by Orna Mizrahi, Yoram Schweitzer
As the Land of the Cedars continues to collapse, Israel can no longer afford to sit on the fence. Jerusalem would do well to adopt a proactive policy, try to guard against Beirut’s falling into Iranian hands, and use all measures to weaken Hezbollah – and ensure that the organization does not choose military adventurism under cover of Lebanon’s internal developments
Saad
Hariri’s return on July 15, 2021 of his mandate to form a government in
Lebanon reflects the downward spiral in the country's political system.
Civilian distress has worsened, while the country experiences one of
its worst-ever economic crises. Difficulties in earning a living have
increased, and there is a severe shortage of basic consumer commodities:
food, electricity, fuel, water, and medicine. Lebanon lacks the basic
infrastructure that a country is supposed to provide for its people. The
political system, which has been without a functioning government for a
year, is almost completely paralyzed and is unable to take the
decisions necessary to deal with the crisis. Lebanon's security
elements, headed by the Lebanese army, which is also suffering from the
economic distress, cannot operate effectively. Hariri's move likewise
demonstrated once again the weakness and ineptitude of the rich and
corrupt leadership of all of Lebanon's communities, including Hezbollah.
This leadership concentrates mainly on maintaining its power and
status, while refusing to make concessions for the benefit of the
Lebanese people as a whole.
There is no solution on the horizon, and there are no prospects for external help: Western countries, which have despaired of a positive response to their demand for the formation of a government and implementation of reforms as a condition for aid, are considering the imposition of sanctions against the Lebanese leadership. Russia and China are willing to help, provided they are guaranteed a return on their investment. Nasrallah's hope of aid from Iran has yet to be fulfilled, in part due to fear in Lebanon that accepting such aid will prevent any possibility of obtaining broad international support.
An examination of the possible scenarios
for developments in Lebanon provides no grounds for optimism. The most
likely scenario right now is a prolonged crisis along the current lines,
continued decline into complete collapse, and even a split in the
country or the outbreak of a third civil war. Another extreme scenario
is a total takeover of Lebanon by Hezbollah and the strengthening of
Iran's grip on the country.
How might continuation of the crisis in Lebanon affect Israel? There are two main approaches in Israel to this question:
- The primary one is that a collapse of Lebanon is bad for Israel: This approach, which reflects the assumption that Israel has an interest in a stable pro-Western Lebanon, argues that despite Hezbollah's dominance in Lebanon, it does not hold a complete monopoly on power. Any further decline in Lebanon's internal situation will strengthen Hezbollah, and is therefore liable to change the political balance in Lebanon to Israel's detriment, primarily in the longer term. Nasrallah's vision of turning Lebanon into another Iranian protectorate and an integral part of the Shiite axis will be realized. Already early in Lebanon's long economic-political crisis, Nasrallah argued that the Lebanese economy should be detached from the West, and should look east and develop ties with Iran, Iraq, and Syria. He explained that Lebanon's collapse would lead it into the warm embrace of Iran, and that Lebanon would eventually become another Iranian outpost in the region, like Syria.
- The collapse of Lebanon is good for Israel: Those who take this
approach, especially those who claim that Lebanon is already controlled
by Hezbollah, believe that if the internal crisis in the countries gets
worse, Hezbollah will be overcome by ailments (including a state of
collapse), find it difficult to give its full attention to the conflict
with Israel, and adapt a more restrained attitude to it. According to
this line of thinking, even if Hezbollah is eventually moved to seize
power and becomes the official hegemon in Lebanon – a step that it has
scrupulously avoided until now because of the advantages in the status
quo for preserving its independent military power and behind-the-scenes
political influence on events in the country through its allies – this
scenario is likely to serve Israel's interests, despite its
disadvantages. Furthermore, in this scenario, which implies that the
Lebanese state and Hezbollah are one, Israel's freedom of action and
legitimacy for operations against Lebanon will be increased, especially
in a military conflict or all-out war.
These different approaches on a
collapsing Lebanon prompt different ideas on the policy that Israel
should adopt. A belief that Lebanon’s falling into Hezbollah hands is
positive supports a policy of non-intervention; furthermore, Israel's
ability to influence events in Lebanon is very limited. Advocates of
this policy argue that Israel should refrain from intervening in
Lebanese internal developments, and should certainly not help Lebanon,
other than through direct or indirect humanitarian aid, because any
other aid will strengthen Hezbollah. Israel should therefore continue
focusing its efforts on weakening Hezbollah.
The other approach holds that there is no
absolute identity between Lebanon and Hezbollah, and that Israel's
interest still lies in a stable pro-Western Lebanon. While Hezbollah is
currently the strongest military and political power in Lebanon, not all
Lebanese support the organization, and the severe crisis afflicting the
country has increased criticism of Hezbollah because of its actions in
the internal theater. Israel should therefore try to support efforts
that seek a way of strengthening the power groups opposing Hezbollah
whom it regards as positive in order to prevent a total Hezbollah
takeover of Lebanon's state institutions and its population, with
Lebanon becoming an Iranian protectorate. This policy, of course, does
not mean abandoning the political and military efforts to weaken
Hezbollah.
The Israeli government should update its
policy on Lebanon according to a long-term perspective, and should
consider the consequences of the collapse of the Lebanese state for
Israel in particular, and for the region in general. Israel should adopt
a proactive approach that regards the current developments in Lebanon
as providing an opportunity to influence the country's future, rather
than treating Hezbollah's dominance as preordained, especially in the
extreme scenario of a takeover of the country by Hezbollah. This is not a
recommendation for direct intervention by Israel in Lebanon’s internal
affairs, similar to previous attempts that failed, or provision of
direct aid to Lebanon. Israel's ability to provide aid is in any case
limited, because most Lebanese perceive Israel as an enemy country. All
of Israel's offers to aid the Lebanese people, including the offer by
Minister of Defense Benny Gantz on July 6 to send humanitarian aid via
UNIFIL, were rejected out of hand.
In light of the dire economic situation in Lebanon, and considering Hezbollah’s attempts to deepen Iranian investments in the country, I have contacted UNIFIL via the IDF’s liaison officials and discussed a proposal to transfer humanitarian aid to Lebanon.
— בני גנץ - Benny Gantz (@gantzbe) July 6, 2021
It is therefore necessary to formulate a
policy that will support simultaneously Israel's two main interests that
can still be advanced: the security interest in dealing with the threat
posed by Hezbollah, and the interest in a stable and pro-Western
neighbor on Israel's northern border.
In order to promote the interest of a
pro-Western Lebanon free of dependence on Iran, Israel needs to spur its
partners in the West. This refers mainly to the United States and
France, who are involved in the efforts to provide aid to Lebanon, but
also Israel's new partners in the Gulf. Israel should urge them to be
more active in providing immediate aid designated for the Lebanese
people, while demanding close supervision of the transfer of the aid in
order to prevent its falling into the hands of Hezbollah and its
supporters. At the same time, it is particularly important to coordinate
with the United States the obstruction of the channels whereby Iran
transfers aid to Hezbollah, if the sanctions against Iran are rescinded
following an agreement on a return to the nuclear agreement. Continued
strengthening of the Lebanese army is an important interest of Israel
(without supplying it with weapons that are liable to jeopardize
Israel's security), which has demonstrated until now that it is the sole
entity capable of preserving internal order in the country. It is also
important to consider ideas for expanding the international
presence/involvement by parties that are not members of the Shiite axis
(the United States and France on the one hand, and Russia, China, and
possibly Turkey on the other).
These efforts should be pursued concurrently with the ongoing effort to weaken Hezbollah. This includes both political undertakings – condemning Hezbollah and consolidating its classification as a terrorist organization in the international theater – and military actions. In the military sphere, the deployment for a possible conflict on the northern border must be continued. In tandem, it is necessary to consider whether the crisis in Lebanon offers Israel an opportunity to deal a more substantial blow to Hezbollah's capabilities, and to act with more determination to defeat the effort by Hamas, Iran, and Hezbollah to forge a new "deterrence equation" against Israel that links clashes on the Temple Mount and elsewhere in Jerusalem to firing at Israeli territory from the north, as occurred during Operation Guardian of the Walls and in the shooting incident on July 20, following the violent clash on the Temple Mount two days earlier.
Orna Mizrahi, Yoram Schweitzer
Source: https://www.inss.org.il/publication/lebanon-collapse/
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