by Evelyn Gordon
Like many Israelis, I’ve been skeptical
that this summer’s war in Gaza achieved anything more than a temporary
calm. So I was encouraged to read the following tweet from Jerusalem Post reporter
Khaled Abu Toameh Saturday night: “Gaza landlords refusing to rent out
apartments to Hamas members and their families out of fear of being
targeted by Israel in future.” His subsequent news story revealed that tenants are equally unenthusiastic about having Hamas neighbors.
This development doesn’t yet constitute victory. But judging from
Israel’s experience in the West Bank, it’s an important step in the
right direction.
To understand why, it’s worth recalling the early days of the second intifada, when an argument raged
between the IDF and the Shin Bet security service over how to handle
it. Many senior IDF officers then – like many today – insisted there was
no military solution, because fighting terror was like trying to empty
the sea with a spoon: No matter how many terrorists you arrest or kill,
there’s a limitless supply of new recruits to replace them.
But then-Shin Bet chief Avi Dichter thought otherwise. While
recognizing that the potential supply of new recruits is indeed vast, he
argued that the actual supply could be dried up by making terror a
business that doesn’t pay.
Any rational cost-benefit analysis would have concluded that during
the intifada’s first 18 months, terror paid handsomely. The odds of
being killed or arrested were low, and the rewards were high: Not only
did terrorist organizations pay relatively well at a time when the
hostilities had destroyed many other jobs and businesses, but terrorists
were lionized as heroes throughout Palestinian society.
What Dichter understood, however, was that Israel could alter this
cost-benefit analysis by arresting or killing enough terrorists. First,
increasing the odds of being arrested or killed would increase the costs
of terrorism. But perhaps even more importantly, it would reduce the
benefits, because other Palestinians wouldn’t want to associate with
people who were liable to be raided by IDF troops or hit with an
airstrike at any moment. Thus instead of being lionized, terrorists
would find themselves ostracized – which isn’t a price most people would
be willing to pay.
And indeed, West Bank terrorists who subsequently abandoned terror
routinely cited social ostracism as the reason for their decision. When
they went into coffeehouses, they complained, everyone else fled,
and the owners would kick them out, fearful their presence would bring
the IDF. Taxi drivers wouldn’t pick them up. Barbershops wouldn’t cut
their hair. And worst of all, they couldn’t get married. One former
terrorist, for instance, said his fiancée's family conditioned their marriage
on him abandoning terror and obtaining an amnesty from Israel. Another
girl’s father said he would never let his daughter marry a terrorist,
because “I want her to have a good life, without having the army coming
into her house all the time to arrest her while her husband escapes into
the streets.”
Gazan terrorists, like their West Bank counterparts during the
early days of the intifada, have until now enjoyed high benefits and low
costs. After all, Hamas controls Gaza, so it can and does ensure that
its members get the best of everything – including by seizing aid shipments
meant for the needy and distributing them to its operatives instead. At
the same time, they face little risk, since Israel largely leaves Gaza
alone except during periodic wars, and then, Hamas personnel can retreat
to their underground bunkers for protection. Indeed, according to
Israel’s own estimate, only about 1,000 of the 2,127 Gazans killed
during the latest war were terrorists, meaning that Hamas, Islamic Jihad
and company lost less than 5 percent of their combined forces.
But because Hamas commanders’ houses doubled (according to Israeli
intelligence) as command and control centers for the organization’s
military operations, Israel could and did target them. Such strikes
rarely hit the Hamas commanders themselves, since Israel’s policy of
issuing warnings before attacking any target where civilians might be
present, such as a house, gave them ample time to flee. Rather, the goal
was simply to disrupt Hamas’ ability to command its men by disabling
its regular command posts and forcing it to relocate to improvised ones.
Yet it turns out these strikes had a side effect no less important,
if not more, than their immediate military purpose: changing the
cost-benefit analysis of terrorism by imposing real costs on the
terrorists. Hamas commanders not only lost their homes during the war,
but are having trouble finding new ones, because landlords no longer
want them around: The risk of having their property destroyed by an
Israeli airstrike come the next war is too high. And for most people,
the prospect of being permanently homeless would be a significant
deterrent.
Of course, this effect won’t last: Because Hamas controls Gaza, it
can impose its will on the population and has never hesitated to do so
ruthlessly, including by putting political rivals under house arrest and
then shooting
those who violate this decree. Thus reluctant landlords will almost
certainly be presented with offers they can’t refuse, along the lines of
“rent these apartments to our people or we’ll kneecap you.”
That’s why I remain skeptical about Israel’s ability to end terror
from Gaza without reoccupying the territory and toppling Hamas: As long
as the organization remains in power, it will probably be able to ensure
enough benefits for its members (and costs for its opponents) to
outweigh the costs Israel can impose by long-distance action. But I’d
love to be proved wrong, and any progress toward the social ostracism of
Hamas terrorists constitutes progress toward that goal.
Judging solely by the polls, one might have thought this summer’s
fighting had the opposite effect: Opinion surveys indicate that the war dramatically increased
support for Hamas. But what people do is far more indicative of what
they really think than what they tell pollsters. And if Gazan landlords
no longer want to rent to Hamas members, then the war has clearly
persuaded at least some Gazans that today, the cost-benefit analysis
favors keeping far away from terrorists.
Evelyn Gordon
Source: http://www.jpost.com/Experts/Some-good-news-from-the-Gaza-front-375391
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
No comments:
Post a Comment