by Jonathan Spyer
For many Egyptian supporters of the July
3 coup against the Muslim Brotherhood-led government, coup leader
General Abd al-Fatah al-Sisi is a figure of veneration. Posters bearing
the general’s visage alongside that of Gamal Abd al-Nasser have appeared
all over Cairo. Nasser, of course, initiated the officers’ regime which
held sway in Egypt from 1952 until the downfall of Hosni Mubarak in
early 2011. He also, in 1954, presided over the bloody repression of the
Muslim Brotherhood.
Sisi, for those who venerate him, is
seen as the inheritor of Nasser’s mantle. For the crowds that he
summoned to Tahrir Square in his televised address on July 24th, he is,
like his predecessor, a patriotic officer who stepped in to save the day
at a moment of supreme national crisis.
No one in Egypt venerates Nasser’s two
successors, Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak. But if the Sisi-Nasser
comparison makes sense, it must also be the case that the putschist
general is their inheritor too. And it is so. The July 3 coup is a
victory for the Egyptian counter revolution. It establishes, at least
for now, the status quo pre-2011.
It is important not to be taken in by
the crowds in Tahrir Square pledged to Sisi’s defense. These were
summoned by the general in a maneuver familiar to other times and
places. Nasser, too, knew how to call intoxicated masses of followers
onto the streets of Cairo when necessary – usually to ecstatically
demand some item of policy which the president had already decided to
carry out. So it is with General Sisi.
In Sisi’s case, the crowds in the square
are needed to make the coup look like something else. This is not only
or mainly for regional or local consumption. In the old days, Arab
officers would cloak their rule in slogans exhorting socialism or the
Arab nation. Today, democracy and representation are the watchwords.
Sisi understands that his patrons in the west, on whom the Egyptian
military relies, are upset and frightened by the army’s move.
For he and his followers, this reaction
represents the very height of naivete. As far as they are concerned, the
July 3 act saved Egypt from the establishment of a Muslim
Brotherhood-led autocracy presiding over chaos and probably famine.
A US decision to delay the delivery of
four F-16 fighter jets to Egypt indicates a growing American discomfort
and concern regarding the de facto military rulers of Egypt. At the same
time, the US has not yet openly stated the obvious fact that the
ousting of Morsy constituted a coup, since this would require a
cessation of US aid in toto, which would plunge Egypt into chaos.
Similarly, EU foreign policy chief
Catherine Ashton’s insistence on visiting deposed and incarcerated
former President Mohammed Morsy was meant to signal the EU’s disapproval
of the military’s tactics.
The military has indicated that it does
not want to rule the country, and has laid down a road map intended to
bring about new presidential elections within nine months. But even if
new elections take place as scheduled, the coup of July 3rd has
irrevocably changed the political landscape that emerged since 2011 in
Egypt. It indicates that whoever wins elections, the army is the force
that will ultimately decide the direction of the country, stepping in to
adjust the situation as and when it sees fit, while leaving the mundane
tasks of daily administration to the politicians.
This was not what the Muslim Brotherhood
had in mind when they entered the elections. It is also not a reality
they intend to accept. As a result, Egypt remains poised on a knife
edge.
The Muslim Brotherhood has not accepted
the verdict of July 3rd. The movement is reverting back to the role of
an insurrectionary opposition movement. Brotherhood demonstrators remain
ensconced in the Rabia al-Adawiya mosque, in the Nasr City area of
Cairo. Hundreds have already died in violent clashes with the security
forces.
There are rumors that guns and explosive
devices are being hoarded at Rabia, in the event that the army attempts
a violent dispersal of the protestors. The Brotherhood’s demands remain
rock-solid: the reinstatement of Morsy and the reimposition of the
Islamist constitution that he and his colleagues brought into being.
Violence against soldiers and police in
the Sinai area is on the increase. There are reports of the growing
presence of Salafi Islamists among the demonstrators at Rabia.
Brotherhood preacher Yusuf al-Qaradawi has called for a jihad against
the new regime in Egypt.
Yet Sisi apparently seeks to avoid a
frontal confrontation with the Brotherhood. For the moment, he has what
he wants – power, popular legitimacy, and the Muslim Brothers outside of
the tent. From his point of view, it is their move. If they seriously
intend to convert themselves into an insurgent army – which would be
outside of the traditions of the movement in Egypt – then they are
inviting an Algerian type situation for Egypt.
Such a scenario would be catastrophic
for all Egyptians. But it would almost certainly result in the defeat
and destruction of the Muslim Brothers.
And if, as seems more likely, they want
to carry on political protests, with the more extreme elements engaging
in sporadic acts of violence, then Sisi will seek to contain them, and
wait them out, countering their gatherings with mass public
demonstrations in his support.
The point to be borne in mind is that
there remain two forces of note in Egypt: the army and the Muslim
Brothers. Everything else is a decoration. And as of now, the army is
winning. This is good for the west, though the west apparently does not
see it that way.
In the meantime, the new
Nasser/Sadat/Mubarak, supported and financed by Saudi Arabia and the
United Arab Emirates, is in control of Egypt. His reign will not bring
democracy, nor prosperity to that blighted country. It will, however,
prevent the nightmare of an Islamist regime on the Nile – by whatever
means the general finds appropriate.
This article appeared in the Jerusalem Post, Aug. 2, 2013.
Jonathan Spyer
Source: http://www.gloria-center.org/2013/08/meet-the-new-mubarak/
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
No comments:
Post a Comment