by Daniel Pipes
Recep Tayyip Erdogan
just ascended to the presidency of Turkey and, his handpicked successor,
Ahmet Davutoglu, simultaneously assumed his old job of prime minister.
What do these changes portend for Turkey and its foreign policy? In two
words: nothing good.
In June 2005, when
Davutoglu served as chief foreign policy adviser to Erdogan, I spoke
with him for an hour in Ankara. Two topics from that conversation remain
vivid.
He asked me about the
neoconservative movement in the United States, then at the height of its
fame and supposed influence. I began by expressing doubts that I was a
member of this elite group,
as Davutoglu assumed, and went on to note that none of the key
decision-makers in the George W. Bush administration (the president,
vice president, secretaries of state and defense, or the national
security adviser) was a neoconservative, a fact that made me skeptical
of its vaunted power. Davutoglu responded with a subtle form of
anti-Semitism, insisting that neoconservatives were far more powerful
than I acknowledged because they worked together in a secret network
based on religious ties. (He had the good grace not to mention which
religion that might be.)
In turn, I asked him
about the goals of Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East in the era
of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) that had begun in 2002,
noting Ankara's new ambitions in a region it had long disdained. He
conceded this change, then took me on a quick tour d'horizon from
Afghanistan to Morocco, noting Turkey's special ties with many
countries. These included the presence of Turkic-speakers (e.g., in
Iraq), the legacy of Ottoman rule (Lebanon), economic symbiosis (Syria),
Islamic ties (Saudi Arabia), and diplomatic mediation (Iran).
What struck me most was
the boastful optimism and complete self-assurance of Davutoglu, a
former professor of international relations and Islamist ideologue.
He not only implied that Turkey had been waiting for him and his grand
vision with baited breath, but he also displayed an unconcealed delight
at finding himself in a position to apply his academic theories to the
great canvas of international politics (a privilege that occurs
surprisingly rarely). In sum, that conversation inspired neither my
confidence nor my admiration.
While Davutoglu has
done remarkably well for himself in the intervening years, he did so
exclusively as consigliere to his sole patron, Erdogan. His record, by
contrast, has been one of inconsistent policy and consistent failure, a failure so abject it borders on fiasco.
Under Davutoglu's stewardship, Ankara's relations with Western
countries have almost universally soured, while those with Iran, Iraq,
Syria, Israel, Egypt, and Libya, among other Middle Eastern states, have
plummeted. To top it off, Turkish rule is endangered even in its own
northern Cypriot satrapy.
Symbolically, Turkey is
slipping away from the NATO alliance of democracies and toward the
shoddy Sino-Russian grouplet known as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
As Kemal Kilicdaroglu, leader of the opposition, sadly notes [ADD LINK:
http://www.todayszaman.com/anasayfa_davutoglus-report-card-on-foreign-policy-a-list-of-failures_356544.html],
"Turkey has grown lonely in the world."
Having failed as foreign minister, Davutoglu now -- in an application of the Dilbert Principle
-- ascends to a heady but subservient leadership of both the AKP and
the government. He faces two major challenges: As AKP leader, he is
tasked with producing a great victory in the June 2015 parliamentary
elections to modify the constitution and turn the semi-ceremonial
position of president into the elected sultanate Erdogan lusts for. Can
Davutoglu deliver the votes? Color me skeptical. I expect that Erdogan
will rue the day he relinquished his prime ministry to become president,
as he finds himself ignored and bored living in the sprawling
presidential "campus."
As Turkey's 26th prime
minister, Davutoglu faces a bubble economy perilously near collapse, a
breakdown in the rule of law, a country inflamed by Erdogan's divisive
rule, a hostile Gulen movement, and a divided AKP, all converging within
an increasingly Islamist (and therefore uncivil) country. Moreover, the
foreign policy problems that Davutoglu himself created still persist,
especially the Islamic State hostage emergency in Mosul.
The unfortunate Davutoglu brings
to mind a cleanup crew arriving at the party at 4 a.m., facing a mess
created by now-departed revelers. Happily, the contentious and
autocratic Erdogan no longer holds Turkey's key governmental position;
but his placing the country in the unsteady hands of a loyalist of
proven incompetence brings many new concerns for the Turks, their
neighbors, and all who wish the country well.
Daniel Pipes (DanielPipes.org) is president of the Middle East Forum.
Source: http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_opinion.php?id=9821
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
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