by Dror Eydar
Just like with the Munich Agreement, opponents of both the Oslo Accords and the recent Iran nuclear deal were silenced and made to look like eternal warmongers • The Iranians became wise to the pattern in time, and rode it all the way to victory.
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                                             For them, this is just the  beginning. The Iranian delegation returns home from Vienna this week Photo credit: AP                                         | 
Many parallels can be drawn between the  1993-1995 Oslo Accords, which Israel negotiated with the Palestinian  Liberation Organization, and the Vienna agreement some 20 years later,  which Western powers, headed by the United States, negotiated with the  Islamic Republic of Iran. In both cases, eager negotiators representing  the Western worldview were keen to strike a "historic" agreement with a  terrorist group/state. In both cases the ultimate goal was to compel the  terrorist entity to abandon its aggressive aspirations and to embrace  peace. 
In both instances, the other side -- the PLO  or Iran -- was in dire straits diplomatically, economically and  militarily when the talks began. They would have likely accepted almost  any dictate, had Western powers, in Iran's case, or Israel in the PLO's  case, been patient and persistent enough to stand their ground, insist  on their demands, maintain economic pressure and not let go of the  double-edged sword at the terrorists' necks. 
In both instances, rightist and conservative  figures warned that the agreement would be a historic mistake. In both  instances, comparisons were drawn to the 1938 Munich Agreement -- the  peace accord signed by Western powers with Nazi Germany that sacrificed  Czechoslovakia by handing Germany what came to be known as the  Sudetenland and leaving the Czechs exposed. The comparison is not  entirely accurate, but Western appeasement toward aggressive tyranny is a  running motif. The people who documented that period, including  Hitler's associates, say that Hitler did not believe that the Western  powers would behave in the way that they did, and their capitulation  convinced him of their weakness, paving the path to the terrible war  that ensued. 
Armaments and War Production Minister for the  Third Reich Albert Speer has recounted that after the annexation of the  Sudetenland, with its massive border fortifications, Hitler traveled  there to personally inspect the bunkers and facilities that had  withstood Germans weapons testing (the Germans used the fortifications  to test and develop new weapons). When he returned, he said with  enthusiasm: "Had the Czechs defended them, it would have made it very  difficult for us to occupy them, and it would have cost us a lot of  blood. Now we have them without having lost a single drop of blood. ...  What a wonderful starting point! We hopped over a mountain range and we  are already sitting deep inside Czechoslovakia.
2. 
In the case of the Oslo Accords, the agreement  was the product of more than 20 years of preparation within the Israeli  Left, and its key tenet was the land-for-peace formula. The word  "peace" was soon joined by the word "now" in the sense of "if not now,  when?" the most common string of words in this context is "window of  opportunity." That is how after the 1992 election, when the Right split  into quarreling factions, losing tens of thousands of votes, the Left  won a narrow victory and rose to power. The urgency of the political  "window of opportunity" led to urgent negotiations. With the help of the  one-sided media, the Oslo Accords blood agreement was marketed as  Israel's only hope for peace and prosperity. Opponents of the agreement  were silenced, and their representatives were made to look ridiculous or  like eternal warmongers seeking constant conflict, precisely  what British Foreign Minister Philip Hammond said about Israel this  week for opposing the Vienna agreement with Iran. Who says history  doesn't have a sense of humor? 
The Iranian nuclear deal was also the product  of U.S. President Barack Obama's worldview from when he first entered  office. He has led a gradual American retreat away from being the global  policeman and marched his country toward historic reconciliation with  the Muslim world. The 2009 Cairo speech was a declaration of intent, but  the ultimate goal was reconciliation with Iran. In 2009, when the  Iranian election was rigged to give Mahmoud Ahmadinejad a second term as  president, millions took to the streets in what came to be known the  Green Revolution. The U.S. (and the West) could have supported the  Iranian opposition, backed the protesters, or helped bring down the  ayatollah regime, which blocked social networks and mobile phones to  interfere with protests, in myriad other ways. (One Iranian opposition  leader told me that the Americans could have provided the protesters  with 30,000 satellite phones thereby circumventing the regime's block).  But all Obama did was provide verbal support and extend his condolences  for the deaths. 
Wise men among us, who refer to the Iranian  nuclear deal as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's personal "failure,"  as though he were a party in the negotiations, would be wise to take  into account Obama's consistent steering toward reconciliation with  Iran. In speeches and interviews, Obama has clearly laid out his views  on Islamist regimes: Even if they are motivated by hatred for the West  and pathological anti-Semitism, "Well, the fact that you are  anti-Semitic or racist doesn't preclude you from being interested in  survival. It doesn't preclude you from being rational about the need to  keep your economy afloat; it doesn't preclude you from making strategic  decisions about how you stay in power; and so the fact that the supreme  leader is anti-Semitic doesn't mean that this overrides all of his other  considerations." So Obama told Jeffrey Goldberg of The Atlantic back in  May. In other words, Obama represents an age-old (humanist?) perception  that suggests that even dictatorships, fanatic religious establishments  and terrorist organizations share the West's rationality. After all,  one of the architects of the Oslo Accords once told me, "They too want  to live well. They too want to compromise. They too prefer talks to  terrorism and war." Yeah.
3. 
Dr. Harold Rhode, who studied in Iran in the  1970s, served as an adviser on Islamic affairs in the Pentagon since  1982. At the end of his career, he also served under Obama for a  time, during which he submitted a paper titled The Sources of Iranian Negotiating Behavior.  His research was rejected, he says. At that time, the White House was  going in another direction. Rhode warned that it would be ill advised to  engage Iran in negotiations without taking into account the long  history and robust culture of Iranian negotiations, whose fundamental  principles are drastically different than those customary in the West,  and especially in the U.S.
For example, compromise, in the Western sense,  is viewed by Iranians as a sign of submission and weakness. Anyone who  makes concessions brings shame upon himself and his family. On the other  hand, those who compel others to compromise are held in high regard,  seen as likely to coerce others to surrender in the future. The Iranians  don't view an opponent's weakness as an opportunity to engage  adversaries in compromise but rather as an opportunity to destroy them.  Therefore, gestures of goodwill are interpreted as weakness and lack of  determination. 
Rhode went into great detail about the Iranian  concept of "ketman." What Iranians really believe, they usually keep to  themselves. Instead, they tell those with power what they think their  leaders want to hear. This is the concept of ketman, or dissimulation.  Iranians do not consider ketman (taqiyyah in Arabic) to be lying. And  they have developed it into a fine art, which they view as a positive  form of self-protection. In his article, Rhode provides additional  examples of the Iranian negotiating style. 
We can conclude with one more pertinent  observation by Rhode: "Negotiations are opportunities to best others, to  demonstrate power, and to defeat opponents. Iranians do not see  bargaining as an opportunity to establish win-win situations. Contracts  are little more than pieces of paper Iranians will sign, if these papers  can advance their interests. Their signatures are not guarantees that  they will carry out the terms of the contract." 
Will we ever learn?
Dror Eydar
Source: http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_article.php?id=26953&hp=1
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
 
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