by Yoram Schweitzer , Benedetta Berti
In light of the complex evolving predicament facing Hizbollah, the alleged discovery of yet another infiltration would probably be branded by the organization as an operational victory. Indeed, by uncovering high level infiltrators, the group can project power and efficiency and discredit Israel’s intelligence apparatus. Even more significant, assuming media reports are credible, and although other intelligence assets may still be utilized by Israel, the arrested senior operative and his four accomplices may have contributed to the successful thwarting of Hizbollah's planned attacks abroad. If so, their exposure can certainly be seen as harmful to Israel in its campaign against the Shiite terror apparatus. The loss of a high ranking asset may limit Israel’s ability to thwart future terror operations against Israeli targets abroad.
Lebanese and international media
reported recently that Hizbollah exposed and tried a high level security
operative and four of his subordinates, accusing them of being Israeli
agents. The media reports about the alleged Israeli agents are based on a
source within Hizbollah rather than an official statement from the
organization. The suspects were allegedly members of Hizbollah’s
External Operations Unit (also known as Unit 910). The main defendant,
Muhammad Shawarba, who formerly served as part of Hassan Nasrallah's
personal security cadre, was the unit's deputy commander.
This latest development joins a series
of “spy ring scandals" exposed by the organization’s security services.
Hizbollah, long extremely fearful of foreign “spies,” has historically
placed an emphasis on counterintelligence. In the early 2000s, as part
of Iran's comprehensive support, the group established an ad hoc
counter-intelligence unit, while also relying on assistance from the
Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Lebanon to locate and expose potential
infiltrators and prevent leaks of information. One of the lessons
derived from the 2006 war with Israel was likewise to invest further in
the group’s preventive security and intelligence systems, again with
Tehran’s assistance, in order to limit the group’s vulnerability to
foreign infiltration within its ranks. Since then, Hizbollah’s
counterintelligence efforts have led to an aggressive campaign to
identify and apprehend potential spies and double agents in Lebanon in
general, and within the organization more specifically. A prominent case
involved Hizbollah’s identifying in June and November 2011 a number of
members who were also allegedly involved with the CIA. This case had an
important impact on Hizbollah, with the group admitting – and for the
first time – to have been infiltrated, in turn tarnishing its reputation
of invincibility and immunity from internal security breaches.
Though not unprecedented, the recent
apprehension of a foreign agent within Hizbollah’s highest ranks further
exposes Hizbollah’s vulnerability to external infiltration, despite its
well-cultivated image as a cohesive and loyal organization. In
addition, on the operational level, this development is of particular
significance. Following the alleged assassination by Israel in 2008 of
Imad Mughniyeh, Hizbollah's top security official and the head of
external operations in Damascus, the group’s Secretary General avowed
his commitment to avenge Mughniyeh’s death. This proclamation was
followed by a string of largely foiled or failed plots against Israeli
assets, personnel, and citizens abroad.
With the alleged spy Shawarba playing
such an important role within the group’s military apparatus, his
possible collaboration with Israel may have contributed to the foiling
of Hizbollah attacks abroad, from Azerbaijan to Turkey, Cyprus,
Thailand, and recently Peru (among others), as well as to serious
intelligence against the group’s leadership. In avenging Mughniyeh,
Hizbollah’s only “success" has been its attack in July 2012 against
Israeli tourists at the Burgas airport in Bulgaria, resulting in six
fatalities – five Israeli tourists and one Bulgarian. This attack, which
strongly contributed to the European community’s decision to add
Hizbollah’s military wing to its list of terror organizations, was
reportedly ascribed to Hizbollah based on information allegedly provided
by Shawarba.
The recent revelations come at an
especially complex time for the Lebanese-Shiite organization: over the
past year Hizbollah has been engaged in a multi-front struggle that
includes support for Bashar al-Assad in Syria, protection of Hizbollah’s
communities and infrastructure, and assistance and coordination with
the Lebanese Armed Forces in dealing with the so-called “takfiri” threat
– referring to the rise in activism of Salafi-jihadist groups in
Lebanon, a phenomenon itself exacerbated by Hizbollah’s own involvement
in Syria. Over the course of 2014, successful attacks by rival groups
against Hizbollah have forced the organization to reexamine its defense
and intelligence apparatus, further focusing not only on
counterintelligence, but on internal security as well. In addition,
Hizbollah’s security landscape and calculations continue to be affected
by its post-2006 de facto deterrence vis-à-vis Israel. Preserving the
status quo has become increasingly harder since the beginning of the
Syrian civil war, with Hizbollah struggling between two competing
interests. One is the need to signal strength and resolve as well as to
re-establish the rules of the game vis-à-vis Israel, as they have been
eroded by the alleged Israeli attacks in Lebanon and Syria targeting
weapons convoys on route to Hizbollah operatives in Lebanon. Two, the
group still needs to avoid escalation and another all-out war with
Israel. In this context, over the past few months the organization has
assumed responsibility for several small scale operations in Mount Dov
(Shab’a Farms) and the Golan Heights.
In light of the complex evolving
predicament facing Hizbollah, the alleged discovery of yet another
infiltration would probably be branded by the organization as an
operational victory. Indeed, by uncovering high level infiltrators, the
group can project power and efficiency and discredit Israel’s
intelligence apparatus. Even more significant, assuming media reports
are credible, and although other intelligence assets may still be
utilized by Israel, the arrested senior operative and his four
accomplices may have contributed to the successful thwarting of
Hizbollah's planned attacks abroad. If so, their exposure can certainly
be seen as harmful to Israel in its campaign against the Shiite terror
apparatus. The loss of a high ranking asset may limit Israel’s ability
to thwart future terror operations against Israeli targets abroad.
The continued threat of international
terror by the Shiite Lebanese organization reinforces Israel’s need to
convey a firm warning to Hizbollah to refrain from further attempted
attacks. In addition, Israel must strengthen its international
cooperation in the effort to uncover the group’s activities abroad.
Furthermore, given Hizbollah’s historical modus operandi, which includes
not claiming responsibility for its external operations, a lack of
internal informants could complicate efforts to pin Hizbollah down as an
international terror player._____________________________________________
Thanks to Yael Basford and Einav Yogev for their assistance with this article.
Yoram Schweitzer , Benedetta Berti
Source: http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=8447
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
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