by Barry Rubin
What is the use, at least potentially, of sanctions on
Making it harder for Iran to build these weapons and the missiles to carry them, slowing down the program, reducing Iran's economic assets which can be used for military spending, denying Iran other weapons, intimidating Iran into greater caution in its actual behavior, and encouraging factions (both within the establishment and in the opposition) to conclude that the current Tehran regime is leading them to disaster and must be displaced.
Of these six goals, the plan largely accomplishes one of them—barring the sale of most conventional weapons (but not anti-aircraft missiles)—and does a small amount toward reducing Iran's assets and slowing down the project. In general, though, it is a question of too little too late.
Again, the problem is not that the sanctions proposed (and which might still be watered down further) aren't so huge as to make Iran stop but that they will not make Iran more cautious, promote internal conflict due to their high cost, or really put on economic pressure to reduce military spending and increase internal unrest.
How can one rejoice over sanctions--and the length of time it is taking to put them on--when German-Iran trade, for example, rose steeply from March 2009 to March 2010 by almost fifty percent?
Should the world stop
How do we know that
There are many articles in Arabic-speaking newspapers and other sources about how they feel the
Is the concept of
We already see this model on a smaller scale with
This is all on a small scale compared to
No one should underestimate the value of
This analysis does not assume a nuclear
The rest of the world is going to have to learn for itself the enormous mistake made by failing to stop
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal.
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