by Efraim Inbar
-- the war's territorial acquisitions entailed a string of important military and strategic advantages.
(L-R)
Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, U.S. president Jimmy Carter, and
Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin celebrate the Egypt- Israel peace
treaty signing, Washington, D.C., 1979. The Six-Day War's territorial
acquisitions and the ensuing land-for-peace formula eventually led to
the historic peace treaty.
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The
June 1967 war was a major watershed in Israel's political history. The
astounding military victory was a key factor in driving parts of the
Arab world to confront the reality of Jewish statehood. The war's
territorial acquisitions, by contrast, are often seen as a mixed
blessing. For although these gains gave birth to the land-for-peace
formula (commonly associated with Security Council resolution 242 of
November 1967), which led to the historic March 1979 Egyptian-Israeli
peace treaty, Israel's continued control of the Golan Heights and the
West Bank has put it under persistent international pressure. The
fiftieth anniversary of the war offers an auspicious vantage point for
rethinking the pros and cons of retaining these territories.
Military and Strategic Importance
There
is little doubt that the foremost gain attending Israel's 1967 victory
lies in the transformation of the international discourse about the
country's future borders, with the June 1967 line (or the Green Line)
becoming the starting point for any such discussion. This represents a
sea change for Israel, whose neighbors had previously refused to accept
its very existence, let alone its initial borders.
The
highly restrictive borders delineated by the U.N. partition resolution
of November 1947 have almost entirely dropped off the international
agenda, their only residual remnant being the international refusal to
recognize West Jerusalem (internationalized by the resolution along the
city's eastern part) as Israel's capital. Also overlooked are the
repeated Arab attempts to slash Israel's pre-1967 territory, notably
through the annexation by Egypt and Jordan of the Negev region, some 60
percent of Israel's territory, an idea that received occasional
favorable hearing in London and Washington.[1]
Israeli
territorial acquisitions following the Six-Day War. Control of the
Golan Heights, the Jordan Valley, and Sinai gave Israel far better
military lines of defense than it had before 1967.
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The
massive political and diplomatic achievement by Israel notwithstanding,
the war's territorial acquisitions entailed a string of important
military and strategic advantages. Control of the Golan Heights and the
Jordan Valley, for one, gives Israel far better military lines of
defense than it had before 1967. The current Golan border is the
watershed line of the region, allowing the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
to hold the high ground with its clear defensive advantages. Nor is
there any other line on the Golan to which Israel could withdraw while
maintaining its topographical edge. The top of the cliffs that mark the
western edge of the heights, sometimes mentioned as a possible line of
withdrawal, would prevent the Syrians from having direct view into
Israel, but it is no higher than the terrain to the east.
In
addition, the IDF's presence on Mount Hermon enables the gathering of
intelligence on goings-on in nearby Syrian areas and even further into
the country. The claim that spy planes and satellites can replace the
Hermon's intelligence value is only partially true as these measures
have limited intelligence-gathering capabilities compared to the
unlimited capabilities of the Hermon station. Moreover, there are weapon
systems for downing airplanes and destroying satellites while it is
exceedingly difficult to down a mountain. The presence of Israeli
military forces just 60 kilometers from Damascus also has a deterrent
value as it is far easier to attack the Syrian capital from the Golan
Heights than from the Green Line. Indeed, the IDF's advance on Damascus
in the October 1973 war was among the reasons why Syria agreed to end
the war. Conversely, without Israel's defense line on the Golan, the
Syrians would have managed to invade its territory at the beginning of
that war—for the first time since the 1948 war—with tragic consequences
for the Jewish state. Instead, the security margins provided by the
Golan allowed the IDF to contain the Syrian offensive, to regroup, and
to move onto the counterattack.
The
Allon Plan recommended partitioning the West Bank between Israel and
Jordan as well as giving the Jewish state control of the strategically
important Jordan Valley. Jordan's King Hussein rejected the plan.
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The
demilitarization arrangements in the Sinai Peninsula, which served to
stabilize Egyptian-Israeli strategic relations and paved the road to
their historic peace treaty, are hardly applicable to the Golan given
the marked size difference between the two arenas: a 200-kilometer-deep
demilitarized zone in Sinai compared to the Golan's maximum width of 24
kilometers. It is far harder to launch a surprise attack in Sinai than
on the Golan.
The
security rationale for Israel's continued control of the Jordan Valley
is a similar case in point. Even a cursory glance at the map shows that
there are very few approaches from the east (that is, from Jordan) to
the West Bank's hilly terrain, and from there, to the center of Israel.
There is also a very large topographical difference between the Jordan
Valley and Israel's watershed line, which runs north-south through
Jerusalem, some 20 kilometers from the valley. The Jordan Valley lies
some 250-400 meters below sea level while the hilltops are some 700-800
meters above sea level—an elevation difference of at least 1,000 meters.
In the event of an attack from the east, an armored column would need
to make a steep 20-kilometer climb with only a handful of
armored-accessible routes. As long as the defending forces can hold the
entrances to these routes, any such invasion can readily be rebuffed.
This was the strategic logic behind the Allon plan of the late 1960s,
which also made eminent demographic sense given that the Jordan Valley
is almost entirely empty of Palestinian population.[2]
Israel's
eastern border is its most important due to its proximity to the
country's main population centers. The aerial distance from the Jordan
River to Jerusalem is 20 kilometers, and to Tel Aviv, 80 kilometers; the
distance from the pre-1967 Green Line to the Mediterranean Sea is at
its narrowest some 16 kilometers. The Tel Aviv-Jerusalem-Haifa triangle,
containing most of Israel's population and the bulk of its industrial
and economic infrastructure, is very close to the Jordan River and a
stone's throw from the Green Line. This is a wholly different case from
the borders with Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon, hence the eastern border's
great strategic importance, and hence the indispensability of an easily
defensible border. The importance of keeping the border as far away as
possible from the country's heartland has become even more pronounced
over the past two decades when the coastal plane's economic and
industrial centrality has steadily increased despite predictions of a
more decentralized population due to developments in communication and
transportation that brought the periphery closer to the center.
It
would be a strategic mistake to allow a foreign presence in Jerusalem
that might threaten Israel's control of its most valuable west-east
route.
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No
less important is the preservation of Israel's control of the area
known as Greater Jerusalem. As a quick glance at the map can easily
reveal, Jerusalem, which is populated by a Jewish majority, marks the
only intersection of the watershed line through which IDF forces can
move from the center of the country to meet an invasion from Jordan. Of
particular importance is the corridor from Jerusalem to Maale Adummim
and down to the Jordan Valley. Hence it would be a grave strategic
mistake to allow a foreign presence in Jerusalem that might threaten
Israel's control of its most valuable west-east route. Moreover, the
Greater Jerusalem area is highly elevated, giving the IDF valuable
intelligence gathering capabilities toward the east, south, and north.
The
historical, religious, and cultural importance of Jerusalem—the Temple
Mount in particular—for the Jewish people goes without saying, yet lies
beyond the scope of this article. It is clear, however, that territorial
concessions in Jerusalem are likely to be viewed as a victory for Islam
and to fuel extremist sentiments throughout the Muslim and Arab worlds.
It is also true that Israeli control of the holy Jewish sites (and the
holy Christian sites for that matter) guarantees free and uninterrupted
access and freedom of worship—in stark contrast to the Palestinian
attitude toward their religious minorities, let alone to Jewish holy
sites under their control, such as the synagogue in Jericho or Joseph's
Tomb in Nablus.
Israel's
military control of the West Bank also has an important role in
fighting Palestinian terrorism. Regrettably, the Palestinian Authority
(PA) has not only failed to meet its obligations to combat terrorism and
to disarm all terror groups in the territories under its jurisdiction,
as required by the Oslo accords of the 1990s, but has also abetted and
actively perpetrated anti-Israel terrorism, especially during the Arafat
years. The need for Israeli control was clearly demonstrated by
Operation Defensive Shield of March-April 2002 and the subsequent
Israeli recapture of some PA-held territory, which allowed the IDF to
destroy terror infrastructures and to restore the intelligence
capabilities vital for fighting terrorism. While Israel has withdrawn
from most of these territories, the IDF continues to enjoy certain
freedom of movement throughout the West Bank, entering many areas on a
regular basis and, as a consequence, thwarting numerous terror attacks.
In terms of counterterrorism, this is a major boon that prevents
terrorists from blowing up themselves and Israeli citizens in Tel Aviv
or Jerusalem; indeed, the past decade has seen a substantial reduction
in the number of suicide bombings on Israeli soil. This reduction is
largely due to Israel's offensive activities, such as preemptive arrests
and targeted killings, with the newly erected security fence playing a
secondary role in curbing Palestinian terror attacks.[3]
The
limited cooperation between the IDF and the PA security forces,
developed after Arafat's death in November 2004, hardly suffices to
prevent terrorism from areas under the PA's control. Quite the reverse
in fact: Contrary to its "moderate" international image, the PA under
Mahmoud Abbas remains as active a source of anti-Israel and anti-Jewish
incitement as it was under Arafat, continuing to encourage terror, if
with lesser intensity than before.[4]
In the absence of a reliable and peaceable Palestinian partner, there
can be no breakthrough toward mutual reconciliation. Relinquishing
military control of the West Bank in the absence of a
peace-seeking Palestinian leadership is all the more dangerous given the
massive difficulties in recapturing this territory in the not unlikely
eventuality that the newly established Palestinian state would become a
fully-fledged terrorist entity as has happened in Gaza following the
Israeli withdrawal.[5]
Standard Strategic Misconceptions
It
has, of course, been argued, notably by the late Shimon Peres, that
territory has lost its importance in the age of missiles. This claim may
have some merit but is historically shortsighted and strategically
misconceived. Throughout history, generations of warfare have produced
dramatic technological changes that resulted in equally dramatic
vicissitudes in the fortunes of defensive or offensive postures. Thus,
for example, the walls and castles of the medieval age improved
defensive capabilities for some 500-600 years until the arrival of a new
technology—the cannon—put an end to these measures and ushered in a new
military reality. While missile attacks on population centers (in
themselves an unequivocal war crime) are undeniably difficult to contend
with, there has been immense investment in missile defense technology,
some of which is already operational and effective, such as Israel's
Arrow and Iron Dome systems.
During
the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, thousands of Palestinians fled the fighting
to Jordan. It is estimated that three million people of Palestinian
ancestry reside in the Hashemite kingdom.
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Likewise,
the conventional assumptions about the Arab world's political realities
and their implications for regional security hardly hold water. It has
been claimed, for instance, that given the Jordanian regime's
historically less hostile attitude to Israel and its longstanding
(albeit covert) objection to the creation of a Palestinian state, there
is no need for Israel to retain control of the Jordan Valley. Yet, just
as King Hussein jumped on the pan-Arab bandwagon shortly before the
outbreak of the 1967 war—after Israel had saved his life on a number of
occasions—so his son King Abdullah may well be tempted into a future
adventure, however unlikely this may seem at the moment.
Nor
is it possible to predict with any certainty whether and for how long
the Hashemite dynasty will be able to withstand the challenge of radical
Islam or the creation of a Palestinian state, which may readily incite
the kingdom's marginalized Palestinian population against its
monarchical rulers. The attempt by the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO) to topple the Hashemite regime in the autumn of 1970 backfired in
grand style. Given the substantial increase in Jordan's Palestinian
population since then, and with the aid and support of a fully-fledged
Palestinian state, especially if ruled by the more militant and
effective Hamas, they may well achieve this goal in the future, thus
creating a vast Palestinian state on both sides of the Jordan River.[6]
Similarly,
the expectations that a newly-established Palestinian state will meet
its contractual peace obligations and refrain from siding with Israel's
enemies in future military confrontations, let alone refrain from
wholesale anti-Israel terrorism, run counter to the Palestinian modus
operandi during the past twenty-four years, as well as the relentless
Palestinian commitment to Israel's destruction in flagrant violation of
their contractual obligations in the Oslo accords.[7]
The presence of U.N. peacekeeping forces in Arab-Israeli conflict areas has proved totally useless.
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Recurring
suggestions for stationing international forces on the Golan Heights
and in the Jordan Valley as a means to allay Israel's security concerns
are equally misconceived. As consistently shown on several past
occasions, the presence of U.N. peacekeeping forces in Arab-Israeli
conflict areas proved totally useless. In May 1967, these forces were
instantaneously withdrawn from the Egyptian-Israeli border where they
had served as a buffer between the two sides the moment President Nasser
demanded their removal. Likewise, in September 2014, U.N. forces were
evacuated from the Golan Heights as fighting in the Syrian civil war
intensified. In Lebanon, the peacekeeping force deployed since the late
1970s (U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon) failed to prevent countless
clashes between Israel and the PLO, then between Israel and Hezbollah.
Nor did it manage to prevent the Islamist terror group from rebuilding
its military infrastructure after the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war as
required by Security Council Resolution 1701 of August 11, 2006.
The
permanent deployment of U.S. peacekeeping forces offers no greater
assurances. Washington quickly withdrew its forces from confrontation
zones when the going got tough (Lebanon 1984, Somalia 1993, etc.), and
its recent unhappy experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq are hardly
conducive to a future, long-term commitment of U.S. troops to one of the
region's longest running conflicts.
No
less importantly, a major part of Israel's strategic value for the
United States, and Western nations more generally, lies in its ability
to defend itself on its own against any local (and at times external)
enemies. This capability stands in marked contrast to the West's Arab
clients, which often needed large-scale foreign intervention on their
behalf (Moscow's 1970 intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli war of
attrition and in the ongoing Syrian civil war; the U.S.-led liberation
of Kuwait, etc.). Predicating a significant part of Israel's security on
international protection will largely erode this strategic edge.
Israel Must Retain the West Bank and the Golan
The
above discussion underscores Israel's dire need for secure borders,
resistant to changes in military technology and regional political
upheavals. A policy that fails to take into account worst-case scenarios
would be highly irresponsible. As political scientist Yehezkel Dror
often remarked, in the Middle East, there is a high probability for
improbable scenarios. In these circumstances, Israel's improved
defensive, intelligence, and deterrent capabilities, thanks to its
current borders, have a strong stabilizing effect on its relations with
the neighboring Arab states by expanding its security margins and
reducing its need for preventive or preemptive strikes, which entail
domestic and foreign political costs.
The
presence of Israeli military forces just 60 kilometers from Damascus
has a major deterrent value. Nothing that Syria can offer would outweigh
for Israel the detrimental effects of relinquishing the Golan Heights.
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Continuing
to hold on to the territories entails additional advantages. To begin
with, it underscores Israel's ability to resist persistent Arab and
international pressure for withdrawal—a highly important demonstration
of strength in a region where crude force constitutes the main
instrument of political discourse, both domestically and externally, and
where military might, in its different forms, is the most respected
political currency. The fact that, despite recurrent international
criticism and myriad anti-Israel U.N. resolutions, the Jewish state has
managed to retain its control of the territories has also demonstrated
its political and diplomatic stamina. The foremost supportive factor in
this respect has been Washington's continued support for the Israeli
demand for an Arab attitudinal change before there can be any real
progress toward peace. This support has been rendered all the more
important over the past decades as the United States became the "only
remaining superpower" following the Soviet Union's collapse—a position
it continues to hold despite the foreign policy setbacks of the Obama
years.
Israel's continued control of the territories offers the best, perhaps the only, chance of Palestinian-Israeli peace.
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Above
all, and contrary to the conventional mis-conception, Israel's
continued control of the territories offers the best, perhaps the only
chance of Palestinian-Israeli peace. Given the categorical Arab
rejection of the idea of Jewish statehood on the one hand, and the
preeminence of physical force in Middle Eastern political culture on the
other, Israel's presence in the territories constitutes a permanent
reminder of Arab impotence and the futility of sustaining the conflict.
It
was indeed the grudging realization that Israel would not be destroyed
by force of arms that drove some of its Arab enemies to the negotiating
table. Egypt received the entire Sinai Peninsula only after concluding a
fully-fledged peace treaty with Israel while the PLO was given control
over the Gaza Strip and the vast majority of the West Bank's Palestinian
population (and some 40 percent of the area's territory) after signing
the Oslo accords, whereby it undertook to eschew violence, terrorism,
and incitement. That the organization failed to abide by its contractual
obligations, with Gaza becoming an unreconstructed terrorist entity
under Hamas's rule, affords further proof, if such were needed, of the
West Bank's critical importance for Israel's future security.
The Costs of Continued Control
After
the 1967 war, the international community seemed to accept Israel's
permanent retention of some of its territorial acquisitions as vividly
illustrated by Security Council Resolution 242, which provided for the
"[w]ithdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the
recent conflict." The absence of the definite article "the" before
"territories"—which, had it been included, would have required a
complete Israeli withdrawal—was no accident but rather reflected an
awareness of the existential threat posed by its pre-1967 boundaries.
Indeed, the resolution envisaged this partial withdrawal to take place
not as a unilateral move but as part of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli
peace that would allow every state in the region "to live in peace
within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of
force."[8]
And while the resolution's intent has been misrepresented over the
years by the Arabs and their international champions supposedly to
demand Israel's complete withdrawal from the territories, the notion
that this will take place within the framework of a Palestinian-Israeli
peace agreement has remained intact. There is no international demand
(apart from those of the PA and its staunchest allies) for a unilateral
withdrawal without a political quid pro quo and some security
arrangements.
Thus
far, the cost of retaining the West Bank and the Golan Heights has not
been particularly high. This should allow Israel to conduct negotiations
over the future of these territories in a considered and patient
fashion from a position of strength. For one thing, time clearly works
in Israel's favor: Since its establishment sixty-nine years ago, the
Jewish state has steadily grown stronger and more advanced while its
Arab adversaries have correspondingly become weaker.[9]
For another thing, the frenzied rush to far-reaching territorial
concessions—by Ehud Barak in the Camp David and Taba summits (July 2000
and January 2001) and Ehud Olmert in the Annapolis conference (November
2007)—has proved highly counterproductive, further fueling Palestinian
rejectionism and triggering the longest and bloodiest war of terror
(euphemized as al-Aqsa Intifada) since the 1948 war. This, in turn,
persuaded most Israelis that they had no real peace partner and that the
establishment of a Palestinian state was a rather hypothetical
possibility so long as no such partner existed. The future status of the
Golan Heights, which Barak was equally keen to surrender, only to be
flatly rebuffed by President Hafez Assad, has also been rendered largely
irrelevant by the ongoing Syrian civil war.
Indeed,
as far as Syria is concerned, the cost of retaining the Golan has been
strikingly low. Since 1974, Damascus has scrupulously observed the
October 1973 ceasefire agreement and the border has been conspicuously
quiet. This status quo suits Israel well, being strategically placed on
the Golan, which unlike the West Bank is very sparsely populated (mostly
by Druze, some of whom are Israeli citizens) hence poses no demographic
problem. Furthermore, since the onset of the twenty-first century,
Syria has been regionally and internationally isolated due to its
intervention in Lebanon and special relationship with Tehran. As a
result, its claim for the Golan has gone largely unheeded and its
(however timid) hopes for retaking this territory by force have been
dashed by the absence of a reliable war ally for this daunting
undertaking. Apparently cognizant of its inability to occupy the Golan
on its own, Damascus has concentrated on developing its defensive
capabilities and expanding its long-range missiles arsenal, mainly
designed to deter an Israeli aggression.
The key to Israel's acceptance by the region will not be found in Damascus.
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Since
2011, Syria has been ravaged by civil war, whose end is nowhere in
sight. Nor is it clear whether the country will be able to retain its
unitary form or instead disintegrate along ethnic and confessional
lines. Yet even if Damascus were to weather the storm, it has little to
offer in exchange for a peace treaty with Israel. The key to Israel's
acceptance by the region is not to be found in Damascus: It is a
historical process that has been in the making since Egypt signed the
first disengagement agreement with Israel in the wake of the October
1973 war, subsequently expanding to Jordan, the Gulf states, and the
Maghreb states. Syria has long since lost its veto power over other Arab
states' contacts with Israel. Moreover, it is unlikely to expect
Damascus to cut ties with Tehran, its ally since the late 1970s and
foremost savior of the Bashar al-Assad regime. Indeed, repeated U.S.
efforts since the mid-1970s to extricate Syria from the radical camp
have come to naught. It is also difficult to see Damascus severing
relations with terror organizations, notably Hezbollah, which serves as
an avenue of influence over Lebanon. At the end of the day, Lebanon is
far more important to Syria than the Golan.
In
short, it seems that nothing that Syria can offer would outweigh the
detrimental effects of relinquishing the Golan Heights as part of a
peace treaty, especially since it has never been clear whether Syria is
interested in peace as Israel understands it.[10]
Rather, it appears more interested in negotiations over a treaty with
Israel with the process itself being more important than the outcome.
Negotiations can protect Damascus from what it fears most: Israeli or
U.S. aggression.
The
Turkish-Syrian context may be instructive. Ankara's conflict with
Damascus was similar to Israel's, revolving as it did on disagreements
over water, terrorism, and territory. Eventually, the Syrians decided at
the end of the 1990s to acquiesce in Ankara's water policy regarding
the Euphrates, to stop supporting Kurdish terrorism against Turkey, and
to drop their demands for the return of the Alexandretta district.
Damascus's acceptance of Ankara's terms was above all a result of its
marked military inferiority. Israel should similarly make the most of
its superiority over Syria.
Hamas's
victory in the 2006 parliamentary elections, its violent takeover of
the Gaza Strip, and the growing influence in Palestinian society of
other Islamist groups cast serious doubts about the Palestinians'
readiness to end their hundred-year conflict with the Zionist movement.
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In
the West Bank, the situation is different, largely because of the
demographic issue and its political implications. As noted above, the
PLO/PA behavior since the conclusion of the Oslo accords inspires little
confidence in its peaceable intentions. Hamas's sweeping victory in the
2006 parliamentary elections, its violent takeover of the Gaza Strip a
year later, and the growing influence in Palestinian society of other
Islamist groups cast serious doubts about the Palestinians' readiness in
the foreseeable future to end their hundred-year conflict with the
Zionist movement.
By
contrast, and given the broad unanimity in Israel about the necessity
of separation from the Palestinian population of the West Bank and Gaza,
Jerusalem should keep open the option for a territorial compromise that
would allow the establishment of an independent Palestinian entity
along the lines of the Allon plan. Of course, there is no certainty that
such an entity will actually be established in view of the
Palestinians' massive state-building inadequacies over the past
twenty-four years. They have most glaringly failed to meet the Weberian
test of state building—maintaining state monopoly over the means of
violence—by consciously enabling the existence of various armed militias
that have spread widespread mayhem and chaos (or fawda, as they call it).
If
the Palestinians are politically incapable of engaging in state
building, then it might be helpful to place them under the tutelage of
the neighboring Arab states—Egypt in Gaza, Jordan in the West Bank. Of
course, neither state is particularly keen on shouldering this daunting
task; yet precisely for this reason, Israel should strive to ensure that
the solution to the Palestinian problem is not placed solely at its
doorstep.
The
time seems ripe for such a change. The ongoing Arab upheavals and the
surge of jihadist Islam make the world far less captivated by the
Palestinian illusion with many states prepared to consider alternative
solutions to the problem. Even among the Arabs, there are growing voices
that question the centrality of the Palestinian issue.[11]
In these circumstances, recurrent Israeli suggestions for unilateral
withdrawal, born of the yearning for the resumption of the peace
process, cannot be more misconceived. If the Gaza experience teaches
anything, it is that a unilateral withdrawal without ironclad guarantees
against the transformation of the evacuated territory into a terrorist
hotbed is an assured recipe for disaster.
In
the absence of a worthy partner capable of effective control of the
prospective Palestinian entity—and as long as Jordan or Egypt would not
assume any role in managing Palestinian affairs—Israel will need to
continue to deal with a weak and corrupt Palestinian Authority for some
time to come. In this respect, it should be noted that even in the
worst-case scenario that the PA would initiate another war of terror,
its economic implications for Israel will be rather negligible. During
the 1987-93 intifada and the "al-Aqsa Intifada," only 5-10 percent of
the national security budget was allocated to fighting terrorism. The
use of infantry units, in contrast to naval and air formations, is
relatively cheap.[12]
This is a "small war" of the type that requires limited investment of
resources. Nor has the diplomatic cost of the two intifadas been
particularly high. The negative views, in which Israel's continued
control of the West Bank are held throughout the international system,
have had only peripheral effect, certainly as long as Washington is
willing to accept the status quo.
The
truth of the matter is that the Palestinians' unhappy situation is
primarily self-inflicted. Rather than promote a real quest for
independence and state and nation building, Palestinian leaders, from
the 1920s to the present day, have driven their hapless subjects from
one disaster to another while lining their pockets from the proceeds of
this misery.[13]
Keenly aware of this reality, most Israelis resent paying the price by
being forced into an unsatisfactory agreement that would imperil their
national security, indeed the very existence of their state. This is all
the more so since the launch of the September 2000 Palestinian war of
terror—seen by most Israelis not as a war of choice but one that has
been forced on Israel. According to many public opinion surveys,
Israel's majority Jewish population displays great resilience to the
difficult tests attending "small wars."
The
military struggle against the Palestinians is bound to determine the
country's eastern border, which must run along the Jordan River.
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In
the absence of a peace agreement, it is crucial for Israel to stick to
its guns, so to speak. The military struggle against the Palestinians is
bound to determine the country's eastern border, which must run along
the Jordan River. Moreover, the conflict with the Palestinians may also
shape the future security arrangements in the West Bank in the event of a
partial withdrawal from these areas. It would be a major mistake to
view the "small war" with the Palestinians as unimportant or as a
distraction from the IDF's ability to concentrate on more dangerous
scenarios. The IDF's current tasks regarding the Palestinians are part
and parcel of its overall duties, and it needs to develop the necessary
organizational and conceptual flexibility for effectively coping with
this challenge, which, in the final account, touches the core of
Israel's existential problems.
Conclusion
Israel's
control of the Golan Heights and the West Bank has many advantages,
which in turn outweigh the attendant costs of holding onto these
territories. While Israel can agree that the West Bank's densely
populated areas (designated as areas A and B by the Oslo accords) where
most of the Palestinian population lives, could become an independent
political entity or be annexed to Jordan as part of a bilateral peace
agreement, maintaining military control over the area west of the Jordan
River is essential for its national security (and for Jordanian
security for that matter). Unfortunately, there is no room for a
territorial compromise on the Golan Heights. Losing this territory would
entail grave security threats, and there is nothing Syria has to offer
to compensate for this loss.
Efraim Inbar is a professor emeritus of political studies at Bar-Ilan University and founding director of its Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (1993-2016).
[1] Ilan Asia, Moked Hasichsuch. Hamaavak al Hanegev, 1947-1956 (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Zvi and Ben-Gurion University, 1994).
[2] See, for example, Yigal Allon, "Israel: The Case for Defensible Borders," Foreign Affairs, Oct. 1976, pp. 38-53.
[3] Hillel Frisch, "Motivation or Capabilities? Israeli Counterterrorism against Palestinian Suicide-bombings and Violence," Journal of Strategic Studies, Oct. 2006, pp. 843-69.
[4] Yossi Kuperwasser, Incentivizing Terrorism: Palestinian Authority Allocations to Terrorists and their Families
(Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs [JCPA], Feb. 2017);
idem, "The West Must Insist that the Palestinians Change Their
Narrative," JCPA, Sept. 5, 2016
[5] Author interview with Maj. Gen. Gershon Hacohen, Ramat Gan, Aug. 28, 2016.
[6] Mudar Zahran, "Jordan Is Palestinian," Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2012, pp. 3-12.
[7] Efraim Karsh, "Why the Oslo Process Doomed Peace," Middle East Quarterly, Fall 2016.
[8] "Resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967," S/RES/242 (1967), U.N. Security Council, New York, art. 1(i), (ii).
[9] Efraim Inbar, "Time Favors Israel. The Resilient Jewish State," Middle East Quarterly, Fall 2013, pp. 3-13.
[10] Daniel Pipes, "Assad Isn't Interested," DanielPipes.org, Aug. 29, 1999.
[11] See, for example, Barney Breen-Portnoy, "Saudi Journalist to Palestinians: Armed Resistance to Israel Is Futile, Arab World Has Lost Interest in Your Cause," The Algemeiner (Brooklyn), Jan. 27, 2017.
[12] Efraim Inbar, "Israel's Small War: The Military Response to the Intifada," Armed Forces & Society, Fall 1991, p. 37.
[13] Efraim Karsh, "Palestinian Leaders Don't Want an Independent State," Middle East Quarterly, Summer 2014.
Efraim Inbar is a professor emeritus of political studies at Bar-Ilan University and founding director of its Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (1993-2016).
Source: http://www.meforum.org/6727/israel-costs-vs-its-benefits
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