by Jonathan Spyer
BEHIND THE LINES: Although the IDF has greatly weakened Hezbollah, the Iranian terror proxy is replenishing and recruiting to combat disarmament efforts.
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On Monday, two Hezbollah operatives were killed in southern Lebanon by Israeli drone strikes in two separate incidents. The strikes took place in the border town of Ait a-Shaab and in Nabatiya. These killings were the latest acts in Israel’s ongoing campaign to prevent Hezbollah from rearming and reorganizing south of the Litani River.
Over 300 Hezbollah members have been killed by Israel in this ongoing campaign since a ceasefire between Israel and the organization was officially declared in November 2024. Israel’s operations against Hezbollah reflect the complexity of the current moment in both Lebanon and the broader region.
The Iran-led regional alliance has been significantly weakened by two years of war with Israel. Yet the various components of the Iran-led Axis of Resistance, and the Tehran regime itself, remain stronger than their domestic opponents. As a result, they are now repairing their losses.
For Hezbollah in Lebanon, this means replenishing weapons supplies, and recruiting and training new fighters. It is also threatening civil strife to deter any inclination that the Lebanese authorities might have to disarm the organization. Hezbollah, it appears, is making steady progress in these areas.
The IDF has made considerable progress in fight against Hezbollah
ISRAEL’S MILITARY achievement against in 2023-2024 was very considerable. According to Israel’s figures, the organization lost around 5,000 fighters who were killed, with another 7,000 wounded. Some 80% of its mid- and long-range missile capacity was destroyed. The organization also lost its top political and military leadership.
The government of President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, unlike previous Lebanese administrations, is not dependent on Hezbollah and its allies for its political survival. In the 2022 elections, the terrorist group and its partners won only 61 seats in Lebanon’s 128-member parliament. As a result, they have five seats in the 24-member cabinet. This is short of the blocking third necessary to veto decisions.
Thus, there is nothing to prevent the government from ordering the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to move ahead with Hezbollah’s disarmament. In June, US officials presented a timeline for the process, which stipulates that it should be completed by the end of the year.
The urgently needed investment in Lebanon from the Gulf states is dependent on the process’s successful completion by year’s end. In August, the cabinet duly voted to disarm Hezbollah by the end of 2025.
Yet despite the stated policy of the government, the comprehensive disarmament of the Shi’ite Islamist terrorist group is not happening, and almost certainly will not happen. Only in the area south of the Litani, where Hezbollah’s capacities were largely destroyed in the last months of 2024, has progress been made.
Nothing has been done north of the Litani, or in Hezbollah’s heartland in the Bekaa Valley, or in south Beirut. The Lebanese Armed Forces show no sign of proceeding in these areas, despite their being included in the plan that the army presented to the government.
Hezbollah is rebuilding
In the meantime, Hezbollah is rebuilding. Predictions that the fall of the Assad regime in Syria would conclusively cut off Iran’s land bridge to Hezbollah and the Mediterranean have turned out to be overly optimistic.The networks responsible for smuggling weapons across Syria were not directly connected to the fallen regime. Rather, these were professional smuggling networks, emerging mainly from the Sunni Arab section of the Syrian population. They have neither disappeared nor gone out of business with Assad’s fall.
The new Syrian government, meanwhile, still has not firmly established its authority over the entire country. The result is that Iran-linked networks are still moving weaponry from Iraq, across Syria, and into Lebanon. The materials in question are forming a significant part of Hezbollah’s slow reconstruction, which in its heartland is being challenged only by Israel, and only from the air.
THE REASONS for the Lebanese government’s failure to make any serious attempt to disarm Hezbollah are clear, and the failure was predicted by many analysts. There are two related elements underlying this stance.
The first is the fear that there would be a civil war if the government insisted on disarming Hezbollah. Hezbollah itself has threatened this possibility. In August, as the government was moving forward with its formal demand for disarmament, Hezbollah leader Sheikh Naim Qassem said that Lebanon “will have no life if you stand on the other side and try to confront us and eliminate us.” This was understood in Lebanon as a lightly veiled threat of civil war.
There remains in Lebanon, among every section of the population, with the exception of Hezbollah and its allies, a profound fear of a return to the devastating days of the 1975-1990 civil war. Hezbollah is keen to preserve its internal political legitimacy, and has no desire to turn its guns on its fellow Lebanese. However, if directly confronted, it will not hesitate to do so.
The last time a Lebanese government attempted to challenge the organization directly was in 2008. At that time, the government attempted far less than a general disarmament of Hezbollah; it was merely seeking to assert control over security at Beirut’s airport. Hezbollah’s response was to take over West Beirut, brushing aside government-associated forces.
There is no reason at all to assume that it would now peacefully acquiesce to giving up its weapons. The government dreads the prospect of civil strife, and Hezbollah knows this. Therefore, Hezbollah also knows that the government is bluffing.
The second reason for the government’s failure to implement its own decision is that it is unsure that it could actually enforce these measures. Although the Lebanese Armed Forces does not release official figures regarding the sectarian makeup of the army, some sources suggest that Lebanese Shi’ites may account for as much as 50% of LAF’s manpower.
Even if the precise figure is lower, it is obvious that a force containing a large percentage of Shi’ite soldiers could not be relied upon to perform a mission that would require, at the very least, a credible threat of force against fellow Shi’ites. Once again, the government realizes this, and as does Hezbollah. Hence, Hezbollah is aware that the government’s declarations are essentially void of content.
What this means is that if Israel wants to prevent Hezbollah from rebuilding and rearming, it will have to ensure this itself. As of now, Israel appears to be achieving this objective largely via the combination of good intelligence and air power.
There may come a time when the choice facing Israel will be whether to escalate the current levels of action against Hezbollah or accept the organization’s steady reconstruction.
In any case, hopes that the government of Lebanon might defang Hezbollah as part of its assertion of sovereignty should be dismissed. There is no Lebanese partner for this mission.
Jonathan Spyer
Source: https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-873019
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