by Ryan Mauro
2nd part of 2
Syria: Ally in the War against Terror?
Some diplomats and analysts argue that if Washington engages Damascus, Syria could become a responsible partner in the war on terror. The State Department praised Syria for its cooperation in 2003, but Cofer Black, the department's counterterrorism coordinator, said that public proclamations do not tell the whole story. In 2003, he told Newsweek, "We clearly don't have the full support of the Syrian government on the Al-Qaeda problem. They have allowed Al- Qaeda personnel to come in and virtually settle in Syria with their knowledge and support."[49] Still, the idea that engagement can flip Syria has resonance. After all, intelligence shared by Syria helped thwart a terrorist attack against the U.S. navy in Bahrain. Syrian cooperation, however, was less than complete. The Syrian government refused to give U.S. investigators direct access to Muhammad Zamar which, according to one expert, means it can be "safely assumed that the Syrians did not pass on information that reflected poorly on them in any way."[50] The high profile 2006 Iraq Study Group report, cochaired by former secretary of state James A. Baker III, and Lee H. Hamilton, the vice chairman of the 9/11 Commission, for example, recommended that the United States should "actively engage Iran and Syria in its diplomatic dialogue, without preconditions."[51]
The Assad regime has become more adept at public relations. In an attempt to portray itself as a natural ally in the war on terror, the Syrian government has framed itself as an enemy and target of Al-Qaeda. The examples given of Al-Qaeda targeting Syria, however, do not hold up. In April 2004, the Syrian regime accused Al-Qaeda of bombing a vacant U.N. building, an attack for which Al-Qaeda did not claim credit.[52] Timing, however, was suspect since the alleged Al-Qaeda operation occurred just as the U.S. Congress debated placing tougher sanctions on Syria. Syrian officials then refused to allow U.S. investigators to look into the incident. Nor is there any evidence that a September 12, 2006 attack on the U.S. embassy in Damascus was Al-Qaeda's handiwork.[53] Within ninety minutes of the attack, the crime scene was cleared of debris, including the destroyed vehicle, the bodies, and any forensic evidence. If the Syrians believed Al-Qaeda was behind the attack, they failed to allow the examination of any evidence.
Proponents of diplomacy base their recommendation on the assumption that the Syrian government has reformed. Practitioners, however, find evidence to support such conclusions lacking. In an October 2008 interview, U.S. Marine Corps Maj. Gen. John Kelly, commander in Anbar province, said, "The Syrians clearly have harbored AQI [Al-Qaeda in Iraq], allowed them to live over there and go back and forth. It's a sanctuary." And "They have done cross-border raids and killed Iraqis. The biggest mistake they made was a cross-border raid on the second of May and murdered 11 Iraqi policemen. They cut their heads off, a sickening thing. It was a huge mistake. We know the guy who did it, AQI guy. Kind of a big dog who works with Syrian intelligence."[54]
Conclusion
The Assad regime sponsors terrorism because it is a regime based on terrorism. The advantages for the Assad regime to sponsor jihadists are many. They seek to use terrorists to defeat the United States in the region, thwart the development of democracies in Lebanon and Iraq, and to employ terror as a means of waging war against Israel. Outmatched by the weapons the West possesses, Syria repeatedly turns to unconventional means. Terror sponsorship also creates a dependency upon the Assad regime making it counterproductive for the forces of Islamic extremism to wage war against it. So long as Assad retains a tight grip on Syria, he need not fear these forces turning against him. Finally, the regime sponsors such forces as a tool of diplomacy. By supporting insurgents and terrorists and allowing radical Islam to show its head inside Syria, Assad makes clear that there is no viable alternative to him and that it is he who must be courted if the West is to be successful in the region.
Any strategy to tackle Assad's support for terrorism must rely on more than engagement and shuttle diplomacy. The Obama administration should develop ways to make Syrian support of terrorism counterproductive to its own objectives. Rather than allowing terrorism to be an effective tool of diplomacy, such actions must be met with economic sanctions and international pressure. Rather than handing Assad victory in the region, every move by Syria should be countered. The regime must see no gain and only loss from its support of terrorism. Finally, the West should find a third option beyond either reliance on Assad or removing him from power—which would allow the Muslim Brotherhood or other Islamists to take his place. The Obama administration should assist the development of the democratic opposition forces in Syria, however weak they may be. By promoting Syrian democratic forces, Washington will regain a strong hand at the negotiating table, simultaneously decreasing the power of Assad and the Muslim Brotherhood and, most importantly, ending the brutal terrorist regime that threatens innocents both in the Middle East and in the West.
Ryan Mauro is the founder of WorldThreats.com and the assistant director of intelligence of The Counter Terrorism Electronic Warfare and Intelligence Centre.
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
[1] Associated Press, Mar. 4, 2009.
[2] Claudia Rosett, "Commerce Department Waives Syria Sanctions," Forbes, Feb. 12, 2009.
[3] Agence France-Presse, Jan. 20, 2008.
[4] "State Sponsors of Terrorism Overview," Country Reports on Terrorism 2007, U.S. Department of State, Apr. 30, 2008.
[5] The Guardian (London), Feb. 13, 2008.
[6] "President Barack Obama's Inaugural Address," The White House, Jan. 21, 2009.
[7] "Homeland Security," "Barack Obama and Joe Biden: The Change We Need," official campaign website, accessed Mar. 23, 2009.
[8] Emerson Vermaat, "Madrid Terrorists Possessed an Important Al-Qaeda Manual," Militant Islam Monitor, Feb. 20, 2007.
[9] Ibid.
[10] International Herald Tribune (Paris), May 19, 2005.
[11] The Daily Star (Beirut), Oct. 1, 2004.
[12] BBC News, Oct. 28, 2002.
[13] "Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal—Al Libi, Abu Faraj," U.S. Department of Defense, Feb. 8, 2007.
[14] Author interview with Hamid Mir, May 24, 2006, via e-mail.
[15] "Profile: Afghanistan's 'Lion of Panjshir,'" Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Sept. 5, 2006.
[16] Jane's Security News (Surrey, U.K.), June 16, 2003.
[17] CNN.com, Apr. 26, 2004.
[18] The Jordan Times (Amman), Apr. 27, 2004.
[19] The New York Sun, Oct. 25, 2007; Ar-Ra'y (Amman), June 8, 2007.
[20] Ya Lubnan (Beirut), June 5, 2007; Michael Young, "Syria's Useful Idiots," The Wall Street Journal, June 3, 2007.
[21] CNN.com, May 24, 2007.
[22] The International Herald Tribune, Mar. 15, 2007.
[23] The New York Daily News, June 18, 2007.
[24] The Washington Post, June 8, 2005.
[25] The Washington Post, June 8, 2005.
[26] The Washington Post, June 8, 2005.
[27] The Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 23, 2004.
[28] The New York Sun, Sept. 14, 2007.
[29] Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco (New York: Penguin Press, 2006), p. 409.
[30] The New York Times, July 5, 2004.
[31] Gary Gambill, "How Significant Is Syria's Role in Iraq?" Terrorism Monitor (Jamestown Foundation, Washington, D.C.), Oct. 7, 2004.
[32] The Washington Post, Dec. 17, 2004.
[33] "Coalition Provisional Authority Briefing with General Richard Myers, chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, commander, Coalition Ground Forces," Baghdad, Iraq, Apr. 15, 2004.
[34] The Washington Post, Dec. 8, 2004.
[35] "180 Terrorists Escape to Syria at Start of Operation Steel Curtain," Kuwait News Agency, Nov. 5, 2005.
[36] "HP-759: Treasury Designates Individuals, Entity Fueling Iraqi Insurgency," U.S. Department of Treasury, Jan. 9, 2008.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Los Angeles Times, Apr. 27, 2003.
[39] Los Angeles Times, Apr. 17, 2003.
[40] The International Herald Tribune, May 19, 2005.
[41] BBC News, Feb. 23, 2005.
[42] Associated Press, Feb. 24, 2005; USA Today, Feb. 24, 2005.
[43] USA Today, Feb. 24, 2005.
[44] CNN.com, Apr. 12, 2005
[45] CNN.com, Feb. 4, 2007.
[46] Sen. Joseph Lieberman, "Al Qaeda's Travel Agent," The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 20, 2007.
[47] The Washington Post, Jan. 21, 2008.
[48] Mark Eichenlaub, "Hundreds of Loyalists and Benefactors of Saddam Hussein's Regime Have Been Found Working with or for Al-Qaeda in Iraq," RegimeofTerror.com, July 20, 2007.
[49] Newsweek, May 6, 2003.
[50] Matthew Levitt, "Iran and Syria: State Sponsorship in the Age of Terror Networks," lecture presentation, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Mar. 7, 2005.
[51] The Iraq Study Group Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2006), p. 36.
[52] BBC News, Apr. 29, 2004.
[53] BBC News, Sept. 13, 2006.
[54] U.S. News and World Report, Oct. 27, 2008.
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