by Shimon Stein, Shlomo Brom
The
third round of fighting between Israel and Hamas in less than six years
shows that the approach that has shaped Israel’s conduct to date has
failed. The alternative proposed in this article, which includes the
abandonment of conflict management as a substitute for conflict
resolution and opts for a return to an approach that strives for
conflict resolution, holds the potential for a graduated change over
time in the basic attitudes of Hamas, as well as Israel. The
organization would then have two options: either it becomes an integral
part of the process of achieving stability in Gaza, whereupon it will
find itself in a situation in which the constraints on using violence
will grow so that it will be forced to change basic attitudes, or it
cleaves to violence and gradually becomes politically weak to the point
of irrelevance.
Israel’s positions in the Egyptian-mediated indirect talks with Hamas – suspended on August 19, 2014 –
reflect an unbending Israeli approach to the management of the conflict
with Hamas in the Gaza Strip, with the exception of few tactical
adjustments required by the situation. In other words, continuity guides
Israel’s policymakers, despite the fact that the shorter intervals
between the three rounds of fighting with Hamas in recent years should
spark doubt about the effectiveness of this approach.
Several basic components of Israel’s thinking prevent a changed approach:
1. The perception that the struggle
between Israel and Hamas is a zero sum game: What is ignored is the fact
that there may be situations that benefit both sides. For example,
improving the lot of the Gazan population is good for Hamas and good for
Israel. While it allows Hamas to take credit for success, it also
exerts pressure on Hamas to maintain the calm. People who have nothing
to lose often favor exploding the situation through the use of violence.
2. The notion that in order to weaken
Hamas it is necessary to make sure Gaza persists at a sub-standard
level, i.e., limited economic activity that basically – and barely –
precludes a humanitarian crisis. Trucks move in one direction alone and
bring goods into the Gaza Strip, but there is no export of goods from
Gaza.
3. Addiction to the image of victory:
Hamas can present any change in Israel’s Gaza policy as a victory, and
therefore Israel avoids any policy change. In this context, consider
that at the end of the Yom Kippur War, Egypt presented its population
with the image of victory when Israeli forces were sitting on the west
bank of the Suez Canal as well as encircling the Egyptian Third Army,
yet no interest of Israel was harmed as a result. Some even claim that
this was one of the factors that jumpstarted the process that eventually
led to peace with Egypt.
4. Continued separation of the Gaza
Strip from the West Bank: This stance is based on the divide-and-conquer
illusion and the assumption that it is possible to separate the two and
handle each independently without there being repercussions for the
other.
5. Abbas is not a partner, certainly
not someone who can lead the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to an
agreement with Israel, and therefore Israel must oppose a unity
government between Fatah and Hamas.
6. Fears and reservations about
international intervention, including international supervision of the
implementation of agreements.
Given the repeated failures of recent years in
reducing Hamas’ incentive to fire at Israel, perhaps after Operation
Protective Edge it is time to create a new balance of factors affecting
Hamas’ considerations. If the Israeli approach does not change, it is
more than likely that the renewal of fighting is only a matter of time.
Only a fundamental change in Israel’s approach provides a chance of not
returning to the cycle of violence yet again.
Fatah and Hamas representatives
in
Gaza announcing an agreement to
form a Palestinian unity government,
April 23, 2014, AFP/Getty Images
The key components in the strategy that should guide Israel are:
1. Abandoning
what has proven to be a failed approach, i.e., conflict management as a
substitute for conflict resolution, and returning to the approach that
strives for conflict resolution. This does not mean ignoring the
political reality on both sides, which apparently does not allow for the
conflict to be resolved any time soon. The process will be hard and
gradual, but from the outset it is vital to announce that the objective
is to resolve the conflict. New contents must be infused toward a
conflict resolution formula, in order to create a clear, feasible
framework for a settlement, and to work backwards to delineate the
gradual steps required to achieve it. These, alongside negotiations,
could be partial or unilateral agreements. Hamas itself adopted the
notion of a partial agreement with Israel in the form of a long term hudna (armistice).
2. Internalizing
the reality that separating the West Bank from the Gaza Strip has
failed and that therefore it is necessary to strive for the
reintegration of Gaza in the Palestinian Authority. A first step in that
direction must be recognition of the Palestinian national unity
government and willingness to work with it. Moreover, it is necessary to
ensure that the reconstruction efforts in the Gaza Strip be spearheaded
by the PA and that the opening of the border crossings is conditional
on the presence of PA security forces on the Gazan side of the border.
3. To
the extent possible, the creation of a normal economy in Gaza, which
includes exports and imports, must be advanced. There is no reason why
the Gaza Strip cannot export vegetables and other products to Israel. It
is necessary to aim for a situation (which once existed) whereby
Israeli industrial plants once again work with Gazan subcontractors. It
is also necessary to expand the Gazan fishing zone.
Concomitant with Gaza’s economic
reconstruction, renewed force construction on the part of Hamas and the
other terrorist organizations in Gaza must be prevented as a stage in
attaining the goal (that for now appears unrealistic) of
demilitarization of the Gaza Strip, i.e., stripping Hamas and the other
organizations of their weapons. Greater openness to the needs of the
civilians in Gaza will facilitate regional and international cooperation
in preventing the rearming of Hamas. Implementing the objectives of
both areas – economy and security – cannot occur without the involvement
of other countries. Israel must work toward the establishment of a
“coalition of the willing” whose objective will be to help the sides
create a new reality in the Gaza Strip. Participating countries must
include Egypt (which will play a key role in changing the Gazan
reality), Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states (with the exception of Qatar),
and Jordan. Common to these countries (and Israel) is, on the one hand,
rejection of Hamas as a member of the radical Islamist axis that
includes Iran, Turkey, and Qatar; and, on the other hand, support for PA
President Abbas and, accordingly, a demand to restore the PA and
supplant Hamas. The collaboration of these nations will be possible only
in a context where there is a chance for real change in the relations
between Israel and the Palestinians. In other words, the Israeli
government must change its current attitude in exchange for the joint
efforts of these countries. The United States and the EU, both of which
made it clear during the fighting that alongside the need for a
ceasefire there was great importance in achieving a permanent settlement
that would ensure the security of Israel and provide for Gaza’s
humanitarian needs, will also have to be part of the coalition and prove
their willingness to go beyond rhetoric by working to implement the
economic and security dimensions of the agreement to be achieved. It is
worthwhile considering anchoring any agreement and the mechanisms of its
implementation in a Security Council resolution; this would emphasize
the commitment of the principal parties and the assisting nations to
implementation of the agreement.
If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it, but
the third round of fighting in less than six years shows that the
approach that has shaped Israel’s conduct to date has failed. The
alternative offered herein proposes a different approach holding the
potential for a graduated change over time in the basic attitudes of
Hamas, as well as Israel. The organization will have two options: either
it becomes an integral part of the process of achieving stability in
Gaza, whereupon it will find itself in a situation in which the
constraints on using violence will grow to the point that it will be
forced to change basic attitudes, or it cleaves to violence and
gradually becomes politically weak to the point of irrelevance.
Shimon Stein, Shlomo Brom
Source: http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=7565
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
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