by Amos Yadlin
In contrast to the clichéd statement that there is no military solution to terrorism, Israel has proven it can solve systemic terrorist threats against it militarily. Nonetheless, the political solution is always to be preferred. The long term political solution for Gaza is the continued weakening of Hamas – economically, politically, and militarily – and the creation of better political alternatives for both the Palestinians and Israel. Over the last two years, Hamas has been politically and financially weakened. If, after Operation Protective Edge, it is militarily weakened as well, it will be possible – together with Egypt, the moderate Arab states, and the international community – to bring the PA back to Gaza, ensure economic development there, and gradually lift the blockade. This, plus the prevention of force buildup and the demilitarization of the Gaza Strip, will be key factors in stabilizing Gaza and steering it toward favorable development.
Six Insights on the Situation
Asymmetrical strategic equilibrium:
After nearly three weeks of confrontation between Israel and terrorist
organizations in the Gaza Strip, during which some 1,500 rockets have
been fired at Israeli cities and towns and Israel has undertaken some
3,500 aerial strikes on Gaza, there is a strategic equilibrium, albeit
essentially asymmetrical, between Israel and Hamas. The “asymmetric
draw” is an important concept that likewise depicts some of Israel’s
past strategic situations. The current asymmetry stems first of all from
the fact that Hamas operates by the rules of a terrorist organization
firing indiscriminately at civilians, whereas Israel, governed by
international law, restricts itself to strike only military targets and
labors to avoid harming innocent bystanders.
Israeli tanks along the Gaza Strip border,
July 24, 2014; Image Bank/Getty Images
On the other hand, Israel enjoys an
immeasurable qualitative advantage in terms of the power of its weapon
systems compared to those available to Hamas and hence also the ability
to escalate the campaign – a prerogative Hamas has already lost. This
aspect of asymmetry has grown even more pronounced, because Hamas has
resumed operating like a resistance terrorist group, having handed
responsibility for the Gaza Strip back to the PA and the government of
technocrats convened following the reconciliation agreement with Fatah.
Hamas’ internal balance of power has shifted in favor of the military
wing, which has bolstered its status as the major element of power in
the organization.
Defensive strategy:
Both sides have excelled in their defensive strategies. Israel
astounded Hamas and the world at large with its ability to provide an
almost hermetic response to Hamas’ rocket attacks, which have hit the
proverbial brick wall in the form of Israel’s Iron Dome. Thanks to good
intelligence and effective, rapid operational activity, Israel has
foiled most of Hamas’ surprises, especially mass-casualty terrorist
attacks and abductions via tunnels dug into Israel. Hamas has
concentrated on defending its military wing and political leadership,
which have disappeared underground into reinforced bunkers beneath
civilian installations. Ironically, the “iron dome” protecting Hamas’
military wing is Gaza’s civilian population – the very population that
Hamas places on rooftops and – contrary to international law – in close
proximity to firepower activity and the hideouts of its command
structure.
Preparedness for the confrontation:
Hamas prepared well for this round of fighting. It seems to have
studied the IDF strategy and operational tools of the 2009 and 2012
operations and devised a systemic response to them. The IDF, which did
not initiate the current confrontation, was dragged into it without an
up-to-date strategy, an effective opening strike, new operational ideas,
and sufficient understanding of the enemy’s rationale. Israel seems to
have assumed that Hamas would be pressured by the increased scope and
intensity of the attacks and would therefore be forced to end the
confrontation in similar fashion to the way it ended previous rounds.
However, relinquishing responsibility on the civic and political fronts
freed Hamas up to ignore Israel’s attacks on “the State of Gaza” and
concentrate instead on the military wing. This change in Hamas’ approach
did not penetrate IDF thinking, which tallied airstrikes instead of
concentrating on targeting the military wing’s commanders and
capabilities. The IDF clung to the concept of “another round” and the
graduated use of force, instead of changing its paradigm and treating
this as a confrontation unlike those of the past.
Attainment of goals:
At the time of this writing, the strategic goals of the operations have
not been achieved. Israel has not yet formulated a systemic approach
and the appropriate offensive operational tools to achieve its strategic
goals. Ten days ago Israel was forced to act to upset the strategic
stalemate in light of the understanding that even the modest goals of
the operation presented by the Prime Minister – restoring the calm,
rehabilitating Israel’s deterrence, and dealing the military wing of
Hamas a harsh blow – were not achieved by the aerial phase alone.
However, the limited ground maneuver Israel has undertaken, designed to
destroy the tunnels, has likewise not changed the situation
dramatically. This phase, which neutralizes a significant Hamas
strategic capability and thereby denies Hamas the opportunity to
escalate the situation, is very important, but is by no means enough.
The survival of Hamas’ military wing is an achievement for Hamas, along
with its ability to continue launching rockets at Israel’s civilian
front throughout the fighting and even to disrupt civilian air traffic
to Israel. The ground incursion as it has unfolded to date is far from
maximizing IDF power, is focused primarily on defensive activity, and is
not marked by the requisite creativity – whereas Hamas has clearly
internalized lessons from previous rounds. Is the inadequate damage to
Hamas’ military wing the result of intelligence flaws? Or, if the
inadequate damage is intentional, does it stem from the justified
concern not to harm innocent bystanders? Or is the operating assumption –
that Hamas should be preserved as responsible for Gaza – simply
incorrect?
The importance of legitimacy:
Israel enjoys a relatively high degree of legitimacy, among its allies
and even in the Arab world, stemming from Hamas’ refusal to accept the
Prime Minister’s “calm for calm” proposal in the initial days of the
operation, its refusal to accept the Egyptian ceasefire proposal, and
the blatancy with which it violated the humanitarian ceasefire. Not only
President Obama and Chancellor Merkel support Israel’s right to defend
itself against rockets aimed at civilians; the Egyptian Foreign Minister
held Hamas responsible for the civilians killed in Gaza due to its
refusal to endorse the ceasefire accepted by Israel. At the same time,
while Israel may have the understanding of Western leaders, it does not
enjoy the support of international public opinion affected by the
graphic photographs of civilian death and destruction coming from Gaza.
With the dissemination of photographs taken during the humanitarian
ceasefire, the pressure of public opinion has risen and become a subject
of consideration for Israeli decision makers, although not to the same
degree as in previous confrontations
The regional aspect – risks and opportunities:
Thus far, concerns and forecasts of a regional escalation have proven
unfounded. Demonstrations by Arabs in Israel and the West Bank in the
first two weeks of the operation did not exceed the scope of
demonstrations prior to the operation. With the third week of the
operation, initial signs of greater unrest surfaced, along with
fatalities on the West Bank. Nonetheless, the assumption remains that a
violent third intifada is not the option preferred by President Abbas
and PA leaders in Ramallah. Its cost is understood and represents a
serious deterrent. The few rockets fired from Lebanon and Syria were not
the opening volleys of a second front, and Israel contained these
isolated events well. The rockets were launched by small, fringe
Palestinian organizations incapable of setting another front ablaze.
Neither Hizbollah, enmeshed in fighting jihadists in Syria, nor Assad
will open a military front on behalf of Hamas, which two years ago
abandoned the radical pro-Iranian axis. The nuclear talks with Iran,
which were extended last week, also did not end in a crisis or a “bad
deal,” thus diverting Israel’s attention. Additionally, the crisis
exposed the regional set of alliances and overlapping interests. The
fact that Israel, Egypt, the PA, and the Arab Gulf states (excluding
Qatar) are aligned against Hamas and its allies represents opportunities
for diplomatic and financial activity against Hamas and the channeling
of other issues in a positive direction in the wider Palestinian arena.
Six Recommended Action Items
Changing the basic assumption that Hamas must be preserved as the entity responsible for Gaza:
This assumption causes multiple damage: it prevents extremely harsh
damage to Hamas lest it fall; it makes Hamas think it can extend the
fighting without paying for it with its own demise; and it prevents the
possibility in the long term of restoring the PA as Gaza’s dominant
power. The assumption that if Hamas falls it will be succeeded by more
radical groups requires closer analysis. What organization can threaten
Israel more than Hamas and shoot rockets farther than Haifa? What
element can dig dozens of terrorist tunnels? It is time to rethink the
doomsday forecasts of “a global jihad tsunami” that haven’t materialized
in the past – neither from Afghanistan to Iraq, nor from Sinai to the
Golan. Any radical organization that seizes control of Gaza should Hamas
collapse (and it is not at all clear that every Hamas substitute would
be radical) would have to spend years building the terrorist
infrastructure Hamas has already constructed.
Continued military pressure – from both the ground and air – to inflict severe damage on Hamas’ military wing:
Once we shake off the assumption that Hamas must be preserved as the
responsible party in Gaza, attention must focus on expanding the
military move to deal a severe blow to Hamas’ military wing. The
military wing is preventing the ceasefire and must therefore be pummeled
and weakened. The entrance of ground troops has already resulted in
some achievements: the discovery and destruction of tunnels, limited
damage to the military wing, and engagement that has yielded new, high
quality intelligence. Still, the current ground campaign is not a
maneuver that unsettles the enemy’s equilibrium. Thus the campaign
should continue, and Gaza should be sectioned into different units. This
would generate pressure on specific areas from which Hamas is firing
and in which it has a significant military presence. Surprise maneuvers,
encirclement, the destruction of rocket launch sites, evacuation of
civilians, and intelligence and operational efforts to reach Hamas’
manufacturing, launch, and command and control centers are all necessary
moves. The leadership of Hamas must decide that a ceasefire is
preferable to continued fighting. It must feel that the noose is
tightening and the IDF is closing in.
Working toward an unequivocal balance favoring Israel:
Ending the campaign against Hamas with a strategic deadlock would
project Israeli weakness elsewhere as well. Hamas is Israel’s weakest
enemy. Hizbollah has many more missiles and rockets and many more
warheads of much greater accuracy. Damascus and Tehran too will study
the results of the current campaign. To be sure, every arena has its
particular features and Israel’s deterrence against states is much more
effective than against terrorist organizations. However, a drawn-out
campaign without a clear-cut decision – the fourth in a row – in which
Israel undertakes a limited ground maneuver while leaving its enemy with
strategic military capabilities because it is protected by civilians,
and failure to destroy Hamas’ military and civilian leaderships are only
some of the factors constituting the final balance liable to erode
Israel’s deterrence and lead to other confrontations in arenas much more
complex than Gaza. The systemic rationale driving the IDF must be that
Hamas must pay an immeasurably high price, not only in infrastructures
but primarily in its key force components, the leadership and senior
military command, and the ability to attack the State of Israel.
Preventing future force buildup is essential for a long period of calm:
Neither Operation Cast Lead nor Operation Pillar of Defense created
effective mechanisms for preventing Hamas’ subsequent force buildup.
When examining the arrangement that will be reached at the end of the
operation, it is critical to understand that without dealing with force
buildup, the next round will be postponed only because of deterrence.
Israel’s deterrence vis-à-vis Hizbollah is extremely strong (thanks to
several factors: the blow Hizbollah was dealt in 2006, which far
exceeded what it expected; its responsibility for the Lebanese state;
intra-ethnic sensitivities in Lebanon; and the fact that it has no
legitimacy for attacking Israel). Against Hamas, Israel’s deterrence was
not effective enough and did not ensure a long period of calm. It is
therefore important to ensure that Hamas force rehabilitation be very
slow to nonexistent. The fact that Egypt is currently effective in
preventing smuggling, the understandings with other Arab nations opposed
to Hamas about joint activity against Hamas’ force buildup, and
Israel’s right to act against the domestic manufacture of strategic
weapons and rockets must all be part of any arrangement at the end of
Operation Protective Edge.
Ending the economic blockade:
Part of Hamas’ ongoing endurance is explained by its spokesmen: “We
have nothing to lose; the situation in Gaza is so dire that we’re not
afraid of military blows or the Israeli occupation.” This is propaganda
that will not survive the test of more pressure on Hamas. Nonetheless,
in any future arrangement, it behooves Israel to distinguish between the
economic blockade, which must be relaxed, and the military siege, which
must be strictly enforced. Wherever there is tension between economic
development in Gaza and possible force buildup, the prevention of any
force buildup must be paramount. Economic development of Gaza, which
will turn the Gazan population to a more positive channel, reduce
support for terrorism based on despair, and underscore the cost Gazans
will have to pay in another round of violence, is a vested Israeli
interest. Therefore, Israel must enlist the international community and
moderate Arab nations in an economic development project for Gaza.
A political horizon:
In contrast to the clichéd statement that there is no military solution
to terrorism, Israel has proven it can solve systemic terrorist threats
against it militarily. Nonetheless, the political solution is always to
be preferred. That said, a political solution without a militarily
advantageous position and the other side’s understanding that a military
confrontation will not promote its political goal can only fail. The
long term political solution for Gaza is the continued weakening of
Hamas – economically, politically, and militarily – and the creation of
better political alternatives for both the Palestinians and Israel. Over
the last two years, Hamas has been politically and financially
weakened. If, after Operation Protective Edge, it is militarily weakened
as well, it will be possible – together with Egypt, the moderate Arab
states, and the international community – to bring the PA back to Gaza,
ensure economic development there, and gradually lift the blockade.
This, plus the prevention of force buildup and the demilitarization of
the Gaza Strip, will be key factors in stabilizing Gaza and steering it
toward favorable development.
Amos Yadlin
Source: http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=7319
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
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