Iran—its two historic imperial rivals—from the
country. This should prevent a Syrian-Israeli war and could even, in
theory, lead to peace between the two countries. It could also lead to
more rights for the Kurdish people in Syria—including autonomy—unless
they become united enough to push for independence once again.
The Turkish intervention has the potential to
bring down both neo-Ottomanism and the radical Shiite revolution that
Iran has been trying to spread. Again—let’s wish both sides the best of
success.
Source: https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/turkey-syria-israel-interests/
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