by Jonathan Spyer
The Asad regime has
always suffered from a legitimacy deficit. When an uprising against it
began in March 2011, the regime possessed few options other than brute
force. Following a few desultory attempts at offering cosmetic reforms,
the regime declared war against the insurgency in June 2011, seeking to
crush it by force. Given the narrow base of his regime, Bashar Asad
has pursued probably the only policy that was available to him. Asad’s
policy of repression has passed through a number of distinct phases. The
regime has been forced to retreat from large parts of the country, due
to its narrow sectarian base and a lack of sufficient manpower to hold
these areas. The direction of events is clearly against the regime.
However, at the time of writing, it shows no signs of imminent collapse.
INTRODUCTION
Since the outbreak of the uprising
against the rule of the Asad regime in Syria in March 2011, the regime
response to the challenge has passed through a series of identifiable
phases. All these have been intended to produce a single identifiable
outcome–namely the continuation of the exclusive and unchallenged rule
of the Ba’ath Party under the leadership of Bashar Asad. However, as
the nature of the uprising has developed and changed, so the regime’s
response has also undergone a series of transformations. These have been
defined not by any changing perception among the ruling elite regarding
the essential nature of the uprising. Rather, they have been
determined by the regime’s perception of the strength of the revolt
against it, and consequently of the realistic options available to it in
responding.
The Asad regime has passed through a
number of distinct phases in its response to the uprising. Initially,
having previously awarded itself a certificate of immunity from the
“Arab Spring,”[1]
the regime clumsily tried to present a series of reforms, which it
apparently hoped would placate protestors and nip the uprising in the
bud. When this failed, from mid-April 2011, Asad abandoned promises of
further reform and went into an all-out effort to crush the rebellion.
By the end of summer 2011, this effort had clearly failed. Instead,
Asad’s brutality brought an armed insurgency against him, in place of
the early peaceful demonstrations.
Asad’s military was over-stretched. The
emergent pattern was one in which the government forces went from area
to area, putting down demonstrations and fighting with rebels. Yet once
the regime forces departed, the rebellion re-emerged. By autumn 2011, as
a consequence, areas under the daily control of the insurgency had
emerged in parts of the country.
In February and March 2012, Asad made a
concerted effort to reconquer these areas. Yet it became apparent that
while the regime could inflict dreadful losses on its enemies, it simply
lacked the sufficient manpower to wage an effective campaign of
counterinsurgency throughout Syria.[2] Hence, by summer 2012, the contours of a new regime strategy were visible.
According to this approach, Asad
effectively ceded parts of the country to the rebels or to elements not
engaged in the conflict on either side. Thus, parts of the northeast
came under the rule of Kurdish separatists. Largely, Sunni Idlib
Province in the north was left effectively under rebel control. The
regime, meanwhile, began to carve out an Alawi base for itself in the
northwest,[3]
while at the same time seeking to maintain control of the two main
cities of Damascus and Aleppo. This latest phase represents an
acknowledgement on the part of the regime of its apparent diminishing
strength, but in no way of the inevitability of its defeat. Throughout,
Asad has continued to reject any process of transition away from the
authoritarian system of government in Syria. Rather, the regime is
digging in for what it expects to be a protracted civil war.
This article will focus in more detail
on the various phases of the regime’s response to the insurgency and
will attempt some speculation regarding the regime’s likely responses in
the period ahead in light of the consistent elements in its strategy so
far.
FIRST PHASE: DENIAL AND COSMETIC ATTEMPTS AT REFORM
In the first months of 2011, as revolts
broke out in Tunisia and Egypt, the Syrian regime appeared unperturbed.
In an interview with the Wall Street Journal on January 31,
2011, President Bashar Asad outlined the thinking behind the regime’s
lack of concern. In a key and much quoted passage in the interview,
Asad explained that the reason Syria had remained stable, despite the
difficult economic situation there, was to do with the deeper feelings
and beliefs of the Syrian people. He asserted that there was a harmony
between the stances of the regime and those of the people on an
ideological level, and this resulted in stability. Asad expressed
himself in the following terms:
We have more difficult circumstances
than most of the Arab countries but in spite of that Syria is stable.
Why? Because you have to be very closely linked to the beliefs of the
people. This is the core issue. When there is divergence between your
policy and the people’s beliefs and interests, you will have this vacuum
that creates disturbance. So people do not only live on interests; they
also live on beliefs, especially in very ideological areas. Unless you
understand the ideological aspect of the region, you cannot understand
what is happening.[4]
Throughout the interview, the Syrian
president sought to turn the subject of discussion from the question of
internal reform to that of the “peace process” between Israel and the
Arab states. His position, a familiar one in the context of Arab
politics, was that any diversion from the main subject of the
Israeli-Arab conflict made the error of dwelling on “details,” rather
than focusing on the central issue. Bashar maintained that progress on
the “peace process” would rapidly lead to advances in other areas.[5]
Though the Syrian president did not state this in the interview, he
presumably also thought that the greater capacity for repression
available to him when compared with other Arab authoritarian rulers
would further shield his regime from the foment taking place elsewhere.
The Wall Street Journal
interview is a fascinating document in that it offers an articulate and
concise version of precisely the ideology and language of justification
that characterized the Arab military republican regimes that have been
the victims of the 2011-2012 Arab uprisings. Arguably, these regimes
have been eclipsed by the 2011-2012 events. The Asad regime, because of
its alliance with Iran and Russia, and perhaps also because of its
greater willingness for extreme brutality, is now the “last man
standing” of the regimes of this type.
Bashar’s assumptions in the interview
nevertheless proved erroneous. The Syrian revolt, famously, began in the
poor, southern Sunni region of Dar’a. The regime’s overreaction to the
writing of graffiti demanding its downfall by a number of
schoolchildren was the spark. The killing of 13-year-old Hamza al-Khatib
in custody, and the return of his mutilated body to his family, led to
widespread rioting throughout the province.[6]
In retrospect, this was the beginning of what would turn into the
rebellion against Asad’s rule and the subsequent Syrian civil war.
It did not seem that way at the time,
however–certainly not to the regime itself. Protests spread from Dar’a
itself to other Sunni Arab areas of the country–Homs and Banias, Idlib,
Douma, and Latakiyya city. The regime’s initial response was to attempt
to drain public anger by announcing a series of reforms. In addition to
the “full enquiry” into the death of Hamza al-Khatib, a number of other
measures were announced in the following weeks.
The regime attempted to blame the Dar’a
events on the local authorities there. An example was made of the
governor of Dar’a province, Faisal Kalthoum, who was dismissed from his
position.[7] In addition to this gesture, it was announced that a ruling banning elementary school teachers from wearing the Islamic niqab dress would be rescinded.[8]
This was a fairly transparent gesture to the public that the regime
considered most likely to take part in any uprising–namely,
conservative, Arab Sunni Muslims. Also, citizenship rights were granted
to a number of Syrian Kurds. Syria contained a population of around
300,000 Syrian-born “stateless” Kurds whose families were stripped of
citizenship by the Arab nationalist Ba’th regime in 1962.[9]
Demonstrations had taken place in the
majority Kurdish city of Qamishli in April 2011, and again the regime
clearly wanted to head off any possibility of the Kurds joining any
rebellion against it. Syrian Kurds had taken part in a series of
protests against the regime in 2004, in which there had been a number of
deaths. [10]
As such, there was a particular sensitivity to the mood among the
Kurds. The regime, whose claims to legitimacy rested on an Arab
nationalist outlook, was aware that this section of the population had
perhaps the least reason for any feelings of loyalty to the Asads.
In a speech to the tame Syrian
“parliament” on March 30, 2011, Asad indicated the direction the regime
would take in its propaganda against the growing revolt. He referred to
the uprising as a “conspiracy” against Syria, deriving from the defiant
stance it had taken toward the United States and its policies. The
conspiracy was “highly organized” and involved “some countries abroad.”[11]
The speech did nothing to stem the
growing tide of dissent, containing as it did a reiteration of tired and
familiar clichés. Indeed, an organization monitoring events on the
ground in Syria reported that demonstrations began immediately following
the conclusion of the speech. On April 16, 2011, a month into the
uprising, President Bashar Asad gave a second speech, this time to his
newly-appointed Cabinet. On this occasion, Asad outlined a series of
proposed reforms.
He pledged to draft legislation that
would codify the right to protest and civil dissent in Syria. He also
spoke of the need for economic reforms and greater accountability. In
addition, he promised to lift emergency laws in place in the country.
Syria has been in an official “state of emergency” since the coming to
power of the Ba’th party in 1963.
This second speech differed from the
first. This time, Asad more openly acknowledged that Syria did have
internal problems, and therefore implicitly that popular discontent had
some basis in reality and was not merely the product of outside
sedition. He spoke of youth unemployment, corruption, and the need for
greater responsiveness from public officials.
Yet predictably, Asad failed to commit
to the rescinding of Article VIII of the Syrian constitution, which
refers to the Ba’th Party as the “leader of the state and of the society
of Syria.” As such, the reforms were dismissed as meaningless by
opponents of the regime.[12] The proposed “reforms” and the speech also predictably failed to stem the tide of growing public protest against the regime.
The protests at this stage did not
involve massive numbers of people–hundreds, rather than thousands. The
barrier of fear had still not been entirely broken. In this regard, and
because of the subsequent pace of events, it is important to remember
just how unassailable the Asad regime appeared to be before the outbreak
of the uprising. The regime had built up a daunting police and security
state on the model of the Communist states of pre-1989 Eastern Europe
and Russia.
The security services employed around 65,000 full-time workers, with a much larger circle of agents and informants.[13]
The reach of the four main intelligence agencies (military, air force,
state, and political security) and a variety of smaller organizations of
this type extended throughout the society. One analyst perceptively
pointed out at the start of the uprising that this barrier of fear would
be the main obstacle to be toppled, since Asad’s power rested precisely
on the population’s fear of him. Once this was broken, all that would
remain available to the regime was the active application of brute
force. Yet in the absence of any other legitimating factor, this would
be unlikely to prove sufficient to restore the situation as it pertained
before the uprising.
Thus, with its initial attempts at
reform rebuffed, the regime set out to crush the rising by force, while
trying to make sure that the majority of Syria’s citizens–in particular
in the main cities of Damascus and Aleppo–were able to pursue normal
daily lives.
SECOND PHASE: ATTEMPT TO CRUSH REBELLION BY FORCE PROVOKES ARMED REVOLT
The result of this was a rising death
toll in the course of the summer of 2011. By early June 2011, 887 people
had been killed, just under half of them in Dar’a. [14]
In these initial months, the protests were also still confined to
particular parts of the country–in the main, rural, conservative, and
poor Sunni areas. Of these, the most significant were Homs, Syria’s
third largest city; Hama, Latakiyya city (a Sunni town surrounded by
Alawi villages), Dayr al-Zour in the northeast, Idlib province in the
north, Banias, Rastan, and Douma near Damascus.
In its official propaganda and media,
the regime continued the theme of presenting itself as facing an armed
attack from Salafi jihadi “gangs.” This assertion remained
unconvincing. Armed attacks on regime forces at this stage were minimal.
Yet while the world as a whole may have found the regime’s explanations
for its conduct unconvincing and even ludicrous, this appeared to be of
secondary concern to Asad.
Explaining its case had never been the
regime’s strong suit. The outbreak of revolt had clearly caught the
regime unawares and entirely unprepared to deal with the revolution in
communications that had taken place over the previous two decades. The
initial response had clearly been simply to attempt to nip the
demonstrations in the bud by repression. This had reckoned without the
ability of Syrians to take pictures and report via the internet, in
particular YouTube. A notable contrast emerged between the relatively
sophisticated propaganda techniques of opposition activists and the
extremely anachronistic methods of the Syrian state news agency SANA.
Rather than seriously compete in the
information battle, the regime sought to control the flow of
information. It did this by primitive, but not entirely ineffective
methods. Thus, the regime tried to prevent foreign journalists and
media organizations from entering the country. It also severely
restricted the freedom of movement of those reporters that it did allow
in. The regime’s closing of much of the country to coverage did not
succeed in diverting media attention from events in Syria, though it did
have a serious effect on the ability to build a clear picture regarding
events on the ground.
The somewhat primitive response of the
Asad regime in the information field, and the half-hearted attempts at
self-justification in the March and April 2011 speeches point to a
central element of this regime–namely, its apparent awareness of the
brittleness of any claims to legitimacy it could make, and its
consequent decision to resolve the issue through the use of force alone.
Asad did not succeed in closing Syria off, of course. The picture that
emerged in the course of the summer and autumn of 2011 was one of brutal
repression.
In a third speech given on June 20,
2011, at Damascus University, Asad’s tone once again shifted. Now there
were no more promises of reform. Rather, the theme was once again that
Syria was the target of a foreign-inspired conspiracy. This time,
however, the Syrian president’s tone was more belligerent. He spoke of
different types of people engaged in the rebellion, with a core group of
“people of sedition,” numbering 64,000, supposedly leading the way.
He referred to conspiracies as “germs,” spreading and increasing.
This third speech effectively marked the
end of any attempt by the regime to pretend that the rebellion against
it was of minor proportions or trying to damp it down with concessions.
Since then, three subsequent public addresses by Asad, on Army Day on
August 1, 2011; again at Damascus University on January 10, 2012; and
again at parliament on June 3, 2012, have reiterated the themes of the
earlier speeches–claims of conspiracy and reassertions of the regime’s
determination to defeat the “enemies” of Syria, both external and
internal.[15]
The summer of 2011 saw a sharp increase
in the daily number of casualties as the regime sought to crush the
rebellion. This period also saw increased defections from the army, and
the first appearance of organized, armed opposition to the Asad regime.
On July 29, 2011, Syrian officers who had defected to the opposition
announced the formation of the Free Syrian Army (FSA).[16]
Initially, the role of the armed group was to protect demonstrators.
However, as the regime repression continued, the FSA and similar groups
began to adopt the tactics of an armed insurgency.
By the end of September 2011, the
abandonment of restraint by the regime and the attempt to crush the
rebellion by force had brought the number of those killed to 3,000,
according to human rights groups.[17]
Yet the campaign had not ended in
successful counterinsurgency and the end of protest. Rather, by the end
of summer 2011, the battle lines were set for a situation of civil war
in Syria, which continues until the time of the writing of this
article. Yet few had yet used the term “civil war” to describe the
events in Syria. This term would take another year to come into
widespread circulation.
Nonetheless, the essential situation had
settled into a clear pattern. The regime had sought to crush the
demonstrations by force, once it became clear that its cosmetic
proposals for reform had had no effect. As a result, the opposition had
increasingly turned to armed resistance. The regime had then sought to
engage and destroy the armed rebels and their supporters.
Yet as defections from the military
continued, it became increasingly difficult for the regime to reassert
its control permanently over the centers of Sunni Arab population, which
formed the heartland of the revolt. Rather, the regime forces would
pacify one area and then move on to take on another. However, once the
forces were removed from an area in revolt, the rebellion would
re-emerge.
The Asad regime’s vastly superior
firepower to that of its opponents at this stage meant that it was able
to conquer any specific point that it defined as a target. It did not,
however, possess enough forces to suppress and hold all areas in revolt
permanently.
The rebellion had from its outset been
mainly confined to areas of predominantly rural Sunni Arab population.
These areas had never been centers of support for the Asad regime, nor
were they economically vital to its survival. As a result, starting
from the autumn of 2011, a regime strategy of de facto withdrawal from
some areas of rebel support–except for occasional raids–began to be
discernible. The result of this was the slow emergence of areas of
precarious rebel autonomy, in which the flag of the rebellion flew, and
the only real authority was that of units loyal to local power
structures and operating under the broad, loose umbrella of the Free
Syrian Army.[18]
The regime was far more tenacious,
however, about holding on to the larger towns. It fought tooth and nail
to remain in the two cities that had exhibited support for the
rebels–Homs and Hama, as well as maintaining clear control and quiet in
the two main cities of Damascus and Aleppo.
THIRD PHASE: STALEMATE
From autumn 2011 to the spring of 2012, a
situation of effective stalemate existed between the sides, as the
bloodletting continued. This stalemate derived from the fact that while
the regime was unable to reconquer and hold all the areas that it had
ceded to the insurgency, the rebels themselves lacked the strength to
move forward into regime-controlled areas and defeat Asad head on. The
deficiencies of the sides did not mirror one another. Asad lacked
sufficient manpower to hold all parts of the country. The rebels lacked
both sufficient manpower and sufficient weaponry to take on the regime
head-on.
In late February and March 2012, as a
UN-sponsored “ceasefire” due to take effect on April 10, 2012, neared,
the regime launched a series of offensive operations against rebel-held
areas. This was a concerted attempt to reassert control in urban areas.
The regime succeeded in expelling the rebels from Homs, areas of
Damascus in which they had established a presence, and Idlib City.
However, the essential picture in which neither side could deliver a
fatal blow to the other remained.[19]
The rebels continued and continue to
seek the elusive “tipping point.” They are aware that Asad is slowly
losing manpower and ground. They are slowly advancing, having now
succeeded in bringing the fight to the big cities of Damascus and
Aleppo. The regime is continuing to do its utmost to drive the rebels
back, but appears gradually to be shedding strength, through defections
of personnel.
REGIME REDUCED TO ETHNIC CORE
The Asad regime has been beset by a
central paradox throughout its existence. It has advanced the interests
of the Alawi sect to which the Asad family itself belongs. The Alawites,
who number around 12 percent of the Syrian population, form the core
elite of the regime’s military and security services. Yet the regime
has also taken care to avoid the appearance of ruling on behalf of a
particular sectarian group. Indeed, the official ideology of the regime
stresses pan-Arab identity and depicts Syria as the “beating heart of
Arabism.” The uprising and subsequent civil war against Asad’s rule has
served to work out this contradiction.
The civil war in Syria is taking on a
more openly sectarian character as a contest between the Sunni Arab
population of Syria and the Alawi-dominated regime. Some (though not yet
all) of the most prominent Sunni figures in the regime have now
defected to the rebels–such as Major-General Mnaf Tlas.
The army units upon which the regime relies, also, are those of predominantly Alawi composition, such as the 4th
Armored Division, Special Forces, and Republican Guard. The Shabiha
paramilitary forces, which have played such a prominent role in the
repression, are of course overwhelmingly Alawi. As the Alawi nature of
the regime has become increasingly laid bare, so evidence has emerged
that the regime itself is following an increasingly open sectarian
logic.
Evidence has emerged, for example, that
the regime is seeking to establish an Alawi ethnic stronghold in the
northwest of the country, west of the Orontes River.[20]
Alawites form a majority, though not the totality of the population in
this area. Some analysts have speculated that this effort forms part of
a “Plan B,” whereby the regime would take on an openly Alawi sectarian
character and leave the main cities when it could no longer defend
them–in order to continue in existence as the ruler of a small Alawi
enclave or statelet. Others have disputed this, suggesting that such an
enclave would lack any legitimacy or long-term viability.
It seems likely, however, that the
regime is indeed carving out an enclave of this kind, not necessarily as
part of a full-blown strategy for the partition of the country, but
rather in order for this area to serve as a base and safe zone of
control for what the regime now expects to be a long and drawn out civil
war. (In this regard, it is worth noting that the Alawi enclave would
contain the Russian naval facility at Tartous. This is an important
Russian interest in Syria. It is also the main landing site for the
Russian weaponry, which is vital to Asad’s survival.)
Asad is still making supreme efforts to
pacify the main cities of Damascus and Aleppo, and to turn back rebel
gains in these areas. He appears confident that the diplomatic and
military support of Russia, and the assistance afforded him by Iran and
its Lebanese proxy Hizballah, will enable him to continue his war effort
against the rebels. The regime’s strategy is a straightforward one, at
this stage. It is to buy time, preserve the support of its vital
foreign backers, and continue the military struggle against the rebels
until such time as the insurgency is weakened and eventually destroyed.
Despite the unimaginative nature of its
strategy, and its tactical inability to carry out a successful
counterinsurgency because of its lack of manpower, the Asad regime is
nevertheless still in existence after many months of rebellion against
it and shows no signs of imminent collapse. What can explain the
surprising longevity of this regime when similar systems have fallen
elsewhere in the Arab world? Also, what explains the absolute refusal
of the regime to countenance any genuine dialogue or negotiation with
the rebels, despite what looks like Asad’s poor strategic look-out.
The dictator, after all, can certainly
hold on for what may be some considerable length of time, by virtue of
his superior military hardware, but with his regime having shed any
vestiges of legitimacy, it is hard to see how Asad can entertain serious
hopes now of a return to the situation as it existed prior to the
outbreak of the revolt in March 2011.
CONCLUSION
The Asad regime has always suffered from
a legitimacy deficit. It was a regime whose support base was unusually
narrow. Only a single ethnic minority community, the Alawites–from whom
the Asad family themselves had emerged–had a clear commitment to the
regime. To mask this deficit, the regime cloaked itself in Arab
nationalist ideology and rhetoric.
The legitimacy deficit meant that when
an uprising against it began, the Asad regime possessed few options
other than brute force. The Asads created and maintained their rule
through fear. They would either reinstate this fear or their rule would
come to an end. This was clear to both supporters and opponents of the
regime. As a result, following a few desultory attempts at offering
cosmetic reforms, the regime effectively declared war against the
insurgency in June 2011, seeking to crush it by force. All subsequent
political moves by the regime (the “referendum” on a new constitution in
February 2012 and the oft-repeated declarations of willingness to
negotiate) were clearly attempts to buy time, so as to allow the
destruction of the insurgency to take place.
The sectarian nature of the regime has
also proved, however, a source of strength to it. As the sectarian
contours of the civil war in Syria became clearer, so the core support
of the Alawites for the Asads remained (along with the neutrality of
Christian, Druze, and Shi’i Syrians who feared the emergence of a
repressive Sunni regime). The Asads have succeeded in “implicating” the
Alawites in their rule. As a result, the Alawites form the main part of
the manpower still available to the regime. This, coupled with the
ongoing international support for Asad from Russia, China, and Iran as
well as the vastly superior weaponry available to the regime when
compared with the rebels, has enabled Asad to preserve his rule thus
far. The strategic direction appears to be against him, as the rebels
slowly extend their areas of activity in the urban centers of Damascus
and Aleppo. Yet the civil war in Syria may continue for a considerable
time to come.
Given the narrow base of his regime,
Bashar Asad has pursued probably the only policy that was available to
him, other than simply giving up his rule. The Asad regime’s rule was
established and maintained by the use of force and the imposition of
fear. It is therefore not surprising that when beset by internal
dissent, it turned swiftly to the application of extreme force as the
means by which it sought to defeat the popular uprising against it. It
has been forced to retreat from large parts of the country, due to the
narrow sectarian base of the regime and a lack of sufficient manpower to
hold these areas. However, at the time of writing, the regime appears
to show no signs of imminent collapse.
*Dr. Jonathan Spyer is a senior
research fellow at the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA)
Center, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya. His first book, The Transforming Fire: The Rise of the Israel-Islamist Conflict, was published in 2010. He has visited Syria twice since the beginning of the uprising.
NOTES
[1] “Interview with Syrian President Bashar Assad,” Wall Street Journal, January 31, 2011, http://online.wsj.com.
[2] See Joseph Holliday, “Syria’s Maturing Insurgency,” Institute for the Study of War, June 2012, http://www.understandingwar.org.
[3] Tony Badran, “Alawistan,” Foreign Policy, July 27, 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com.
[4] “Interview with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad,” Wall Street Journal, January 31, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703833204576114712441122894.html.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Fouad Ajami, The Syrian Rebellion (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 2012), p. 10.
[7] Jim Muir, “Syria: Setting the Country Alight?” BBC Online, March 24, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk.
[8] “Syria Reverses Ban on Islamic Face Veil in Schools,” al-Arabiya, April 6, 2011, http://www.alarabiya.net.
[9] “Syria to Tackle Kurds’ Citizenship Problem,” Kurd-Net, April 1, 2011, http://www.ekurd.net.
[10] Robert Lowe, The Syrian Kurds: a People Discovered (London: Chatham House, 2006).
[11] “Speech to the Syrian Parliament by President Bashar al-Assad,” Syria Comment, March 31, 2011, http://www.joshualandis.com.
[12] “Bashar Assad Speech April 16 2011: Promises of Reforms and Brushing off Protests,” April 16, 2011, http://worldnews.about.com.
[13] Alan George, Syria: Neither Bread nor Freedom (London: Zed Books, 2003), p. 2.
[14] Ajami, The Syrian Rebellion, p. 75.
[15] For English translations of Assad’s recent speeches, see http://www.presidentassad.net.
[16] Free Syrian Army profile, Jane’s Information Group, July 24, 2012, http://articles.janes.com.
[17] Ajami, The Syrian Rebellion, p. 91.
[18] Holliday, “Syria’s Maturing Insurgency”; also as witnessed by the author in Idlib Province, February 2012.
[19] “They Burned My Heart: War Crimes in Idlib During Peace Plan Negotiations,” Human Rights Watch, May 4, 2012, http://www.hrw.org.
[20]
Badran, “Alawistan.” See also Josh Landis, who outlines his skepticism
regarding the likelihood that an Alawi statelet would be established, in
“Five Reasons Why There Will Not Be an Alawite State,” Syria Comment, July 1, 2012, http://www.joshualandis.com.
Jonathan Spyer is a senior research fellow at the Global Research in International Affairs Center in Herzliya, Israel, the author of The Transforming Fire: The Rise of the Israel-Islamist Conflict (Continuum, 2010) and a columnist at the Jerusalem Post newspaper. Spyer holds a PhD in International Relations from the London School of Economics and a Masters' Degree in Middle East Politics from the School of Oriental and African Studies in London. He served in a front-line unit of the Israel Defense Forces in 1992-3, and fought in the war in Lebanon in summer 2006. Between 1996 and 2000, Spyer was an employee of the Israel Prime Minister's Office.
Source: http://www.gloria-center.org/2012/11/syrian-regime-strategy-and-the-syrian-civil-war/
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
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