by Emil Avdaliani
Moscow is having a difficult time managing geographically diverse separatist regions all at the same time.
A Russia-backed rebel armored fighting
vehicles convoy near Donetsk, Eastern Ukraine, May 30, 2015,
image by
Mstyslav Chernov via Wikimedia Commons
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 1,678, August 6, 2020
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: For geopolitical
reasons, Russia has been building a chain of separatist states near its
borders since the 1990s. However, as Russia’s economy worsens,
competition with the West is increasing. As the “breakaways” grow ever
more predatory, Moscow is having a difficult time managing
geographically diverse separatist regions all at the same time.
An important part of Russia’s grand strategy in
terms of foreign policy is its purposeful creation and management of
conflict zones across the post-Soviet space. This has to do with the
battle Russia is fighting with the West over the borderlands—i.e., the
regions that adjoin Russia from the west and south.
Maintaining the 11 buffer states around Russia
(excluding the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) is a
cornerstone of the Kremlin’s foreign policy against Western military and
economic encroachment. The Russians knew that because of their
country’s low economic attractiveness, the South Caucasus states would
inevitably turn to Europe. The same was likely to occur with Moldova and
Ukraine on Russia’s western frontier, as their geographical proximity
to and historical interconnections with Europe render them particularly
susceptible to the West’s economic and military potential.
To prevent Western economic and military
penetration, the Kremlin has deliberately fomented various separatist
conflicts. This policy has been successful so far, as the EU and NATO
have refrained from extending membership to Ukraine, Georgia, and
Moldova.
However, Russia now faces a different problem: its
long-term vision for the separatist regions is becoming increasingly
unrealistic. While in the first years following the collapse of the
Soviet Union, Russia had to manage breakaway conflicts only in small and
poor Georgia and Moldova, Moscow’s responsibilities had increased
significantly by the late 2010s.
Following the Ukraine crisis, Donetsk and Luhansk
became part of Russia’s “separatist empire.” One could also add Syria to
the list. The latter’s inclusion might be surprising, but considering
the level of Russian influence there and the stripping away of many of
Damascus’s international contacts, the war-torn country is essentially
now fully dependent on Russia.
With Syria and Donbas on the roster, the Kremlin
now has to manage a range of territories that rely almost entirely, in
both the military and the economic senses, on Russia—but that are also
geographically dispersed, economically disadvantageous, and
geopolitically vulnerable. Even the conflict around Nagorno Karabakh, in
which Russia is not militarily involved, is under the geopolitical
influence of the Kremlin.
This means that at a time when economic problems
resulting from the pandemic, Western sanctions, and the lack of reforms
are looming large on the Russian home front, Moscow has to pour yet more
money into multiple separatist actors spread across the former Soviet
space, as well as Syria.
Moscow’s broader strategy of managing
separatist conflicts is therefore under increasing stress.
It is more and more difficult for the Kremlin to
maneuver across so many diverse conflicts simultaneously. At times,
participants have tried to play their own game independently from
Moscow. Kyiv and Chisinau, for example, have considered constraining the
breakaway territory of Transnistria, and Moscow—which has no direct
land or air route (Kyiv would likely block the latter)—can do little
about it. In Georgia’s Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russian forces stand
by and watch as NATO exercises take place on Georgian soil—an indication
that despite Russia’s military presence, the West is continuing to
expand its military support for Georgia.
Geopolitical trends indicate that Russia’s
long-term “separatist” strategy to stop Western expansion in the former
Soviet space is losing its effectiveness. While it is true that Moscow
stopped its neighbors from joining the EU and NATO, its gamble that
those breakaway regions would undermine the pro-Western resolve of
Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine has largely failed. Although Russia
remains militarily predominant, Western expansion via the powerful
weapon of economic influence is proving to be more efficient.
Nor can the Russian leadership solve the problem
of its failure to entice states around the world to recognize the
independence of breakaway states. For instance, in the case of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia, only Syria, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Nauru have
extended them recognition—not a prominent set of states from a
geopolitical point of view. This trend is not likely to change anytime
soon. Moscow simply does not have sufficient resources—and in any case,
US laws withholding financial aid from states that recognize the
independence of separatist territories throughout the former Soviet
space remain a major disincentive.
Nor does Russia have any long-term economic vision
for the breakaway states. Dire economic straits have inevitably caused
populations to flee toward abundant medical, trade, and educational
possibilities. Usually these are territories from which the separatists
initially tried to break away. The Kremlin has failed to transform those
entities into secure and economically stable lands. Crime levels have
been on an upward trajectory, too, as high-level corruption and active
black markets have undermined the effectiveness of Moscow’s spending.
Over the past several years, there have been hints
in the media about rising discontent within the Russian political
elite on how the breakaway territories (plus Syria) are being
run. Questions have been raised about how Russian money is being spent
and about the increasingly predatory nature of the separatist (plus
Syrian) political elites, which are focused on extracting as much
economic benefit as they can from Moscow.
This situation is similar to the state of affairs
in the late 1980s, just prior to the Soviet collapse. At that time,
members of the Soviet elite started to realize that Moscow had become
little more than a supplier to Soviet republics that had grown more and
more predatory as corruption skyrocketed and production levels sank. The
result was the Soviet dissolution.
The Soviet level of endowment to the republics was
far higher than it is now, but a similar pattern is emerging. Moscow
has to cope with domestic economic troubles, “disobedience” from
separatist leaders, and problematic relations with the West. These
challenges make it increasingly difficult for Moscow to pull the strings
in multiple separatist regions at once. Even in Syria, the Kremlin’s
spending is occasionally questioned by Russian analysts and politicians.
The Russian elite has grown less willing to provide direct economic
benefit to the separatists, as the return is too marginal to warrant the
expense.
Source: https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/russia-separatist-states/
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