by Emil Avdaliani
Moscow’s foreign policy moves need to be viewed with a balanced perspective and should be placed in their historical context.
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Vladimir Putin and President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko, 2017, photo via Office of the President of Russia
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BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 1,372, December 15, 2019
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Russian foreign policy
since the mid-2000s tends to be perceived in contradictory terms: as
either a negative for Russia or the product of a grand strategic vision
on the part of the Russian leadership. It is also often falsely
perceived as representing a break with the past. Moscow’s foreign policy
moves need to be viewed with a balanced perspective and should be
placed in their historical context.
The grand analytical narratives of Russian foreign
policy dating from the early 2000s draw radical and opposing
conclusions. Some analysts warn that Russia is on a downhill trajectory
because of internal economic troubles, while others claim it has been
transformed into a geopolitical player as important as the US, China, or
the EU.
Russian diplomacy lies somewhere in between a
grand long-term strategy and a set-up for an apocalyptic scenario in
which Russia loses big.
The Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and
subsequent conflict in eastern Ukraine, the war with Georgia in 2008,
and the Syrian campaign are seen by many as clear signs that Moscow has
expansionist ambitions.
But one can also argue that those actions were
intended to solidify Russian influence that was already in place. Take,
for example, Crimea. Even before 2014, Russia effectively controlled the
peninsula, had military bases there, and enjoyed the support of a part
of the population. Though radical in terms of international law, from a
purely strategic point of view the annexation of the peninsula in 2014
led to a solidification of Moscow’s grip on the territory through the
opening of additional military bases and increasing economic influence.
As for Georgia’s breakaway regions, Russia
effectively controlled those regions before 2008 both militarily and
economically. The war of 2008 can thus be seen as a solidification of
Russian foreign policy gains dating from the 1990s, when Moscow halted
Georgia’s western drive.
In Syria, too, before the Russian military
intervention of 2015, Moscow inherited a close partnership with Damascus
from the Soviet Union and even had a military base there. Russia has
been solidifying its presence in the country from 2015 through the
present.
Russian foreign policy moves over the past 10
years or so are thus not as innovative or expansive as many believe.
They reflect a solidification of Russian interests, which by extension
means that Moscow’s current foreign policy is a continuation of its
policy from the 1990s. In all recent Russian military campaigns, Moscow
has defended military assets already on the ground.
Let’s consider what is likely to happen in the
immediate future in Belarus. Moscow’s economic, cultural, and military
influence on Minsk has been exponential since the breakup of the Soviet
Union. When it was announced recently that Belarus and Russia will move
forward with plans to create a single state through unified parliament,
financial, and judiciary systems, many sounded the alarm of further
Russian expansionism.
But while this is an important development, it is
not an indication that Russia is growing its influence out of
proportion. Here too we see a solidification of Russian foreign policy
that was in place well before Vladimir Putin’s rule began. Talks between
Moscow and Minsk began and integration plans were signed by the
countries in the 1990s, right after the collapse of the Soviet system.
Even in Central Asia, where Uzbekistan is
reportedly close to joining the Eurasian Economic Union, the Russians
are not aiming at something out of proportion. Moscow’s military and
economic clout in the region has been foundational since the 1990s.
The past two decades have thus been primarily
about Russia safeguarding the military perimeter the Soviet Union once
enjoyed. And to the Russians’ credit, they have managed to do this.
Russian troops in Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Tajikistan, and
Kyrgyzstan have thwarted NATO and EU expansion into the heart of
Eurasia. A main reason for the Russia-Belarus integration talks is
Moscow’s need to open a military base on Belarusian soil, close to the
Polish border, to preclude military moves by NATO.
While the above moves represent an intensification
of weakened 1990s-era Russian foreign policy, there are exceptions that
seem to signal a break from post-Soviet Russian diplomacy. For example,
on Afghanistan, Russia has been at the heart of negotiations between
the Kabul government and the Taliban on more than one occasion. Several
peace conferences have been held in Moscow in the past couple of years.
In Africa, Russia is gradually being transformed
into a significant power with large diplomatic, military, and economic
ambitions covering broad swaths of the continent. A pan-African summit
was recently held in Sochi (Russia).
Still, one can argue that Russia exerted influence on Afghanistan in Soviet times, and Soviet Russia had ambitions in Africa.
Returning to the question of whether Russia has
increased its influence in Eurasia: While it is fashionable to claim
both that its increased influence will diminish and that it is being
transformed into a new global player, Russian foreign policy gains
(including economic and military moves) have in fact been moderate.
Moscow has rarely involved itself in risky theaters and has not invaded a
country it cannot defeat. All its moves were carefully calibrated and
none represented a radical change from what the Russians were doing in
previous decades (or centuries, according to some).
In the longer term, Moscow’s military and economic
moves have created more problems for Russia than solutions. But its
intention was never to find a long-term solution to the Ukraine, South
Caucasus, or Syria. Moscow’s goal was to solidify its influence in order
to keep western economic and military expansion at bay until better
geopolitical circumstances arise.
Source: https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/russian-foreign-policy/
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