by George L. Simpson, Jr.
2nd part of 2
Mixed Signals?
Recent events demonstrate the complexities of the evolving relationship between Tehran and its great-power allies. Over the summer of 2009, there were mixed signals coming from Russia and Iran concerning bilateral ties. In June, following the upheavals in Iran over that country's disputed presidential elections, Russian president Dmitry Medvedev cancelled, because of alleged scheduling conflicts, a planned meeting with Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad at a gathering of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a mutual-security organization comprising China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.[43] Iran has observer status with the multinational group and aspires to become a full member, but the Russians have not gone out of their way to make this happen. In August 2009, Russia joined with Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan in a four-party regional summit to which Iran was not invited.[44] At that time, the Nezavisimaya Gazeta, a journal whose views sometimes reflect those of the Kremlin, editorialized, "It appears that the idea that Iran is a regional power, which Russia could use as a trump card in relations with the West, has turned out to be mistaken."[45] It would appear that at least some in the upper echelons of the Russian government doubted the wisdom of continuing support to Tehran following the disputed election and the international opprobrium directed against the mullahs as they suppressed subsequent dissent.
For their part, at least some Iranians took note of this chilly behavior. An editorial in the "moderate" Iranian newspaper E'temad, which serves as the mouthpiece for Mehdi Karroubi's oppositional National Trust Party, complained that Moscow had not helped Iran in the United Nations with its "peaceful pursuit" of nuclear energy as much as it could, and that it was dragging its feet in getting the Bushehr nuclear facility up and running. The article concludes, "Russians cheat their allies if it is necessary, and history shows that they have swindled us heavily."[46]
At the same time, other Russian officials have acted as if it were business as usual between Moscow and Tehran. Moreover, supporters of this approach seem to have had the final say in the Kremlin. Two days after what was viewed by most outside observers as a fraudulent vote, newly "reelected" Iranian president Ahmadinejad made his first foreign trip to Russia. Russian deputy foreign minister Sergei Ryabkov called the visit "symbolic" and added, "This is a signal of successful mutual relations in the future."[47] Shortly thereafter, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov referred to the Iranian elections as "an exercise in democracy."[48]
In early September 2009, Foreign Minister Lavrov opined, "The most important thing is Iran is ready for a comprehensive discussion of the situation, what positive role it can play in Iraq, Afghanistan and the region."[49] In fact, he all but ruled out imposing sanctions on Tehran in order to get the regime to come clean on its nuclear program. In light of this, it is doubtful that the Obama administration's recent lobbying efforts have fundamentally altered Russia's position on Iran. Two weeks after Lavrov's statement, following the revelation that Iran had been covering up the existence of a nuclear facility, CNN reported an unidentified senior U.S. official's claims that Washington's efforts to bring Russia (and China) on board with new sanctions against Tehran had "already begun to bear fruit."[50] Yet even after the existence of the secret Iranian nuclear site near Qom became public knowledge,[51] Medvedev told the press, following the Group of Twenty summit in Pittsburgh:
I do not believe sanctions are the best way to achieve results. Sanctions were used on a number of occasions against Iran, but we have doubts about the results. Nevertheless, when all instruments have been used and failed, one can use international legal sanctions. … I think we should continue to promote positive incentives for Iran and at the same time push it to make all its programs transparent and open. Should we fail in that case, we'll consider other options.[52]
Medvedev's statement offers no clear sense of what might prompt the Russians to wield a stick against the mullahs. Moreover, one must still wonder whether former president Putin, the real power behind the throne, would agree to such a policy. Notwithstanding Moscow's concurrence with an October 2009 IAEA compromise for Iran to send most of its enriched uranium abroad to be processed into reactor fuel, there seems to have been no Russian reaction to Tehran's failure to respond to President Obama's December 31, 2009 deadline regarding the offer. It is hard to imagine that Moscow will support any but modest penalties to be imposed against Tehran. Indeed, as recently as January 2010, Russian foreign minister Lavrov said that "acting with a logic of punishing Iran … is not a sober approach."[53]
On the surface, the Kremlin has apparently joined with the United States, Great Britain, France, and Germany in pursuing the so-called "two track" policy of threatening Iran with sanctions while still dangling the carrot of dialogue. On February 5, 2010, Lavrov met with his German counterpart Guido Westerwelle in Berlin and afterwards told reporters that "if we do not see a constructive answer from Iran, we will have to discuss this in the U.N. Security Council." Yet, the Russian foreign minister went on to say that he was still hopeful of a diplomatic solution to the nuclear issue.[54] The question remains, however, whether Moscow will let go of the carrot and, even if it does, whether it would ever support more than a slap on Tehran's wrist.
Basing one's appraisal of Russian intentions on experience rather than hope, one is inclined to agree with the conclusion of Ray Takeyh, senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Nicholas Gvosdev, adjunct senior fellow at the Nixon Center: "Russia is not interested in playing an active role in resolving the Iran crisis on terms America will find acceptable."[55]
Tehran's ties with Beijing appear even stronger than those it has with Moscow. Chinese president Hu Jintao had even fewer scruples than his Russian counterpart in the wake of the fraudulent Iranian election. Days after the disputed vote, he shook hands with Ahmadinejad as Xinhua, China's state-run news agency, reported on the "sound momentum" of bilateral relations.[56] When the Chinese media actually did report on the post-election disturbances in the streets of Tehran, they were attributed to "vandals" and "terrorists," and Chinese television viewers were shown no images of Iranian security forces brutalizing protesters.[57] Still, Wu Sike, China's special envoy to the Middle East, maintains that Beijing opposes Iran's production and possession of nuclear weapons. The problem is that while he avers that China's policies have not changed on this issue, he and his superiors appear to see no urgency in acting to stop it.[58]
China does not, however, offer a strictly one-sided backing for all of Iran's aspirations. In 2008, China's Hu Jintao officially "welcomed Iran's interest to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), saying an expert committee will be formed to consider the proposal."[59] Yet little progress has been evident thus far; Iran sent a representative to the SCO secretariat in Beijing in January 2010 to discuss how it might further its interaction with the organization but remains an observer state.[60]
On the nuclear issue, Beijing also appears intent on opposing sanctions. Thus, in early September 2009, China's Foreign Ministry declared that "under current circumstances, we must increase diplomatic efforts and renew talks with Iran."[61] Although there was some hope that Vice President Joseph Biden's September 11, 2009 meeting with Wu Bangguo, China's second most powerful leader, would have changed this response, such has not been the result. Indeed, shortly thereafter, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson gave Beijing's response to the revelation about Iran's covert nuclear facility: "We believe that sanctions and exerting pressure are not the way to solve problems and are not conducive for the current diplomatic efforts on the Iran nuclear issue."[62]
While French prime minister Francois Fillon has since asserted that his country and China "share identical views on how to lead Iran away from its threatening stance and isolation on the nuclear issue,"[63] no such declaration has been forthcoming from Beijing. In fact, the opposite is true.
In January 2010, China, France, Germany, Great Britain, Russia, and the United States gathered in New York to focus on the issue of Iran's nuclear program. Beijing, however, sent a low-level diplomat to the meeting in what observers considered a snub to the others.[64] The Chinese representative explained that his country was only prepared to begin discussing the possibility of imposing sanctions.[65] At this point, it would seem that optimism regarding China's coming around to support effective sanctions is reminiscent of Samuel Johnson's estimation of second marriages as "the triumph of hope over experience."
Conclusions
The most imminent threat to the global order comes from the radical Islamic regime in Iran bent on developing nuclear weapons. Both Russia and China have consistently supported Tehran by their aggressive, opportunist—and shortsighted—policies, and both are in large measure responsible for the threat that the Iranian government poses to the world today.
Should the radicals in Tehran obtain the ability to launch ballistic missiles with warheads on them, there is no guarantee that one day they might not target Russian cities or other objectives. China, too, might ultimately find itself in the sights of an unfriendly regime in Iran. Should a military conflagration occur in the Persian Gulf and curtail the flow of oil from the region, it would surely spell disaster for the Chinese economy. With its vast supplies of oil and natural gas, Moscow might reap windfall profits, but there is no guarantee of where the chain reaction of a Middle East war might stop. A radical Shi'i Iranian regime armed with nuclear weapons would likely lead to proliferation among other states in the area such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt. The stakes are high and getting higher. Indeed, those who have decided to back Tehran should consider how a nuclear Iran will promote their security interests.
The opaqueness of decision-making in the Kremlin makes it difficult to explain fully Moscow's behavior in abetting the Iranian regime, but it would seem that the temptation of making a fast ruble and undermining Washington in the bargain is just too much for those in power to resist. Likewise, both China's economic imperatives and its desire to become the next great superpower on the world stage likely play a decisive role in its behavior.
Russian and Chinese posturing that they have sought peace and stability in the region through constructive dialogue has been a façade. The occasional snubs from Russia following the 2009 sham election or expressions of discomfort from both countries over Iran's covert nuclear program seem little more than public relations stunts.
The two authoritarian regimes have consistently undermined the United States in its efforts to contain Iran and have profited by doing so. Indeed, if the leaderships in Moscow and Beijing continue to sabotage diplomatic efforts to halt the clerical regime's drive for nuclear weapons, they should be held accountable by Washington and the international community for obstructing nonviolent remedies to the Iranian problem. U.S. officials could launch a concerted public relations campaign to demonstrate to the world the depth of the Russian and Chinese culpability in creating a problem that threatens the stability of a vital geopolitical part of the world. Washington might press the restart button on its plan to provide missile defense systems in central Europe or increase its military cooperation with Taiwan. Additionally, as trade is a two-way proposition, the Russians and Chinese could encounter a host of difficulties in this sphere as well.
Unless they change their course immediately, it is they who will carry the onus for a U.S. or Israeli recourse to military intervention in order to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran. It may seem hard to imagine the present administration in Washington taking such action, but it is also unclear what Jerusalem will do. An Israeli strike against Iran would likely result in a serious setback to Tehran's nuclear program, but its certainty of success is by no means guaranteed. Moreover, Israel would pay a heavy diplomatic price for what would no doubt be termed its "reckless adventurism." Thus, it hesitates, and if it does so for too long, one should not be at all surprised if Israel or some other country ends up being the innocent victim of a nuclear power that the Russians and Chinese will have helped to create.
While there may not be a new axis in a formal sense, the combination of Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran on a range of issues has undermined the security of the Persian Gulf region and worked against the interests of the United States and its allies. Its potential continuation represents a broader and more fundamental threat to global stability, would likely destroy decades of diplomacy, and sound the death knell of the nonproliferation regime.
George L. Simpson, Jr., is professor and chair of the history department at High Point University.
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
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Notes
[1] Ely Karmon, "Counterterrorism Policy: Why Tehran Starts and Stops Terrorism," Middle East Quarterly, Dec. 1998, pp. 35-44.
[2] Jonathan Schanzer, "Ansar al-Islam: Back in Iraq," Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2004, pp. 41-50.
[3] Gen. David H. Petraeus, commander U.S. Central Command, testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Afghanistan-Pakistan Strategic Review and the Posture of Central Command, Apr. 1, 2009.
[4] Elihu D. Richter and Alex Barnea, "Tehran's Genocidal Incitement against Israel," Middle East Quarterly, Summer 2009, pp. 45-51.
[5] Rossiiskie Vesti (Moscow), Russian Federation, June 23, 2005.
[6] Ariel Cohen, "The Russian Handicap to U.S. Iran Policy," Jerusalem Issue Briefs, Apr. 22, 2009.
[7] Steven Rosefielde and Stefan Hedlund, Russia since1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 211-30.
[8] John W. Garver, China and Iran: Ancient Partners in a Post-Imperial World (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006), pp. 71-82.
[9] Cohen, "The Russian Handicap to U.S. Iran Policy."
[10] Garver, China and Iran, p. 5.
[11] John Calabrese, "China and Iran: Partners Perfectly Mismatched," Middle East Institute, Aug. 18, 2006.
[12] Ilan Berman, "The Logic behind Sino-Iranian Cooperation," China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Nov. 2006, pp. 15-23; "Fueling the Dragon: China's Race into the Oil Market," Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, Potomac, Md., accessed Dec. 28, 2009.
[13] Tehran Times, Jan. 6, 12, 2010.
[14] United Press International, June 12, 2009.
[15] Asia Times (Hong Kong), Nov. 29, 2004; China Daily (Beijing), Feb. 18, 2008; The Guardian (London), June 22, 2009; Canberra (Aus.) Times, Nov. 12, 2007; Tehran Times, May 11, 2009.
[16] Garver, China and Iran, p. 247.
[17] Ibid., pp. 139, 155.
[18] "Weapons of Mass Destruction: Bushehr-Background," GlobalSecurity.org, accessed Dec. 28, 2009.
[19] United Press International, June 6, 2006.
[20] Barbara Slavin, Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies: Iran, the U.S., and the Twisted Path to Confrontation (New York: St. Martins Press, 2006), p. 29.
[21] BBC News, Oct. 10, 2007.
[22] Fars News Agency (Tehran), May 9, 2009.
[23] The Washington Post, Nov. 17, 2004.
[24] Charles P. Vick, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: Shahab-6," GlobalSecurity.org, Jan. 26, 2009.
[25] Xinhua General News Service, June 16, 2006.
[26] "Unclassified Report to Congress, January–June 2003," Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C., Apr. 30, 2007; Garver, China and Iran, pp. 182-9, 213-4.
[27] "C-801 YJ-1/YJ-8 (Eagle Strike), CSS-N-4 SARDINE," Military Analysis Network, Federation of American Scientists, Aug. 10, 1999; Reuters, Jan. 19, 2010.
[28] Agence France-Presse, Sept. 14, 2006.
[29] "Weapons of Mass Destruction: Biological Weapons," GlobalSecurity.org, Apr. 28, 2005.
[30] "Weapons of Mass Destruction: Chemical Weapons," GlobalSecurity.org, Oct. 15, 2008; Ronen Bergman, The Secret War with Iran: The 30-Year Clandestine Struggle against the World's Most Dangerous Terrorist Power (New York: Free Press, Sept. 2008), p. 313.
[31] "Din vecheshbon chelki," HaVaadah Livdikat Eiru'ei haMa'arachah beLevanon 2006 vaadat Winograd, MyNet.co.il, Apr. 2007.
[32] "Zelzal-1/2/3," MISSILETHREAT.com, Claremont (Calif.) Institute, accessed Jan. 25, 2010; The New York Times, July 9, 2008.
[33] Al-Manar TV (Beirut), Aug. 22, 2009.
[34] Jareer Elass and Amy Myers Jaffe, The History and Politics of Russia's Relations with OPEC (Houston: James A Baker, III, institute for Public Policy, Rice University, May 6, 2009), p. 31.
[35] Defense Industry Daily (Thetford Ctr., Vt.), Dec. 5, 2005; Pravda (Moscow), Dec. 1, 2007.
[36] Agence France-Presse, May 21, 2007.
[37] The Washington Post, Mar. 6, 2007.
[38] The Times (London), Sept. 19, 2008; The Guardian, Sept. 8, 2009.
[39] Tehran Times, Jan. 18, 2010.
[40] Gill Bates and Evan S. Medeiros, "Foreign and Domestic Influences on China's Arms Control and Nonproliferation Policies," The China Quarterly, Mar. 2000, pp. 74-9; Kenneth Katzman, "Iran: Arms and Technology Acquisitions," Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C., Jan. 26, 2001; "Iran Missile Milestones," IranWatch.org, Jan. 2010, accessed Feb. 7, 2010; "Thondar Fast Attack Missile Boat," GlobalSecurity.org, accessed Feb. 7, 2010.
[41] Rear Adm. Mark I. Fox, Communications Division chief for Multi-National Force-Iraq, and Brig. Gen. Mark Gurganus, Ground Combat Element commander for Multi-National Force-West, news briefing, Baghdad, Sept. 30, 2007.
[42] Associated Press Worldstream, Apr. 6, 2006; Bergman, The Secret War with Iran, pp. 294-5.
[43] Interfax News Agency (Moscow), June 16, 2009, in BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union-Political, June 16, 2009.
[44] Siyasat-e Rouz (Tehran), Sept. 12, 2009, in BBC Monitoring Middle East-Political, Sept. 27, 2009.
[45] Los Angeles Times, Aug. 10, 2009.
[46] E'temad (Tehran), Aug. 12, 2009, in BBC Monitoring Middle East-Political, Aug. 29, 2009.
[47] The Christian Science Monitor, June 16, 2009.
[48] Reuters, June 25, 2009.
[49] The New York Times, Sept. 10, 2009.
[50] CNN News, Sept. 25, 2009.
[51] The Guardian, Sept. 26, 2009.
[52] MSNBC, Sept. 25, 2009.
[53] Iran Daily (Tehran), Jan. 23, 2010.
[54] Reuters, Feb. 5, 2010.
[55] Ray Takeyh and Nicholas Gvosdev, "The Russian Riddle II: Russia, the U.S., and Iran," The New York Times, Sept. 8, 2008.
[56] China View (New York), June 16, 2009.
[57] The Australian (Sydney), June 24, 2009.
[58] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Beijing, Aug. 11, 2009.
[59] Tehran Times, Sept. 7, 2008.
[60] "SCO Secretary-General receives Iran's Charge d'Affaires to China," Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Jan. 28, 2010.
[61] National Public Radio, Sept. 8, 2009.
[62] The Guardian, Sept. 24, 2009.
[63] Agence France-Presse, Dec. 22, 2009.
[64] The Times, Jan. 16, 2010.
[65] The Times, Jan. 18, 2010.
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