by Yonah Jeremy Bob
IDF sources view the two names symbolically, likening them to a "Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde" duality, suggesting a true internal struggle within Syria's leader and his shifting alliances.
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The IDF is still suspicious of Syria's leader and wondering whether, between two of his names symbolic of his dual identities, he will turn out to be more of his jihadist past as Mohammad al-Julani or Ahmed Al-Sharaa, the suit and tie wearing technocrat official he has portrayed himself as since taking power from the Assad regime in December 2024.
IDF sources treat the two names as symbolic, with almost a "Dr. Jekyl" and "Mr. Hyde" dual personality quality, making it clear that they do believe there is a true internal struggle going on within Syria's leader as well as among his various allies and potential allies who are trying to pull him in one direction or another.
In the balance is whether Israel now has a new, greater threat in Syria than even the Assad regime, if not in sophistication of weapons, then in ferocity and commitment of its forces to invading and fighting against non-Muslims.
Or now has a unique opportunity to reach a long-term stable ceasefire or even normalization with a country which has been hostile to Jerusalem since the founding of the state, including a new regime which will continue to cut off any Iranian attempts to reform a ring of fire around its borders.
To date, the IDF gives very high marks to al-Sharaa and his forces for preventing Iran and Hezbollah from smuggling arms through Syria into Lebanon.
Both in private but also in public, al-Sharaa has said he has no desire to fight Israel and could even potentially reach normalization with it sometime in 2026.
These are remarkable and strategic changes which could see Syria join the Abraham Accords - something no one would have thought remotely possible a year ago.
However, Israel has seen downsides which suggest that "Dr. Julani," who spent years leading a wing of al-Qaeda terrorists, could still be in the picture right behind "Mr. al-Sharaa."
In the Spring, allies of Julani massacred Alawite-Shiite Syrians in Western Syria, and last week, some of his allies massacred Syrian-Druze in Sweida in southern Syria.
Israel verbally blasted Julani for allowing - or some say behind the scenes ordering - some of his forces to massacre the Alawites and said this proved he was stil a dangerous jihadist who the West should shun, but took no large actions to protect them because it was far off from Israel's border and because the Alawites are open enemies of Israel.
In contrast, the IDF said that to try to stop Julani's forces from massacring Syrian Druze in Sweida last week, it had attacked Syrian forces allied with Julani 140 times, including the Syrian Defense Ministry Headquarters in Damascus.
With Sweida, Israel intervened both because it was closer to its border and because of the alliance between Israel and the Druze population, some of whom are Israelis and some who are in Syria.
The above Israeli attacks in Syria were in addition to a total of 300 general attacks by the IDF in Syria in 2025, often against military vehicles or capabilities, and not against Julani's forces.
Israel had attacked far more Syrian Assad-era military targets in a blitz of attacks in December 2024 - as many as 600 targets using 1,800 munitions - as soon as the Assad regime fell and before Julani had truly solidified his hold on power.
Regarding Julani's handling of the Sweida incident, IDF sources said that they did not believe he had intended the massacre to occur, but that it had happened since he does not yet have control over aspects of his Syrian forces whose backgrounds are entirely jihadist.
Still, IDF sources would admit that he could have taken stronger measures to avoid such a massacre, and other top Israeli defense establishment sources have exclusively told the Jerusalem Post that Julani is not to be trusted, no matter how well he dresses.
There is an additional complication that Julani may not agree to normalization without a return of the Israeli side of the Golan Heights, something which the 1990s Rabin, Netanyahu, and Barak governments seriously considered, but which has left the Israeli lexicon since ISIS took over large portions of Syria for a time during the 2010s.
Also, to achieve any long-term ceasefire, Julani would demand that Israel withdraw from the buffer zone it took in southern Syria in December 2024, and the latest massacre in Sweida makes it less likely that Israel will do so in the near future, absent heavy pressure from the Trump administration.
Further, IDF sources warned that Julani could come under the influence of Turkey and Qatar, both powers that have helped him and his forces with weapons and financing to overthrow the Assad regime.
From the perspective of worrying about a Turkey-Qatar-Syria alliance, it might be better for Israel if the West and the Saudis continue to warm up to Julani and to help him with funding, so as to try to keep him under some Western-Saudi influence, which is more friendly to Israel.
Based on those concerns, IDF sources said that Israel hotly debated whether it should go as far as to target the Syrian Defense Ministry during the Sweida episode.
Some were concerned that such an attack could push Julani into the hands of Turkey and Qatar and away from the West and from any improved arrangements with Israel.
In that spirit, the IDF did not rush to attack the ministry, but rather tried other, less serious attacks first to hint to Julani to control his forces.
However, IDF sources said that once Julani ignored the initial, smaller level attacks, Israel thought it had no choice other than to attack a bigger target to try to end the massacre.
There were also complexities in that Julani's forces and allies were split into three groups, including jihadist militias with around 3,000 fighters, the more formal army with 3,000-4,000 fighters, and some defense ministry forces.
Despite efforts to bring all of the militias into the army, either Julani lacks the power to make all of his allies join the army, or he has decided that allowing certain allied militias to continue to exist to do dirty work on behalf of his army, is a useful tactic for promoting massacres against his enemies, while having plausible deniability.
After all of this, Julani is still viewed as an undecided-unclear figure - new ally or new foe - even nine months after taking power.
Other problems remain in Syria
There are around 3,000 Palestinian Islamic Jihad fighters, a few hundred Hamas fighters, and a medium number of ISIS fighters.In terms of the hundreds and then around 1,000 Israeli Druze who broke into Syria past IDF forces during the Sweida episode, as well as the 100 Syrian Druze who entered Israel illegally then, the IDF was surprisingly unapologetic about the incident.
The IDF did say that there would be more physical barriers and forces trained to stop such low-scale public order problems in the future (generally, soldiers are trained to fight terrorist invaders heading into Israel, not to stop unarmed Israeli Druze from leaving it in large groups to help their brethren try to survive a massacre.)
But IDF sources also said that a battalion commander had decided to physically open a gate to allow Israeli-Druze into Syria when he thought that the physical pressure they were placing on the gate was itself dangerous.
Not only is this battalion commander not being reprimanded, but IDF sources said that they believed he had acted exactly the right way under complex circumstances.
According to IDF sources, the only alternative for IDF troops to what actually happened would have been to start shooting at the knees of unarmed Israeli-Druze trying to break through the border, something which probably also would have led to accidental deaths, and according to the IDF, much worse criticism than the criticism it ended up receiving.
There was also discussion of the idea that Sweida was so far away, at 80 kilometers from the border, that the IDF may have had an idea that the Israeli-Druze would not actually get very far on foot and would have to return home shortly after their "invasion" to help their brethren.
Yonah Jeremy Bob
Source: https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-862621
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