Iran: The Time Has Come.

 

by Asculai, Ephraim

If its domestic situation were not so serious, Iran's government could be very happy indeed. Iran managed to gain another crucial year in its quest for a nuclear weapons capability, and every passing day brings it closer to its ultimate goal: having the potential to produce deliverable nuclear weapons in short order, if it so decides. It successfully delayed the West from pursuing a more severe sanctions regime, and the West is behaving as if it has all the time in the world. It does not.

How did this come about? Several factors combined to achieve the net result, most of them not of Iran's doing: the election of a new US president who believed in engagement as the sole way to resolve conflicts (and may still want to believe this); the unwillingness, for years, of the IAEA to acknowledge Iran's ultimate goal; the (unclassified) 2007 US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that raised the possibility that Iran abandoned its quest for nuclear weapons; the reluctance of the US to assume the lead role in confronting Iran, and letting the EU-3 deal, albeit ineffectively, with the situation; the contrary attitude of Russia and China, which are watching the West struggle to find a solution while throwing it a bone from time to time in supporting some sanctions resolutions that are not achieving their aim; and the exceptional spanner in the works embedded in the quite unproductive suggestion to transfer some of Iran's low enriched uranium (LEU) outside the country and return it as medium enriched uranium fuel for its Tehran Research Reactor. This last statement needs some explanation.

On October 1, 2009, the P5 +1 (the five permanent Security Council members plus Germany) and Iran began talks in Geneva that were supposed to deal with a host of issues, including the suspension of Iran's uranium enrichment activities. Meantime, the US proposed the said uranium transfer idea. The rationale was, apparently, to remove the major portion of the LEU from Iran, thus delaying Iran's potential to produce the core of its first nuclear explosive device. The talks were then postponed for more than a month, the IAEA produced a text of an agreement accepted by the Russian, US, and Iranian delegations, and the Iranians went home to obtain the approval of the agreement by their government. The government probably never had any intention of approving this. The deadline for an Iranian reply came and went and nothing happened. Meanwhile, Iran continued to enrich uranium.

Evaluating the proposal objectively, little would have been achieved, even if the Iranians had agreed to it. The LEU stockpile would have been reduced, and its quantity would be below what is needed for a complete nuclear weapon core, but this would remain so for a short time only, since enrichment would continue. Thus, the uranium transfer proposal bought precious time for the Iranians, and no uranium enrichment suspension was even discussed.

Meanwhile, the end of the 2009 deadline set by the US for resolving the Iranian nuclear issue also came and went, and nothing happened. The Iranians are enriching, the US is hesitating, and the East seems to be quite happy with the situation. The US year's end deadline proved to be devoid of substance. The US administration apparently had no fallback plan to deal with such a situation, and if it had, it did not execute it. Although Iran formally rejected the above plan, the IAEA director general was quoted as saying that the plan was still on the table. One wonders what this would achieve if it were now accepted by the Iranians, except for a further delay of a comprehensive solution to the issue and a continuing enrichment of uranium by Iran. Time is running short, and action is needed if Iran's almost inevitable achievement is to be thwarted.

The main solution, agreed to by almost all involved, is to level strong sanctions. However, there is a lack of consensus on what these should be and how to apply them. Recently, the idea has been floated that sanctions should be applied mainly on those who are involved in Iran's nuclear project – the Revolutionary Guards. It is a worthy notion, but almost impossible to implement. It is worthy, because it would not affect the man in the street, who is anyway oppressed by the regime. It is impossible to implement, because it is quite difficult to think of any effective sanctions that would target only the Revolutionary Guards.

The only sanctions that make sense that could influence the Iranian regime to cave in and at least suspend the uranium enrichment program and agree to institute the inspections according to the Additional Protocol are the Iraqi-type sanctions. These should limit imports into Iran of anything but foodstuffs, medicines, and other humanitarian aid, if and when necessary. No other imports including oil distillates or technical equipment would be supplied to Iran until it agrees to the above conditions. It is a mistake to assume that any less severe sanctions would do the trick. Iran would go on and continue enriching without giving much thought to the outside pressure. If this is not undertaken by the Security Council, the US should implement it with all the friends it can muster.

What would happen if this is not done? The one remaining way to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power is military action against Iran's nuclear installations. This is a route fraught with dangers and uncertainties. Depending on how successful the attack would be, the Iranian program could suffer a severe setback. However, there is a high probability that Iran would attempt to retaliate. Moreover, the Iranians would be able to reestablish their facilities within a few years and the vicious cycle would recommence. If both suggested routes of action are not applied or they fail to achieve the expected results, then within a few years a nuclear Iran will likely emerge and begin activating its plans for regional hegemony. This would cause a major upset of power distribution in the region, possible new wars, and possibly the complete loss of American hegemony in the Gulf region. On a global scale, the nuclear non-proliferation regime would suffer, perhaps beyond repair.

Unfortunately, it is the latter possibility that seems to be in the offing. Unless the US – which for all its rhetoric seems resigned to this outcome – takes strong sanctions action now, this is probably what will happen. Iran should not be given the time to accomplish this.

 

Asculai, Ephraim

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.