by Jonathan Ariel
What have the Saudis been up to?
Henrique Cymerman, photo via Wikipedia
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 1,090, February 17, 2019
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: A number of senior
security officials, including ISA (Shabak) chief Nadav Argaman and
several Israeli cyber consultants, have taken note recently of apparent
attempts by several foreign countries to interfere in the upcoming
Israeli elections via cyber and IW (Information Warfare) attacks. Below
the radar, there is evidence that at least one country – Saudi Arabia –
may be attempting to interfere via more traditional methods.
Ever since Russia’s IW assault on the American
political system in 2016 and its less successful attempt to manipulate
the French elections, hacking, fake news, bots, and trolls are what come
to mind regarding attempts to illicitly manipulate elections and affect
democracies’ public discourse.
The success of such means, and the fact that they
have captured the public imagination, should not allow us to assume that
the more traditional methods of influencing another country’s political
system have gone out of circulation. They may be out of fashion but
they still exist, and countries are still making good use of them.
“Traditional” refers to hiring PR teams,
advertising agencies, and policy advocacy and lobbying companies to
promote a country’s interests and agenda, both diplomatic and economic.
In addition, it not infrequently includes funding politicians, and
sometimes a particular party as well.
A foreign country hiring a lobbyist or a PR agency
is not a problem in a democratic society, as long as the country in
question is not considered a hostile power and has diplomatic relations
with the country it is trying to influence. Some countries require that a
company or consultant hired by a foreign country register as a foreign
agent, but as long as regulations are adhered to, there is no legal
problem.
Providing funding is something else. The US and
all other major western powers have strict campaign finance laws
designed to prevent covert injection of funds from unclear sources into
political campaigns.
No country has made more extensive use of both
these methods than Saudi Arabia. It hires the best lawyers, lobbyists,
and advertising agencies money can buy (or at least rent) in the US,
Britain, and other countries of interest to them.
In the pre cyber-IW era, when these were the only
effective means by which to interfere in another country’s elections,
Israel was relatively safe from attempts by hostile powers in this
regard. Only the US and the EU attempted in the past to affect Israeli
elections via such means. This was done primarily via funding of
campaigns, party institutions, and NGOs/PACs affiliated with particular
sides they were interested in helping. Since such interference could not
be done by governmental agencies, it was done via a tangled web of NGOs
that directly and indirectly funneled funds to pertinent local NGOs.
Despite its willingness to meddle in other
countries’ political systems via the above-mentioned means, Saudi Arabia
never attempted to target Israel, despite the allure of manipulating
the political system of a sworn enemy. Its antipathy to Israel was so
strong that it refused to do anything that would require any kind of
contact with it, despite the potential gains. The kingdom ignored pleas
from Jordan, Egypt, and the PA to provide them with funding to influence
Israeli politics in this way.
This policy seems to have changed. It is an open
secret that Jerusalem and Riyadh have begun to cautiously develop a
covert, mutually beneficial relationship, especially between their
respective intelligence agencies. This is not surprising, since both
countries regard Iran as their most dangerous enemy. Both are determined
to prevent it from realizing its goals of obtaining unfettered access
to the Mediterranean and becoming a nuclear power.
Having broken its taboo regarding contacts with
Israel, there are increasing signs Riyadh may have embarked on a new
policy regarding meddling in Israeli elections. There is a not
insubstantial level of circumstantial evidence indicating some level of
Saudi involvement with the Labor party, specifically its chairman, Avi
Gabbay.
Shortly after being elected Labor leader, Gabbay
sidelined the party’s foreign affairs and defense committee, led by
Prof. Haim Assa, former premier Yitzhak Rabin’s NSA and one of the most
respected strategic and technology gurus in Israel’s defense
establishment. Despite Assa’s reputation, Gabbay ignored him and the
committee, and instead formed a new “foreign affairs forum” outside the
party structure. He appointed Henrique Cymerman, a journalist with dual
Israeli and Portuguese citizenship and a long-time associate of Yisrael
Yozemet chairman Kobi Huberman, to run it.
Yisrael Yozemet (Israel Initiates) is where things
get interesting. It is an NGO whose purpose is to promote links between
Israel and Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. It also encourages
Israel to conduct negotiations with the Palestinians within the
framework of the 2002 Saudi Peace Initiative.
Huberman also happens to be chairman of Yisrael
Yozemet Ltd., a commercial company active in promoting commercial ties
between the Arab world and Israel. Several members of the boards of both
the company and the NGO have their own UK-registered companies that are
involved in a variety of commercial enterprises with Saudi Arabia and
the UAE.
Israeli security agencies have long been aware of
Huberman’s ties to the Saudis. A highly respected former IDF general
declined an offer to lead one of the new parties formed when the early
elections were announced after he realized the extent of Huberman’s
involvement in it. The general suspected that the party would be funded
with Saudi money.
Several weeks ago, Cymerman announced his
intention to run in the Labor primaries. Gabbay made it clear he
strongly supported him, and it is widely believed that he is one of the
candidates for the three spots on the list Gabbay can nominate if he
does not gain a high place in the primaries.
Gabbay and Cymerman recently held a joint event at
which Labor’s foreign affairs platform was presented. They were the two
speakers. This was, at least so far, the only Labor campaign event
dedicated to foreign policy. Common sense would seem to dictate that
this event be highlighted for maximum publicity, as Labor desperately
needs to convince the public it actually has a coherent foreign and
defense policy. In reality, however, it was a low key event attended by
party activists, and there was no media presence.
From what Gabbay and Cymerman said, it was clear
that Labor’s foreign policy platform is a carbon copy of Yisrael
Yozemet’s plan for Israel to immediately enter negotiations based on the
Saudi Initiative. To burnish his credentials as a serious foreign
affairs player, Cymerman detailed how he had been instrumental in
helping Gabbay develop a relationship with the Saudi leadership, and
described how he had accompanied him on several secret trips to the Gulf
region.
Subsequently, in a conversation with a former
senior Israeli journalist, Cymerman confirmed that all his links with
Saudi Arabia originated in his long-term relationship with Huberman, who
was also present on Gabbay’s trips to Saudi Arabia.
Additional evidence possibly indicating Saudi
involvement in Labor, and its willingness to invest in it, can be
gleaned from the way Labor has organized its campaign budget.
Under the Israeli system, established parties are
eligible for state loans to fund their campaigns based on the number of
Knesset seats they currently have. The catch is that if they end up with
fewer seats in the new parliament, they have to return the difference
to the state. Gabbay decided Labor would take a loan based on the 24
seats the party currently has, despite the fact that according to every
poll that has been taken over the past several months, he will be lucky
if Labor gets 10 seats in the next Knesset (most polls have Labor
winning 6-8 seats). This means that unless the polls have got it totally
wrong, Labor will end the elections with a huge deficit that, combined
with its expected transformation into a small niche party, could cause
it to implode.
This leads to an inescapable question. How can a
man who has presented himself as a competent and successful CEO of a
major corporation risk burying his party under a mountain of debt? One
possible answer is that he knows Saudi money will be available.
The bottom line is that there seems to be a
preponderance of evidence, equally circumstantial and compelling,
leading to a not improbable conclusion that the Saudis regard Labor as a
strategic asset. They appear to have already invested in it
politically, and may be willing to invest in it financially as well.
The more fundamental questions are why the Saudis
would change their longstanding policy of assiduously avoiding
interfering in Israeli elections, and why they would choose Labor, which
on the surface seems like backing a loser.
The latter question is easier to answer. Anyone
who has ever had any business dealings with the Arab world knows it
values age, wisdom, and experience over youth. The Saudis see Labor as
an old and venerable institution and therefore as a still potentially
valuable strategic asset, despite its current state of disrepair. They
are therefore willing to invest what amounts to peanuts for them in the
party.
The former requires a more complex answer. The
Saudis have a well-earned reputation for hedging their bets. They know
their position in Washington is precarious. If, in 2020, they find
themselves having to deal with a Democratic White House and Congress, it
could be a train wreck for them.
They understand that any Likud government would
face major problems of its own in such an environment, and would be
hard-pressed to maintain its influence in Washington, let alone help the
Saudis. The most promising solution to this problem would be for the
Saudis to develop a relationship with an internationally respected
Israeli political entity that would enjoy a reasonably good working
relationship with a White House and Congress dominated by the Democrats.
Labor is the Israeli party that best meets those criteria; hence its
attractiveness to the Saudis as a potentially valuable strategic asset.
The House of Saud has two main objectives: its
survival, and containing Iran. Despite its huge defense budget, its
performance in Yemen has highlighted just how lamentable its military
capabilities are. It knows the only potential regional ally capable of
defeating Iran is Israel. It also knows that robust support, or at the
very least tacit acquiescence from Washington, is vital for any such
Israeli-Saudi alliance to achieve its strategic goal of effectively
containing Iran.
Labor meets all the Saudis’ criteria. Despite
having fallen on hard times, the party is still internationally
respected. The party of Peres, Rabin, and Barak is still a prime
strategic asset in a blue-tinged Washington, irrespective of its current
electoral weakness.
The Saudis must know Labor will not win the
elections. Given the current polls, they will be pleased if it ends up
winning 8-9 seats, which would keep it alive. It is clear that
irrespective of who wins, given the current balance of power and
Netanyahu’s legal problems, Israelis will likely find themselves at the
polling stations again within 18 months or so. By that time the result
of the 2020 US election will be known. If, as seems likely, Washington
emerges in 2020 under Democratic control, the Saudis – through their
negligible (for them) investment in Labor – would have a valuable
strategic asset.
MBS knows full well that if, under his watch,
Riyadh successfully brokers a peace treaty based on the Saudi
Initiative, the Democrats will rush to embrace him, and not even a dozen
more Khashoggis would change that. The best chance of that happening is
if Israel has a Labor-led government. Considering what it has to gain,
providing the funds needed to cover Labor’s expected campaign deficit
and recharging its bank balance is a bargain, and the Saudis know a
bargain when they see one.
Jonathan Ariel is a South African native who
served as an intelligence officer with the ANC and subsequently worked
with Mandela. In Israel he was News Editor of Makor Rishon, Editor-in-Chief of Ma’ariv International, and Editor-in-Chief of Jerusalem Online’s English-language website Channel 2 News.
Source: https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/foreign-intervention-in-israels-elections/
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