by Roie Yellinek
[N]o other country is both supportive of the Assad regime and capable of embarking on a project of such scale.
The destroyed Bab Amro neighborhood of Homs, Syria, photo via Freedom House Flickr CC
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 1,514, April 1, 2020
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: After
almost a decade of civil war in Syria, the question of who will be in
charge of the reconstruction has arisen over and over again (though any
practical activity in that direction will have to be suspended during
the acute stage of the coronavirus crisis). China’s position on this
issue can be discerned by looking at its prewar relations with Syria and
the way it has behaved during the war.
The relationship between China and Syria dates
back to 1956, when the countries first initiated diplomatic contact.
Bilateral relations have stayed largely consistent. In 2010 (the last
year Syrian output was measured), trade between the countries amounted
to $2.2 billion and mostly went in one direction, from China to Syria.
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s
database, Beijing has sold Syria arms totaling $76 million since 2000.
For the sake of comparison, Russia purchased $2.1 billion in small arms during the same period.
On August 5, 2018, the Chinese ambassador to Syria published an article in the Syrian daily al-Watan,
a mouthpiece for President Bashar Assad. The piece stressed
Chinese-Arab ties, announced that Beijing is deepening its strategic
partnerships in the Middle East, and claimed that China wishes to play a
greater role in driving peace and stability in the region.
The ambassador wrote that ever since the beginning
of the Syrian crisis, China has supported the Syrian people both
politically and humanely. He praised Assad’s forces for strengthening
the regime’s stability and said China wanted to strengthen cooperation
between the countries and was prepared to take part in Syria’s rehabilitation:
We highly commend the Syrian ‘”Eastward” strategy and intend to cooperate more with Syria in the political, military, economic and social fields, to actively participate in Syria’s economic reconstruction so that the Syrian side benefits from Chinese economic benefits … and establish the exchange of knowledge in the fields of ideology, culture and government to contribute to the restoration of peace, stability and prosperity in Syria as soon as possible.
On June 5, 2019, Chinese president Xi Jinping visited Russia. During his visit, he had this to say about the Syrian civil war:
Syria is…home to one of the most ancient civilizations with a long history, and it is also an important country in the Middle East… As the process of finding a political solution to the conflict is forging ahead and the Syrian government and people are starting to rebuild their homeland, China stands ready to participate in Syria’s reconstruction within its own ability and do the best [it can] to help the Syrian people resume their normal life and production soon.
China is widely perceived as the leading candidate
to rebuild Syria’s drastically damaged infrastructure after the long
years of war. Beyond the statements from the Chinese leadership, the
reason for this perception is simple: no other country is both
supportive of the Assad regime and capable of embarking on a project of
such scale. The Assad regime has support from Iran, but the Islamic
Republic lacks China’s economic capabilities. Estimates of the cost of
rebuilding Syria range from a “modest” $200 billion to more pessimistic forecasts in the area of $1 trillion.
The level of potential expenditure raises the
question: Does China want to be a kind of “project manager” in the
reconstruction of Syria? To answer this and make projections about
Beijing’s evolving Syria policy, it is helpful to analyze Chinese
behavior and possible motivations during the civil war—a massive
calamity that has killed more than 600,000 people, devastated the Syrian
economy, destroyed half the country’s infrastructure, displaced 4
million Syrians internally, and prompted the emigration of another 6
million.
The two sides of the war have received external
aid in various forms, with the US and other Western countries supporting
the anti-regime movement and Russia, Iran, and China providing support
to the Assad regime.
While Russia and Iran have sent troops and sold
arms to the regime, China has given almost exclusively diplomatic
support to Damascus. There are a few exceptions in which Chinese
personnel were either on the ground or in direct communication with
proxies. Xinhua, China’s state news agency, quoted a senior
Chinese officer on August 16, 2016 as saying that “China wants to
strengthen its military ties with Syria.” The officer made this comment during a rare Chinese visit to the divided country.
The Chinese have also given Syria economic aid on a
small scale. On July 10, 2018, Xi pledged a package of $20 billion in
loans and about $106 million in financial aid to Middle Eastern nations
as part of what he called an “oil and gas plus” model to revive economic
growth in the region. It is unclear what percentage of the loan was
intended for Syria, but only $91 million has been set aside for Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen together.
On August 27, 2019, China’s ambassador to Damascus said
his country will give the Syrian people new buses and emphasized that
his country is “ready to provide more and more backup to Syria in all
areas, and in particular to the transport sector.” It appears that
Beijing, while limiting its investment in Syria so far, is waiting for
the end of the war and will then ramp up operations on a larger scale.
As noted, most Chinese support for Syria has been
diplomatic. At the UN, Beijing has consistently stood with Moscow in
support of Assad, vetoing six of seven Security Council resolutions
condemning the Syrian authorities for using force against its citizens.
This long-term backing from China has given the Assad regime the
latitude to fight the rebels with great brutality without having to
contend with debilitating pressure from the international community.
On October 31, 2012, during talks with UN-Arab
League Joint Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi in Beijing, Yang Jiechi, the
director of the Office of Foreign Affairs of the Communist Party, announced
a four-point proposal to establish a transitional governing body.
Though this proposal did not include plans for any action to solve the
crisis, it made China’s engagement with Syria explicit. At the end of
2015, China’s foreign ministry spokesperson said Beijing would invite the two sides separately to discuss options for ending the war.
Why does Beijing, which tends to avoid
intervention and criticizes Western countries whenever they insert
themselves into the domestic turmoil of other states (such as in Yemen,
Venezuela, and elsewhere), support the Assad regime? There are several
reasons. First, China wants to establish itself as a superpower, and
defending the interests of its allies is a step in that direction. The
Chinese ambassador to Syria said
recently, “We [the Chinese] will be proud of any sanctions Washington
may impose on Chinese companies participating in the Damascus
International Fair,” an indication that Beijing is willing to use Syria
as part of the heated trade battle between China and the US.
Another element explaining Chinese support for
Assad is Beijing’s concern about ethnic Uighurs from China’s far western
region of Xinjiang who traveled clandestinely to Syria and Iraq to
fight together with Islamist groups. ISIS has killed at least one
Chinese hostage and issued statements threatening to attack China, which
has incentivized the Chinese leadership to support the Assad regime
against the Islamists.
It is also worth noting that the Chinese are
famously patient. Supporting Assad could prove to be a significant net
positive in the long run, and Beijing is prepared to wait to reap the
benefits.
It is of course difficult to predict what will
happen next in this relationship, which has been developing over more
than 50 years. But China’s support for the Assad regime over the years
of civil war is unequivocal. China is the second-biggest economy in the
world, and its vast Belt and Road Initiative is an integral part of
Chinese trade policy. It makes sense that China will take part in the
reconstruction of Syria once the war is over and the coronavirus crisis
has passed.
Beijing vividly remembers evacuating Chinese
workers from Libya and Yemen and has no interest in putting Chinese
nationals in harm’s way on Assad’s behalf. The first and most important
condition for Chinese involvement in Syria’s development is a complete
end to the fighting.
This is an expanded version of an article that appeared in E-International Relations on March 23, 2020.
Source: https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/will-china-rebuild-syria/
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