by Zvi Magen , Sarah Fainberg
Signs of a severe economic crisis in Russia, threatening the stability and future of Vladimir Putin’s regime, are multiplying. The economic sanctions imposed on Russia are among the main triggers of the crisis, along with the sharp decline in the price of oil, which – according to Russian officials – is the result of deliberate anti-Russian activity initiated by the United States. However, it is too early to eulogize Putin’s rule. He still enjoys widespread public support and projects a sense of being in control of the situation. Nonetheless, the trend is one of crisis whose key feature is uncertainty. It is impossible to predict the scope and duration of the Russian economic decline and its possible negative impact on the nation’s governmental and social stability. This uncertainty means that the potential for exacerbation of the Russian-Western conflict remains.
Signs
of a severe crisis of Russia’s economy are multiplying, which threatens
the stability and future of Putin’s regime. The economic sanctions
imposed on Russia are among the main triggers of the crisis, along with
the sharp decline in the price of oil, which – according to Russian
officials – is the result of deliberate anti-Russian activity initiated
by the United States.
This crisis is directly linked to developments on
the Ukrainian front. The ongoing, low-intensity Ukrainian conflict has
turned into a manifest Russian defeat. Ukraine has cut itself off from
Russia’s influence and forged closer relations with the West, lowering
Russia’s chances of establishing a viable Eurasian Union under its
leadership. Adding to Moscow’s predicament, the West, led by the United
States, has imposed strong economic sanctions on Russia because of its
Ukrainian policy. As a result, Russia currently faces a very challenging
economic reality that is forcing it to try to annul some of the steps [that]
were taken against it.
From the perspective of the United
States, Russia’s difficult situation seems well-suited (at least better
than in many years) to US attempts to promote its global strategic
objectives. Yet Washington has a list of demands that Russia will find
hard to accept. The willingness of the United States to ease the strong
pressure exerted on Russia hinges on Moscow’s readiness to concede its
assertive policy in eastern Ukraine in particular and in Russia’s
post-Soviet neighbors in general, for the conflict over Ukraine is
neither an accidental nor a stand-alone issue. The Russia-US conflict
(in effect, a Russian-Western conflict) is about gaining comprehensive
influence on the post-Soviet space and for this reason it will not end
with a compromise over Ukraine alone. Therefore any arrangement
palatable to the West will also presumably involve elements connected to
other post-Soviet territories in dispute.
In tandem with the Ukraine crisis,
recent months have seen increased Russian activity across the Middle
East. Russia’s relations with several Sunni states – including Egypt,
Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, Jordan, and Lebanon – have been
upgraded, mitigating the coldness that characterized these relations
following the outbreak of the so-called Arab Spring. Russia has signed
arms deals, some of them quite large (e.g., with Egypt) with most of
these states, while maintaining good relations with its traditional
allies: Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Most prominently, after years of strong
tension, relations between Russia and Turkey have improved. President
Putin visited Ankara in late November, and the two countries signed an
agreement on a new gas line from Russia through Turkey to Europe. It
seems that as part of its strategy vis-à-vis its complex international
situation, Russia has chosen to increase its involvement in the Middle
East so as to convert its achievements in the region into leverages of
influence on the West, especially on issues pertaining to Eastern
Europe. Indeed, within just a two-month time period, Russian activity in
the Middle East has scored substantive successes that could form the
new basis for a Russian-Western dialogue on Ukraine and other issues.
Furthermore, Russia is seeking to find
new ideas that would serve as a basis for a compromise, ultimately
resulting in the lifting of Western sanctions. Moscow’s current Middle
East activity is insufficient to that end, and therefore Russia must
come up with alternatives. It may be that the Syrian conflict will serve
as a new focus for this Russian calculation. In practice, Russia
remains the main supporter of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and can topple it
should it choose to do so. A development of this nature would in fact
be congruent with the interests of the US administration, and it may be
that this is the background to recent Russian moves in Syria: Putin’s
Middle East envoy, Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov, recently
met with rebel leaders in Syria, Hizbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, and
the Syrian leadership itself; Russia and Iran have been in contact,
possibly hinting at the intention to formulate a joint proposal for a
Syrian settlement; and Syrian, Iraqi, and Hizbollah representatives met
in Tehran, another sign of possible consultations on Syria’s regime.
There have also been indications that Russia intends to hold a
conference on Syria’s future, including discussions on Assad’s mandate.
It may be that an initiative was already formulated by Russia and Iran
whereby a new Syrian government, comprising opposition elements, would
be declared in the course of an international conference that would also
decide Assad’s status (his removal or his incorporation in the new
government in a minor capacity). Such a development would mean a new
political reality in Syria whose principles would be shaped
cooperatively by the West, Russia, and Iran, with the backing of the
pragmatic Sunni nations in the Middle East.
This formula will likely neither be
accepted by the US administration nor prompt it to lift the sanctions,
because the future of Syria is hardly the only issue dividing Washington
and Moscow. The December 14, 2014 meeting in Rome between Secretary of
State John Kerry and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov dealt with the
Middle East crises that are of utmost interest to Russia: the civil war
in Syria, the Israeli-Palestinian political process, and the
negotiations with Iran over the nuclear issue. In exchange for lifting
the sanctions, Russia would presumably have to cooperate with the United
States on these three issues, as well as on the Ukrainian crisis. For
its part, the US administration is signaling its willingness to advance
new understandings with Moscow: President Obama has yet to implement
further sanctions on Russia already approved by Congress. But because it
is hard to imagine Russia doing an about-face, lowering its profile on
the international arena, and adapting its policies on key issues in the
Middle East so that it is more aligned with the United States, the
sanctions regime on Russian economy is far from over. Therefore, it is
almost certain that the severe economic crisis unfolding in Russia has
not yet reached its peak.
It is too early to eulogize Vladimir
Putin’s rule. He still enjoys widespread public support and projects a
sense of being in control of the situation. But the trend is one of
crisis whose key feature is uncertainty. It is impossible to predict the
scope and duration of the Russian economic decline and its possible
negative impact on the nation’s governmental and social stability. This
uncertainty – in addition to domestic disagreements over appropriate
policies – means that the potential for exacerbation of the
Russian-Western conflict remains. It may be that the economic pressure
will spur Russia to show flexibility and compromise with the West in
order to contain the economic challenge, with its domestic and
international repercussions. On the other hand, if Russia persists in
maintaining its recent policy on the international arena, not only will
the economic crisis and its international impact worsen, but the
difficulty in promoting coordinated moves among the great powers and
collaboratively address crises in areas of dispute – including in the
Middle East – will be further aggravated.Zvi Magen , Sarah Fainberg
Source: http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=8438
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
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