by Dore Gold
In 1996,
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan convened an international forum at the
Hashimiyya Palace in Amman with guests from the entire Middle East as
well as noted statesmen from outside the region. As a newly appointed
foreign policy adviser to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, I found
myself invited to one of these events. Among the guests, with whom I
spoke a great deal, was former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who
possessed a rare combination of enormous diplomatic experience and the
capacity to derive lessons from what he did in practice that can be
applied in other cases.
The Israeli-Palestinian
peace process was clearly on the verge of collapse at that time, after
Palestinian suicide bombers attacked Israeli cities four times in
February-March 1996 and ninety Israelis had been killed. Recognizing
that it was necessary to take a different approach, Kissinger told me
"what you need is a 'code of conduct' for the Middle East." To be
honest, I had absolutely no idea what he was talking about. But I
decided that when I got home to Jerusalem, I would check the four
volumes of his memoirs that I had on my bookshelves and then speak to
him again when he arrived a few days later.
Looking under the
letter "C" in the index of his books, I expected to find the term "Code
of Conduct." It wasn't there. Yet from our subsequent discussion, it
became clear what he was getting at. Back in 1972, Kissinger found
himself involved in negotiations with the Soviet Union over limits on
the growth of the strategic missile arsenals of the two superpowers.
These negotiations eventually led to the signing of the SALT I Treaty.
But there were serious
reasons to doubt whether the negotiating process between the superpowers
was leading anywhere, since Moscow was looking to increase its military
activism in the Third World, from Vietnam to Angola. Kissinger did not
want to sit at the negotiating table while the Soviets resumed their war
against the West through their proxy forces.
What he developed was a
document called "Basic Principles of U.S.-Soviet Relations." If Moscow
adhered to this code of conduct, then Washington could judge the level
of progress that had been made in creating new relations between the
superpowers based on detente. But if Moscow violated the code of
conduct, then Washington could turn these principles into a blunt
diplomatic instrument for hammering the Russians before the NATO allies
and the American public more generally. The code of conduct would allow
the U.S. to smoke out the Soviets to reveal their true intent.
Could Kissinger's idea
of a code of conduct been helpful in the Middle East? Was it possible to
devise a set of rules for future negotiations that would either promote
a real peace process or provide a clear measure for indicating that the
Palestinian leadership had violated its commitments? There were unique
issues in the Middle East that could have been addressed: incitement to
violence, providing sanctuary to terrorist organizations, or halting
hostile initiatives in international bodies like the U.N.
These were not formal
issues for the negotiating agenda, like borders, refugees, or
settlements, but they served as important indicators of whether the
peace process was serious or not. In 1996, Israel found itself in a
position in which it was negotiating with Arafat at the peace table,
while he was giving a green light to Hamas to escalate suicide attacks
on Israel and thereby gain diplomatic leverage. This was completely
untenable. To make the code of conduct in the Israeli-Palestinian case,
the U.S. would have had to support it and, in effect, serve as its
judge.
Presently, the idea of a
code of conduct is relevant for another dimension of Middle Eastern
diplomacy. In the aftermath of what is still called the Arab Spring, new
regimes are sprouting across North Africa and the Middle East, which
often contain leaders who identify with the Muslim Brotherhood. In
Syria, in the post-Assad era, it is likely that even more extreme Salafi
currents, and in some cases actual branches of al-Qaida, will have
considerable sway.
There is a huge debate
underway in the West about what to do with the Muslim Brotherhood. On
the one hand, there is an awareness that the leadership of al-Qaida
acquired its political education under the wings of the Muslim
Brotherhood, like Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden's successor, who
started his career in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood or Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed, the architect of 9/11, who grew up in its Kuwait branch. On
the other hand, there are policymakers in Europe and even in Washington
who view the Muslim Brotherhood as a more moderate alternative to the
Salafists.
By establishing
objective criteria for acceptable state behavior, a code of conduct, if
carefully designed, can be used as a tool for distinguishing those
rulers that adhere to its principles from those who renounce them. It
can be used for establishing who should be "inside the tent" with the
West and allowed to benefit from international trade, technology
transfer, and even arms sales; as opposed to those who should be left
"outside the tent," along with the rogue states.
Eventually, Kissinger's
idea of a code of conduct was incorporated into the founding document
of a European security conference in 1975, known as the Helsinki
Declaration. Those who adhered to its principles came to what was called
the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).
Israel agreed to the
establishment of a Middle Eastern CSCE in its peace treaty with Jordan
from 1994. If such a conference were convened for the Middle East and
states had to decide whether they supported its principles, it would
help to create the foundation for a stable regional order in the future.
But the West embracing new leaders in the Middle East who refuse to
meet some minimal international standards is the fastest way to create
the pre-conditions for international chaos that will increase the risks
of armed conflict in the region in the future.
Dore Gold
Source: http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_opinion.php?id=3259
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
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