Monday, November 30, 2009

Hillary's Bombshell: Obama Administration Subtly Launches Dramatic Policy Change on Peace Process.


by Barry Rubin

In a one-paragraph statement welcoming Israel's ten-month-long freeze on building apartments in existing West Bank settlements, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made a major statement. The dramatic new U.S. stance on Israel-Palestinian Authority peace agreement is camouflaged by  brevity and subtle wording. But make no mistake: this is one of the most important foreign policy steps the Obama Administration has taken.

Here is the
statement in full:

"Today's announcement by the Government of Israel helps move forward toward resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. We believe that through good-faith negotiations the parties can mutually agree on an outcome which ends the conflict and reconciles the Palestinian goal of an independent and viable state based on the 1967 lines, with agreed swaps, and the Israeli goal of a Jewish state with secure and recognized borders that reflect subsequent developments and meet Israeli security requirements."

Clearly, this approach builds on the 2000 Camp David meeting and the December 2000 plan of President Bill Clinton. Ironically, the latter is called the Clinton plan, so the name need not change since now it is renewed and extended by another Clinton.

These 77 words are worth analyzing in great detail. First, there is what the United States is offering the Palestinian side:

"The Palestinian goal of an independent and viable state based on the 1967 lines, with agreed swaps…"

One should first ask, which Palestinians? Hamas and Islamic Jihad don't favor this approach and Hamas still runs the Gaza Strip. To pretend that Israel can or should make a peace treaty with the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority (PA) which has no authority over the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip is ludicrous. Whatever deal Israel makes with the PA, it could—indeed, probably would--be attacked by Palestinians from Gaza the next day. The conflict cannot be ended by anything the PA does by itself. Without a real commitment to overthrow Hamas the United States can never make peace.

The second issue is that what Clinton lists is not the entire Palestinian goal since the PA also demands a right for all Palestinians to go and live in Israel, thus subverting that country and destroying the state. This is no mere throw-away line but a very strongly held demand. Anyone who thinks that the PA is just going to drop it—no matter how much land or money it is given—knows nothing about Palestinian politics.

The word "based" in the phrase, "based on the 1967 lines" is carefully chosen to imply flexibility as to where the exact border would be drawn. In fact, the PA has always said that it must get the 1967 boundaries completely, never mentioning the word "swaps." Therefore, when Clinton says that this is a Palestinian "goal" she is wrong.

It tells a great deal that the idea of "swapping land" so that the PA gets the equivalent of the same number of square miles as Jordan ruled before 1967 is an Israeli idea, another example of Israel's willingness to compromise. Remember that the original Israeli position was that it annex about four percent of the West Bank.

 Hence, by whittling down the demands she is making the typical negotiators' error of putting forward a false stance and then finding out the negotiation fail.
But at the same time, however, Clinton is trying to define how the United States sees a reasonable Palestinian demand that it will accept. In other words, she is implying: this is all you're going to get.

There is also Clinton's formulation of what Israel gets:

"The Israeli goal of a Jewish state with secure and recognized borders that reflect subsequent developments and meet Israeli security requirements."

This incorporates several Israeli demands:

--"An outcome which ends the conflict": Israel insists that any peace treaty will explicitly end the conflict. Makes sense, right? But the PA refuses to agree to this principle. The reason is, of course, that it does not view getting an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and east Jerusalem as an end to the conflict but only as stage one of a longer-term effort to wipe Israel off the map.

--
"Jewish state": Israel wants Palestinian recognition of Israel as a Jewish state. Why: To show a real acceptance on the Palestinian side. In addition, though, it has a very practical side, avoiding a Palestinian claim to recognize "Israel" and then doing everything possible—like flooding it with Palestinian Arabs—to transform it into an Arab and/or Islamic state. ("Binationalism" is just a cover word to hide a step in that direction.)

--"With secure and recognized borders": Israel wants borders recognized as a sign that full peace exists. The word "secure" here implies security arrangements to prevent future attacks.

--"
That reflect subsequent developments": This is a fascinating and new phrase. What can it mean other than this: Since so many Jews have moved into settlements, this new factor must be taken into account in shifting the borders. This is the Obama Administration's version of its predecessor's idea that Israel could keep "settlement blocs," large towns built up along its border like the Etzion bloc and Maale Adumim. It could also be applied to Jerusalem, though that sensitive word is not mentioned in the statement.

--"And meets Israeli security requirements": Another and stronger reference to security guarantees.

How will this statement be received in Israel?
This raises a fascinating question: Was it coordinated with the Netanyahu government as part of the freeze deal? If so, the Netanyahu government has certainly proved itself to be flexible and peace-oriented. Certainly, there isn't everything Israel wants in this statement yet it does encompass some important points taken out of the cabinet's position on peace arrangements.

The more I think about this point, the more it makes sense to me that the position is a gesture toward Israel. This is a statement that favors Israel's position while still offering the Palestinians, in the mind of the administration, enough to make them happy (wrong) and enough to show the world that the United States is even-handed (right for Europe; wrong for the Arab world).  It isn't a blatantly pro-Israel stance
but does incorporate key elements of what Israel wants to an extent greater than where the United States has gone before.

It also offers the Palestinians, or at least the PA, what it says it wants. Well, not exactly but in a way that Americans think is reasonably close. Unfortunately, that's not the way the PA thinks. For more than thirty years the United States has been trying to formulate plans on the basis of what it thinks will satisfy Palestinian goals—the first Camp David meeting, the Reagan plan, the second Camp David meeting, and a thousand plans, conferences, statements, and initiatives in between.

Each time they fail because they aren't addressing what the Palestinian leadership really wants. And today that is further complicated by there being two Palestinian leaderships.

The United States has endorsed the Israeli position that the PA must recognize Israel as a Jewish state, this is a big step forward and a victory for Israel.

ps: (in response to a reader's question asking if this means the United States demands that Israel return to the 1967 borders):

IT DOES NOT SAY THE 1967 BORDERS. ISRAEL'S  FORMULA FOR THE LAST 15 YEAR HAS BEEN: "WITH MINOR MODIFICATIONS" TO THE BORDERS.  I DEFINITELY DON'T THINK THIS WILL LEAD TO ANY BREAKTHROUGH--THE PALESTINIANS WILL REJECT IT AND THERE IS NO TREATY IN SIGHT FOR DECADES. IN THAT SENSE, WHAT IT OFFERS THE PALESTINIANS IS NOT IMPORTANT BECAUSE THEY WILL SAY NO TO EVERYTHING SHORT OF ALL THEY WANT WITHOUT THEIR MAKING ANY CONCESIONS.

COMPARE THIS STATEMENT TO THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT'S OWN PROGRAM AS WELL AS TO ISRAEL'S POSITION IN THE 2000 CAMP DAVID MEETING AND THE SUBSEQUENT [BILL] CLINTON PLAN IN DECEMBER 2000. IT IS QUITE COMPARABLE. IT INCLUDES RECOGNITION OF THE JEWISH STATE, SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS SATISFACTORY TO ISRAEL, CHANGING THE BORDER, AND END OF CONFLICT ARE FOUR OF THE MAIN SIX POINTS. THE FIFTH, RESETTLING PALESTINIAN REFUGEES IN A PALESTINIAN STATE--NO RETURN, IS UNQUESTIONABLY GOING TO BE ENDORSED BY THE UNITED STATES. THE SIXTH, A DEMILITARIZED PALESTINIAN STATE, IS ALSO NOT MENTIONED EITHER WAY.

OF COURSE, JERUSALEM IS AN IMPORTANT ISSUE NOT EXPLICITLY MENTIONED HERE. BUT CLINTON STATEMENT OF  ["THAT REFLECT SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS"] ALSO MUST APPLY TO JERUSALEM, THUS LEGITIMIZING POST-1967 ISRAELI NEIGHBORHOODS THERE. THIS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT.

AS I SAID, THIS IS NOT A STATEMENT ENDORSING EVERYTHING ISRAEL WOULD LIKE TO HAVE. BUT IT IS THE BEST CONCEIVABLE POSITION THAT THE UNITED STATES, AND ESPECIALLY THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION, COULD CONCEIVABLY TAKE.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal.

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Peace or appeasement?

 

by Yoram Ettinger

 

Construction freeze in Judea and Samaria based on erroneous assumptions

 

1. A freeze will not soften – but will intensify - President Obama's criticism of "settlements" in particular and Israeli policy in general. For instance, Prime Minister Netanyahu's June 14, 2009 Two-State-Solution-speech triggered exacerbated pressure by Obama. Moreover, Netanyahu's willingness to exchange hundreds of Palestinian terrorists for Gilad Shalit was followed by US pressure to release more terrorists.

 

2. A freeze will not moderate – but will whet the appetite of - the PLO (Abbas) or Hamas (Haniyeh); it will radicalize their demands and fuel their terrorism. Former Prime Minister Barak's sweeping concessions, offered to Arafat and Abbas in October 2000, were greeted by the PLO-engineered Second Intifada. Furthermore, Prime Minister Olmert's unprecedented offer of concessions (including the return of some 1948 refugees) was rebuffed by Abbas.

 

3. A freeze re-entrenches the misperception of Jewish presence in Judea and Samaria as an obstacle to peace. It diverts attention and resources from the crucial threat to peace: Abbas-engineered hate education - the manufacturing line of terrorists - and Arab rejection of the existence – and not just the size – of the Jewish state.

 

4. A freeze and the adherence to presidential dictate will not transform the White House position on Iran-related matters. Besides, a freeze and the adherence to presidential dictate do not constitute a prerequisite to maintaining constructive strategic relations with the US (e.g. supply of critical military systems and crucial strategic cooperation). In fact, a freeze and a serial submission to presidential pressure – just like any other form of retreat - erode Israel's strategic posture in Washington and in the Middle East. Such an attitude ignores the role and power of Congress – especially when it comes to the Jewish state - at the dire expense of Israel's national security.

 

Is Jewish construction in Judea and Samaria an/the obstacle to peace?

 

1. In September 2005, Israel uprooted 25 Jewish communities from Gaza and Samaria. Gaza became Judenrein. It paved the road to the meteoric rise of Hamas, and induced more smuggling, manufacturing and launching of missiles at Jewish communities in Southern Israel.

 

2. President Obama defines Jewish presence in Judea and Samaria as a root cause of Arab hostility toward Israel. However, Jewish communities were established in Judea and Samaria after the wars of 1967, 1956 and 1948, after the 1949-1967 campaign of Arab terrorism, after the 1964 establishment of the PLO, after the 1929 slaughter of the Hebron Jewish community and the 1929 expulsion of the Gaza Jewish community, after the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s slaughter of the Jewish community of Gush Etzion, etc.

 

3. President Obama considers the 300,000 Jews (17%), who reside among Judea and Samaria's 1.5 million Arabs, an obstacle to peace. Why would he, then, view the 1.4 million Arabs (20%), who reside among pre-1967 Israel's 6 million Jews, as an example of peaceful coexistence?!

 

4. Obama urges the uprooting of Jewish communities from Judea and Samaria, in order to supposedly advance peace and human rights. Would he, therefore, urge the uprooting of Arab communities from pre-1967 Israel?!

 

5. Since Obama tolerates Arab opposition to Jewish presence in Judea and Samaria would he tolerate Jewish opposition to Arab presence in pre-1967 Israel?! While any attempt by Jews to reside in Palestinian Authority-controlled areas would trigger a lynching attempt, Arabs have peacefully resided within pre-1967 Israel. Doesn't such a reality highlight the nature of Arab intentions and the real obstacle to peace?!

 

6. Obama pressures Israel to freeze Jewish construction in Judea and Samaria, in order to avoid unilateral creation of facts on the ground. Shouldn't Obama demand a similar freeze of Arab construction in Judea and Samaria, which is 30 times larger than Jewish construction?! Doesn't the absence of a balanced approach, by Obama, prejudge of the outcome of negotiation?!

 

7. The 1950-67 Jordanian occupation of Judea and Samaria was recognized only by Britain and Pakistan. The most recent internationally-recognized sovereign over Judea and Samaria was the League of Nations-authorized 1922 British Mandate, which defined Judea and Samaria as part of the Jewish National Home, the cradle of Jewish history. Article 6 of the Mandate indicates the right of Jews to settle in Judea and Samaria. Judge Stephen M. Schwebel, former President of the International Court of Justice, determined that Israel's presence in Judea and Samaria was rooted in self-defense and therefore did not constitute "occupation." Eugene Rostow, former Dean of Yale Law School and former Undersecretary of State and co-author of UN Security Council Resolution 242, asserted that 242 entitled Jews to settle in Judea and Samaria. The Oslo Accord and its derivatives do not prohibit "settlements." Moreover, Israel has constrained construction to state-owned – and not private – land, avoiding expulsion of Arabs landowners.

 

Freeze of Jewish construction in Judea and Samaria is not a peace-enhancer; it is an appeasement-enhancer

 

Yoram Ettinger

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Sunday, November 29, 2009

WW II Battleship sailor tells Obama to shape up or ship out !

This venerable and much honored WW II vet is well known in Hawaii for his seventy-plus years of service to patriotic organizations and causes all over the country. A humble man without a political bone in his body, he has never spoken out before about a government official, until now. He dictated this letter to a friend, signed it and mailed it to the president.

Dear President Obama,

My name is Harold Estes, approaching 95 on December 13 of this year. People meeting me for the first time don't believe my age because I remain wrinkle free and pretty much mentally alert.

I enlisted in the U.S. Navy in 1934 and served proudly before, during and after WW II retiring as a Master Chief Bos'n Mate. Now I live in a "rest home" located on the western end of Pearl Harbor, allowing me to keep alive the memories of 23 years of service to my country.

One of the benefits of my age, perhaps the only one, is to speak my mind, blunt and direct even to the head man.

So here goes.

I am amazed, angry and determined not to see my country die before I do, but you seem hell bent not to grant me that wish.

I can't figure out what country you are the president of.

You fly around the world telling our friends and enemies despicable lies like:

" We're no longer a Christian nation"

" America is arrogant" - (Your wife even

announced to the world,"America is mean-

spirited. " Please tell her to try preaching

that nonsense to 23 generations of our

war dead buried all over the globe who

died for no other reason than to free a

whole lot of strangers from tyranny and

hopelessness.)

I'd say shame on the both of you, but I don't think you like America, nor do I see an ounce of gratefulness in anything you do, for the obvious gifts this country has given you. To be without shame or gratefulness is a dangerous thing for a man sitting in the White House.

After 9/11 you said," America hasn't lived up to her ideals."

Which ones did you mean? Was it the notion of personal liberty that 11,000 farmers and shopkeepers died for to win independence from the British? Or maybe the ideal that no man should be a slave to another man, that 500,000 men died for in the Civil War? I hope you didn't mean the ideal 470,000 fathers, brothers, husbands, and a lot of fellas I knew personally died for in WWII, because we felt real strongly about not letting any nation push us around, because we stand for freedom.

I don't think you mean the ideal that says equality is better than discrimination. You know the one that a whole lot of white people understood when they helped to get you elected.

Take a little advice from a very old geezer, young man.

Shape up and start acting like an American. If you don't, I'll do what I can to see you get shipped out of that fancy rental on Pennsylvania Avenue. You were elected to lead not to bow, apologize and kiss the hands of murderers and corrupt leaders who still treat their people like slaves.

And just who do you think you are telling the American people not to jump to conclusions and condemn that Muslim major who killed 13 of his fellow soldiers and wounded dozens more. You mean you don't want us to do what you did when that white cop used force to subdue that black college professor in Massachusetts, who was putting up a fight? You don't mind offending the police calling them stupid but you don't want us to offend Muslim fanatics by calling them what they are, terrorists.

One more thing. I realize you never served in the military and never had to defend your country with your life, but you're the Commander-in-Chief now, son. Do your job. When your battle-hardened field General asks you for 40,000 more troops to complete the mission, give them to him. But if you're not in this fight to win, then get out. The life of one American soldier is not worth the best political strategy you're thinking of.

You could be our greatest president because you face the greatest challenge ever presented to any president.

You're not going to restore American greatness by bringing back our bloated economy. That's not our greatest threat. Losing the heart and soul of who we are as Americans is our big fight now.

And I sure as hell don't want to think my president is the enemy in this final battle.

Sincerely,

Harold B. Estes

When a 95 year old hero of the "the Greatest Generation" stands up and speaks out like this, I think we owe it to him to send his words to as many americans as we can.

Please pass it on.

The Trouble with Soft Diplomacy: Endless Resolutions on Iran, No Resolution of the Issues.

 

by Barry Rubin

In its own view, the Obama Administration has won a considerable foreign policy victory in the International Atomic Energy Agency vote to condemn Iran's nuclear program. Winning such triumphs is the whole goal of a patient policy by the Obama Administration to cultivate wide support for criticizing Iran. The problem is that this is not the same thing as doing something about Iran.

The key development is that only three countries—Cuba, Venezuela, and Malaysia—supported Iran. China and Russia backed the U.S. position. It is being implied that this signals the possibility that they might support material sanctions against Tehran.

But that's not true and thinking otherwise shows a real structural failure in how even supposed experts nowadays think about international affair. Voting for a resolution is a substitute for taking action, a fact that might prove to be the bane of the Obama Administration.

In addition, while the resolution is being touted as tough, it I based on an incontrovertible set of simple facts. Iran was criticized for two things: continuing to defy the previous UN resolutions by enriching uranium and building a secret nuclear facility.

It's like passing a resolution to criticize, rather than arrest, someone you just saw pump a half-dozen bullets into a murder victim and then being pleased that it was nearly unanimous.

What's really significant is that it is now clear the United States, having missed its September deadline for raising sanctions, is now going to miss the December deadline as well. The question is whether that process will even have begun before 2009 ends.

Iranian delegate Ali Asghar Soltanieh, in his response, told us everything we need to know about Tehran's position and future developments:

"Neither resolutions of the board of governors nor those of the United Nations Security Council...neither sanctions nor the threat of military attacks can interrupt peaceful nuclear activities in Iran, [not for] even a second."

I believe him, except for the "peaceful nuclear activities" part. But guess what? This supposedly tough resolution doesn't exactly contradict that point. It only expresses "serious concern" that Iran's refusal to cooperate with inspections means "the possibility of military

dimensions to Iran's nuclear program" cannot be excluded.

So that's it. In November 2009 the United States after almost a year of effort by the Obama Administration persuaded a UN to vote that Iran might be developing nuclear weapons but it can't tell and insists that Iran abide by promises it made years ago.

What makes this important enough for you to be reading about at this moment is that it is a model for the kind of multilateral, soft diplomacy that is now in fashion. Indeed, the U.S. government has not even announced yet that Iran is obviously refusing to make a deal. Statements by Western countries indicated that Tehran was being given one more chance for the one hundredth time.

At some point in the not-distant future, the idea is that President Obama will make one of those, "We interrupt this program to bring you a special message from the president of the United States" moments that begin, "My fellow citizens…" In other words, he springs into decisive real action and does something tough.

One is beginning to suspect that this moment will never come on any international issue.

As a British officer said after the Battle of Bunker Hill in the American Revolution, one more victory like this and there may be no one left to report it. After a certain point, someone who believes that soft power is sufficient must be soft in the head.


Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal.

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

The “Coup” in Iran and What it Means.


by Barry Rubin

For a couple of years it has been visible; for months the opposition has been talking about it. What's happening is the gradual takeover of a huge amount of power by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The Iranian government has generally been radical since the revolution, 30 years ago. But now the most extremist faction of all has taken over, pushing out its rivals.

Of course, Spiritual Guide Ali Khamenei is the most powerful man in Iran. But obviously he has no problem with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad being president and the IRGC becoming the power behind the throne.

This is important because the IRGC is the most fanatical and risk-taking part of the regime. It is very much committed to expanding the revolution and maintains the regime's links with foreign revolutionary and terrorist groups.

Oh, and it will also be the institution that will have actual possession of Iran's long-range missiles and nuclear weapons.

Not only are these people nobody can make a deal with, but they are also the ones most likely to make a war some day.

The BBC reports that the IRGC now controls one-third of Iran's economy, either openly or through front groups. This is probably too high. But more than one-third is controlled either by the IRGC or foundations under the control of regime hardliners so the basic idea isn't far off. Moreover, Ahmadinejad has been appointing former IRGC commanders to a lot of top jobs, including cabinet ministries and provincial governorships.

Now the group has won a $2.5 billion contract to build a big railroad project. And the IRGC is taking control of intelligence, running key prisons, and taking custody of political prisoners.

This is one reason why foreign observers can underestimate the regime's stability. With the IRGC playing such a central role, so well-armed, united, and ready to fight, any serious threat of a revolution or internal collapse would be blocked, no matter how much bloodshed it takes. The opposition and those critical of the regime are also aware of that fact.

Another reason why this is important regards Iran's intentions after getting nuclear weapons. Whether or not it would fire off such armaments, Iran will certainly use them to become more powerful, threatening, and influential throughout the region. The loser here will be the United States, its interests, and policies.

Judging from his statements, President Obama seems to have the following picture of Iran: There are many factions; the supreme guide really runs the show; Ahmadinejad is just a noisy front-man without much power. Iran should be judged by its past record, which has often shown caution. In this conception, it is possible to engage Iran, appeal to its interest, and find some relative moderates or pragmatists who will make a deal.

One could argue this position two years, perhaps even a year ago. But it no longer applies. The Iranian regime has changed to become far more hardline and risk-taking.

My personal view is that Khamenei is preparing for his departure from the scene by putting the revolution into the hands of those who he trusts not to dilute it. While Iran is a country of endless factional bickerings, this analysis means that the power of Ahmadinejad and the IRGC will grow greater in the coming years. That provides still another reason why soft diplomacy won't work and that a world where Iran--meaning Ahmadinejad and the IRGC--have nuclear weapons and long-range missiles is far more dangerous.

That doesn't mean that Iran will immediately attack Israel with nuclear weapons. Even in the radical worldview that would be foolish. What is more likely is that Iran will systematically try to turn much of the region into Islamist satellite states, putting off any confrontation with Israel to the future. (This is parallel to the strategy of Arab nationalist regimes--despite their 1967 miscalculation and 1973 attempt at revenge--over the last half-century.)

Do you think the Arab states will choose to appease Iran or stand firm in the belief that President Barack Obama will go to war on their behalf?


Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal.

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

UN Resolution 181.

 

Adopted November 29, 1947

 

by Eli E. Hertz

 

UN ReUsNol uRteisoonlu 1t8io1n 181

In 1947 the British put the future of western Palestine into the hands of the United Nations, the successor organization to the League of Nations which had established the Mandate for Palestine. A UN Commission recommended partitioning what was left of the original Mandate – western Palestine, into two new states, one Jewish and one Arab.1 Jerusalem and its surrounding villages were to be temporarily classified as an international zone belonging to neither polity.

 

Resolution 181, was a none-binding recommendation to partition Palestine, whose implementation hinged on acceptance by both parties - Arabs and Jews. The resolution, adopted on November 29, 1947 in the General Assembly by a vote of 33 - 12, with 10 abstentions. Among the supporters were both the United States and the Soviet Union, and other nations including France and Australia. The Arab nations, including Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia denounced the plan on the General Assembly floor and voted as a bloc against Resolution 181 promising to defy its implementation by force [italics by author].

 

The resolution recognized the need for immediate Jewish statehood (and a parallel Arab state), but the 'blueprint' for peace became a moot issue when the Arabs refused to accept it. Subsequently, de facto realities on the ground in the wake of Arab aggression (and Israel's survival) became the basis for UN efforts to bring peace. Resolution 181 lost its validity and relevance.

Aware of Arabs' past aggression, Resolution 181, in paragraph C, calls on the Security Council to:

 

"… determine as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter, any attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged by this resolution."

 

The ones who sought to alter by force the settlement envisioned in Resolution 181 were the Arabs who threatened bloodshed if the UN were to adopt the Resolution:

 

"The [British] Government of Palestine fear that strife in Palestine will be greatly intensified when the Mandate is terminated, and that the international status of the United Nations Commission will mean little or nothing to the Arabs in Palestine, to whom the killing of Jews now transcends all other considerations.

 

Thus, the Commission will be faced with the problem of how to avert certain bloodshed on a very much wider scale than prevails at present. … The Arabs have made it quite clear and have told the Palestine government that they do not propose to co-operate or to assist the Commission, and that, far from it, they propose to attack and impede its work in every possible way. We have no reason to suppose that they do not mean what they say." 2 [italics by author]

 

Arabs' intentions and deeds did not fare better after Resolution 181 was adopted:

 

"Taking into consideration that the Provisional Government of Israel has indicated its acceptance in principle of a prolongation of the truce in Palestine; that the States members of the Arab League have rejected successive appeals of the United Nations Mediator, and of the Security Council in its resolution 53 (1948) of 7 July 1948, for the prolongation of the truce in Palestine; and that there has consequently developed a renewal of hostilities in Palestine."3

 

Text from the actual document of Resolution 181 reads:

"… Having constituted a Special Committee and instructed it to investigate all questions and issues relevant to the problem of Palestine, and to prepare proposals for the solution of the problem, and Having received and examined the report of the Special Committee (document A/364). … Recommends to the United Kingdom, as the mandatory Power for Palestine, and to all other Members of the United Nations the adoption and implementation, with regard to the future Government of Palestine, of the Plan of Partition with Economic Union set out below; …" [italics by author].

 

In the late 1990s, more than 50 years after Resolution 181 was rejected by the Arab world, Arab leaders suddenly recommended to the General Assembly that UN Resolution 181 be resurrected as the basis of a peace agreement. There is no foundation for such a notion.

 

Resolution 181 (the 1947 Partition Plan) was the last of a series of recommendations that had been drawn up over the years by the Mandator and by international commissions, plans designed to reach an historic compromise between Arabs and Jews in western Palestine. The first was in 1922 when Great Britain unilaterally partitioned Palestine. This did not satisfy the Arabs who wanted the entire country to be Arab. Resolution 181 followed such proposals as the Peel Commission (1937); the Woodhead Commission (1938); two 1946 proposals that championed a bi-national state; one proposed by the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry in April 1946 based on a single state with equal powers for Jews and Arabs; the Morrison-Grady Plan raised in July 1946 which recommended a federal state with two provinces – one Jewish, one Arab. Every scheme since 1922 was rejected by the Arab side, including decidedly pro-Arab ones because these plans recognized Jews as a nation and gave Jewish citizens of Mandate Palestine political representation.

 

Arabs rejected the "unbalanced" Partition Plan

The UN International Court of Justice (ICJ) uses the term "unbalanced" in describing the reason for Arab rejectionism of Resolution 181.4 This description hardly fits reality. Seventy-seven percent of the landmass of the original Mandate for the Jews was excised in 1922 to create a fourth Arab state – Trans-Jordan (today Jordan).

 

In a statement by the representative of the Jewish Agency for Palestine to the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) he had that to say about fairness, balance, and justice:5

 

"According to David Lloyd George, then British Prime Minister, the Balfour Declaration implied that the whole of Palestine, including Transjordan, should ultimately become a Jewish state. Transjordan had, nevertheless, been severed from Palestine in 1922 and had subsequently been set up as an Arab kingdom.

 

 Now a second Arab state was to be carved out of the remainder of Palestine, with the result that the Jewish National Home would represent less than one eighth of the territory originally set aside for it. Such a sacrifice should not be asked of the Jewish people." 6

 

Referring to the Arab States established as independent countries since the First World War, he said:

 

"17,000,000 Arabs now occupied an area of 1,290,000 square miles, including all the principal Arab and Moslem centres, while Palestine, after the loss of Transjordan, was only 10,000 square miles; yet the majority plan proposed to reduce it by one half. UNSCOP proposed to eliminate Western Galilee from the Jewish State; that was an injustice and a grievous handicap to the development of the Jewish State." 7 [italics by author].

 

Israel's independence is not a result of a partial implementation of the Partition Plan.

Resolution 181 has no legal ramifications – that is, Resolution 181 recognized the Jewish right to statehood, but its validity as a potentially legal and binding document was never consummated. Like the schemes that preceded it, Resolution 181's validity hinged on acceptance by both parties of the General Assembly's recommendation.

 

Cambridge Professor Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, Judge ad hoc of the International Court of Justice, a renowned expert on international law and editor of one of the 'bibles' of international law, Oppenheim's International Law, clarified that from a legal standpoint, the 1947 UN Partition Resolution had no legislative character to vest territorial rights in either Jews or Arabs. In a monograph relating to one of the most complex aspects of the territorial issue, the status of Jerusalem, Judge, Sir Lauterpacht wrote that any binding force the Partition Plan would have had to arise from the principle pacta sunt servanda,8 that is, from agreement of the parties at variance to the proposed plan. In the case of Israel, Judge, Sir Lauterpacht explains:

 

"… the coming into existence of Israel does not depend legally upon the Resolution. The right of a State to exist flows from its factual existence-especially when that existence is prolonged, shows every sign of continuance and is recognised by the generality of nations." 9

 

Reviewing Lauterpacht's arguments, Professor Stone, a distinguished authority on the Law of Nations, added that Israel's "legitimacy" or the "legal foundation" for its birth does not reside with the United Nations' Partition Plan, which as a consequence of Arab actions became a dead issue. Professor Stone concluded:

 

"… The State of Israel is thus not legally derived from the partition plan, but rests (as do most other states in the world) on assertion of independence by its people and government, on the vindication of that independence by arms against assault by other states, and on the establishment of orderly government within territory under its stable control."10

 

Arab's aggression before and after the adoption of Resolution 181.

Following passage of Resolution 181 by the General Assembly, Arab countries took the dais to reiterate their absolute rejection of the recommendation and intention to render implementation of Resolution 181 a moot question by the use of force. These examples from the transcript of the General Assembly plenary meeting on 29, November 1947 speak for themselves:

 

"Mr. JAMALI (Iraq): … We believe that the decision which we have now taken … undermines peace, justice and democracy. In the name of my Government, I wish to state that it feels that this decision is antidemocratic, illegal, impractical and contrary to the Charter … Therefore, in the name of my Government, I wish to put on record that Iraq does not recognize the validity of this decision, will reserve freedom of action towards its implementation, and holds those who were influential in passing it against the free conscience of mankind responsible for the consequences."

 

"Amir. ARSLAN (Syria): … Gentlemen, the Charter is dead. But it did not die a natural death; it was murdered, and you all know who is guilty. My country will never recognize such a decision [Partition]. It will never agree to be responsible for it. Let the consequences be on the heads of others, not on ours."

 

"H. R. H. Prince Seif El ISLAM ABDULLAH (Yemen): The Yemen delegation has stated previously that the partition plan is contrary to justice and to the Charter of the United Nations. Therefore, the Government of Yemen does not consider itself bound by such a decision … and will reserve its freedom of action towards the implementation of this decision."11

 

The Partition Plan was met not only by verbal rejection on the Arab side but also by concrete, bellicose steps to block its implementation and destroy the Jewish polity by force of arms, a goal the Arabs publicly declared even before Resolution 181 was brought to a vote.

 

Arabs not only rejected the compromise and took action to prevent establishment of a Jewish state but also blocked establishment of an Arab state under the partition plan not just before the Israel War of Independence, but also after the war when they themselves controlled the West Bank (1948-1967), rendering the recommendation a 'a still birth.'

 

Any binding force to the Partition Plan would have had to arise from the principle pacta sunt servanda12 ("Treaties must be honored," the first principle of international law). In other words, it would become a legal document only upon agreement of the parties at variance to accept the proposal. Israel's 'legitimacy' as a nation does not reside with the United Nations' partition plan except in a symbolic sense as recognition of the need for a Jewish statehood. As Professor Stone, a distinguished scholar of the Law of Nations noted:

 

"… The State of Israel is thus not legally derived from the partition plan, but rests (as do most other states in the world) on assertion of independence by its people and government, on the vindication of that independence by arms against assault by other states, and on the establishment of orderly government within territory under its stable control."13

 

The UN itself recognized that 181 had not been accepted by the Arab side, rendering it a dead issue: In January 29, 1948, the First Monthly Progress Report of the UN-appointed Palestine Commission, charged with helping put Resolution 181 into effect was submitted to the Security Council (A/AC.21/7).

 

Implementation of Resolution 181 hinged not only on the five Member States appointed to represent the UN (Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Panama, Philippines) and Great Britain, but first and foremost on the participation of the two sides who were invited to appoint representatives. The Commission than reported:

 

"… The invitation extended by the [181] resolution was promptly accepted by the Government of the United Kingdom and by the Jewish Agency for Palestine, both of which designated representatives to assist the commission. … As regards the Arab Higher Committee, the following telegraphic response was received by the Secretary-General on 19 January:

 

ARAB HIGHER COMMITTEE IS DETERMINED PRESIST [PERSIST] IN REJECTION PARTITION AND IN REFUSAL RECOGNIZE UN[O] RESOLUTION THIS RESPECT AND ANYTHING DERIVING THEREFROM [THERE FROM]. FOR THESE REASONS IT IS UNABLE [TO] ACCEPT [THE] INVITATION."14

 

The UN Palestine Commission's February 16, 1948 report (A/AC.21/9) to the Security Council noted that Arab-led hostilities were an effort

 

"to prevent the implementation of the [General] Assembly's plan of partition, and to thwart its objectives by threats and acts of violence, including armed incursions into Palestinian territory."

 

On May 17, 1948 – after the invasion began, the Palestine Commission designed to implement 181 adjourned sine die [Latin: without determining a date] after the General Assembly appointed a United Nations Mediator in Palestine, which relieves the United Nations Palestine Commission from the further exercise of its responsibilities.

 

At the time, some thought the partition plan could be revived, but by the end of the war Resolution 181 had become a moot issue as realities on the ground made establishment of an armistice-line (the "Green Line") – a temporary ceasefire line expected to be followed by peace treaties - the most constructive path to solving the conflict.

 

A July 30, 1949 working paper of the UN Secretariat entitled The Future of Arab Palestine and the Question of Partition noted further that:

 

"The Arabs rejected the United Nations Partition Plan so that any comment of theirs did not specifically concern the status of the Arab section of Palestine under partition but rather rejected the scheme in its entirety."15

 

By the time armistice agreements were reached in 1949 between Israel and its immediate Arab neighbors (Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and Trans-Jordan) with the assistance of UN mediator Dr. Ralph Bunche – Resolution 181 had become irrelevant, and the armistice agreements addressed new realities created by the war. Over subsequent years, the UN simply abandoned the recommendations contained in Resolution 181, as its ideas were drained of all relevance by events. Moreover, the Arabs continued to rejected 181 after the war when they themselves controlled the West Bank (1948-1967) which Jordan invaded in the course of the war and annexed illegally.

 

Attempts by Palestinians in the past decade (and recently by the ICJ) to 'roll back the clock' and resuscitate Resolution 181 more than five decades after they rejected it 'as if nothing had happened' are a baseless ploy designed to use Resolution 181 as leverage to bring about a greater Israeli withdrawal from parts of western Palestine and to gain a broader base from which to continue to attack an Israel with even less defendable borders. Both Palestinians and their Arab brethren in neighboring countries rendered the plan null and void by their own subsequent aggressive actions.

 

Professor Stone wrote about this 'novelty of resurrection' in 1981 when he analyzed a similar attempt by pro-Palestinians 'experts' at the UN to rewrite the history of the conflict. (Their writings were termed "Studies".) Stone called it "revival of the dead"

 

"To attempt to show … that Resolution 181(II) 'remains' in force in 1981 is thus an undertaking even more miraculous than would be the revival of the dead. It is an attempt to give life to an entity that the Arab states had themselves aborted before it came to maturity and birth. To propose that Resolution 181(II) can be treated as if it has binding force in 1981, [EH the year the book was written] for the benefit of the same Arab states, who by their aggression destroyed it ab initio,16 also violates 'general principles of law,' such as those requiring claimants to equity to come 'with clean hands,' and forbidding a party who has unlawfully repudiated a transaction from holding the other party to terms that suit the later expediencies of the repudiating party." 17[italics by author].

 

Resolution 181 had been tossed into the waste bin of history, along with the Partition Plans that preceded it.

 

Eli E. Hertz

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

 

1 For an overview, of the history, see Ian J. Bickerton and Carla L. Klausner, A Concise History of the Arab Israel Conflict, 4th ed. (New York: Prentice Hall, 2002). The mandate territories in the Middle East also included Syria and Lebanon (awarded to France); and Iraq (awarded to Britain).

2 United Nations Palestine Commission. First Monthly Progress Report to the Security Council. A/AC.21/7, January 29, 1948. See: http://www.mefacts.com/cache/html/un-resolutions/10923.htm. (10923)

3 See among others, Security Council Resolution S/RES/ 54 (1948) at: http://www.mefacts.com/cache/html/un-resolutions/10894.htm. (10894)

4 ICJ discussion on the Partition Plan in paragraph 71 of the Court's ruling. See: http://middleeastfacts.org/content/ICJ/ICJ-Ruling-HTML.htm. (10908)

5 Delivered by Dr. Abba Hillel Silver, October 2, 1947.

6 Yearbook of the United Nations 1947-48. 1949.I.13. December 31, 1948. See: http://www.mefacts.com/cache/html/un-documents/11270.htm. (11270)

© 20C0o9,p Eylir Eig. hHte r©tz 2009, Eli E. Hertz 77 UN ReUsNol uRteisoonlu 1t8io1n 181

7 Ibid.

8 "Treaties must be honored," the first principle of international law.

9 Professor, Judge Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, Jerusalem and the Holy Places, Pamphlet No. 19 (London: Anglo-Israel Association, 1968).

10 Professor Julius Stone, Israel and Palestine, Assault on the Law of Nations (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981) p. 127.

11 UN GA "Continuation of the discussion on the Palestinian question." Hundred and twenty-eighth plenary meeting. A/PV.128, November 29, 1947. (11363)

12 Cited in Elihu Lauterpacht, Jerusalem and the Holy Places, Pamphlet No. 19 (London: Anglo-Israel Association, 1968).

13 Professor Julius Stone, Israel and Palestine, Assault on the Law of Nations (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981)

14 United Nations Palestine Commission. First Monthly Progress Report to the Security Council, a/ac.21/7, January 29, 1948. See: http://middleeastfacts.org/content/UN-Documents/A-AC-21-7-29-January-1948.htm.

15 UN document A/AC.25/W.19, at: . http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/4ecbf3578b6149c50525657100507fab?OpenDocument

16 In Latin: From the beginning.

17 Professor Julius Stone, Israel and Palestine, Assault on the Law of Nations (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981) p. 128.

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