by Herb Keinon
Just as Israel will not allow Hezbollah to reestablish itself along its northern border, it will not allow Hamas to rebuild its murderous capabilities along its border in the south.
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As of Sunday, Israel is juggling two ceasefires simultaneously: one in Lebanon and one in Gaza.
The ceasefire in Lebanon, which began on November 27, is set to expire on January 26. The Gaza ceasefire will enter a critical phase in two weeks when negotiations are to start on the second stage – a process aimed at securing the release of all the remaining hostages and a complete Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.
The prevailing assumption regarding Lebanon is that the ceasefire will be extended for at least another month to allow for the fulfillment of its terms: the movement of Hezbollah fighters north of the Litani River, the withdrawal of IDF forces south of the Blue Line, and the deployment in southern Lebanon of the Lebanese Army to take over Hezbollah positions and dismantle the terror infrastructure entrenched there.
The rationale behind this arrangement is clear: Israel can no longer tolerate a terrorist organization, openly committed to its destruction, operating directly on its border. Dismantling Hezbollah’s capabilities is seen as a necessary step to prevent future threats.
What is true in Lebanon is also true in Gaza
Just as Israel will not allow Hezbollah to reestablish itself along its northern border, it will not allow Hamas to rebuild its murderous capabilities along its border in the south.
However, anyone who watched the release of the three hostages on Sunday witnessed a sobering reality – Hamas remains a significant presence in Gaza. Its terrorists, in facemasks, dark sunglasses, green headbands, and army fatigues, were once again seen riding through the street in white pick-up trucks.
The irony in this staged show of might was tremendous. For this parade, Hamas terrorists wore uniforms and rode through the streets brandishing their automatic rifles; during 15 months of fighting, they cowardly shed those uniforms and fought from behind women and children.
Yes, Hamas is still there. While Sunday’s spectacle was carefully staged to project dominance, Israel’s terms for a permanent ceasefire will reflect the same principles applied in Lebanon: disarming the terrorist organization and moving it away from the border.
Just as Israel is not aiming to eliminate every Hezbollah terrorist in Lebanon, it is also not going to be able to kill every Hamas terrorist in Gaza. The objective of the ceasefire in Lebanon is to dismantle Hezbollah’s terrorist infrastructure and prevent it from massively rearming, and that – along with moving Hamas out of power – will be the objective of a permanent ceasefire in Gaza.
This is where the parallels diverge.
In Lebanon, there is a government that, at least theoretically, aspires to reclaim sovereignty. That government has an army, backed by the West, that has the capability – if it chooses – to reclaim control of southern Lebanon from Hezbollah.
No such government exists in Gaza. And therein lies the challenge. Hamas, after 15 months of fighting, is not going to relinquish power voluntarily. It has signaled a willingness to share power with the Palestinian Authority – a scenario Israel has not endorsed, not trusting the PA much more than Hamas – but it is unwilling to give up its arms.
Israel and the US – and here it is worth taking Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, US President Donald Trump, and others in Netanyahu’s cabinet and the new US administration at their word – have been unequivocal: Hamas cannot openly govern Gaza nor control the Strip from behind the scenes by dint of its military might. If it refuses to disarm and dismantle its infrastructure, the war in Gaza will not end.
No one thought that Israel would renew fighting after the first ceasefire in November 2023, yet it did. Similarly, few believe Israel will renew fighting in Gaza this time as well, but if Hamas does not step aside, Israel will have no other choice, just as Israel will have no other option than to strike at Hezbollah if it again tries to rebuild itself on the northern border.
The Gaza ceasefire is constructed so that after the 16th day, the two sides will begin negotiating a second stage that would, if all goes well, commence after 42 days and the release of the last of the initial group of 33 hostages.
This second stage, according to the plan, would result in the release of all the hostages, a complete IDF withdrawal from Gaza, and the beginning of talks on the reconstruction of the devastated coastal Strip.
This is where the international community – expected to ante up for this reconstruction – will gain leverage over Hamas.
The working assumption, potentially mistaken, is that Hamas wants to see Gaza rebuilt, a project that will take years and tens of billions of dollars.
Likely funders include Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, the European Union, and – to a lesser extent – the US.
The logic is simple: International donors, with the exception of Qatar, will not invest unless Hamas ceases to be a military force and relinquishes its control. There needs to be a broad consensus that money will not flow into Gaza until and unless Hamas dismantles and disbands.
This, of course, is much easier said than done.
On paper, no donor – with the possible exception of Qatar – wants to see Hamas retain control. The question will be whether they will have the fortitude to stick by their guns and condition any aid to Gaza on the dismantling of Hamas.
When the world media descends on Gaza as the fighting tapers off and the scope of the destruction there becomes evident, there will be calls for Gaza’s reconstruction no matter what because Gazans should not have to live amid the ruins of war. Israel will need to push back hard against this narrative and insist that, despite the suffering, there can be no reconstruction of Gaza with Hamas still in power.
If the international community shows resolve on this matter, then there is hope. If not, Hamas will simply rearm and rebuild, setting the stage for continued conflict because Israel cannot and will not live with a viable Hamas threat on its border within striking distance of neighboring Israeli communities.
But then there is another catch, and this one applies to Israel. Major donors, such as the Saudis and the Europeans, will inevitably tie their aid to Gaza with demands for “creating a pathway” toward a Palestinian state.
Following October 7, this will be difficult for the government – any Israeli government – to swallow, given the horrendous experience with what, for all intents and purposes, was the mini-Palestinian state of Gaza.
This ceasefire offers an opportunity but no guarantees. The challenge for Israel now is clear: to prevent Gaza from once again becoming a staging ground for terror. Much depends on international resolve – whether donor nations will link aid to Hamas’s disarmament and enforce it. Without this, the calm will be short-lived, and Israel will be forced to act again.
After October 7, there is no room for any illusions about what leaving Hamas unchecked would mean.
Herb Keinon
Source: https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-838416
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