by Barry Rubin
Once upon a time, Arab nationalism ruled the Middle East. Its doctrine
saw Arab identity as the key to political success. Some regarded Islam
as important; others were secular. Yet there was no doubt that national
identity was in charge. All Arabs should unite, said the radical
nationalists who ruled in Egypt, Libya, Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere, to
destroy Israel, expel Western influence, and create a utopian single
state in the region.
Instead, of course, the period was characterized by battles among the
radical Arab states for leadership. The less extreme ones sought
survival through a combination of giving lip service to radical slogans,
paying off the stronger regimes, and getting Western help.
That era is over. We are now in the era of Sunni Arab identity and
especially of Sunni Arab Islamism. With the liberals so weak, except
possibly in Tunisia, the three main choices are between the Muslim
Brotherhood; the Salafists; and conservative-traditional forces (as in
Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan) that will have some Islamic flavor but
not seek to be destabilizing and aggressive in the region.
Sunni Arab Islamist identity’s primacy has important implications for both national and regional politics.
First, tolerance for other groups is low to zero. The future of
Christians in the Middle East is dim. Already, most have been driven out
of Iraq and the Gaza Strip. If Christians in Syria and Egypt—comprising
more than ten percent of the population in each country--could find
somewhere to go, it is quite possible that hundreds of thousands will be
leaving in the coming years. Were the rebels to come to power in Syria,
the Alawite minority—which has largely ruled the country for the past
four decades—also faces serious threats to its existence.
Second, the regional ambitions of Turkey’s Islamist regime will come to
nothing. There is a deep resentment against Turks among many Arabs and
especially the Islamists. Hamas and Hizballah will take Turkish aid but
will give Ankara no influence over themselves. Any influence the Turkish
regime has over the Syrian rebels would not survive a victory for the
revolution.
Third, this situation is a severe setback for Iran. A few years ago it
was possible to believe that Tehran had a shot at achieving regional
hegemony. But the Sunni Arab Islamists generally despise Shia Muslims,
and the new Arab leaders don’t feel warmly inclined toward Persians
either. In Iraq, circumstances—including a military defeat and minority
status—have forced the Sunni Muslims to accept a Shia-dominated
government. That won’t happen anywhere else. Iran is down to just three
potential allies: the faltering Syrian regime; Hizballah in Lebanon;
and, on some issues but especially confronting Sunni Muslim hostility to
Shia Muslims, Iraq. It is likely to lose Syria but that very outcome
might push Iraq and Iran closer together against a hostile Sunni bloc.
That doesn’t mean Baghdad will become a satellite of Iran, an active
enemy of the United States, or an equally radical state, but the two
will increasingly cooperate.
Within the Sunni Arab Islamist world, the groups that we call Salafist
for convenience—smaller organizations that demand full revolution
now—compete with the Muslim Brotherhood but the two can also work
together. Their goals are the same; their sense of timing, not to
mention clashing personal and group ambitions for power, are different.
Even today, the Muslim Brotherhood rules only in Egypt and the Gaza
Strip, as well as leading a coalition in Tunisia. Their prospects are
good in Syria but not in Jordan. We should not overstate the group’s
power though, of course, Egypt is the single most important Arab state.
The Brotherhood leadership, in Egypt and potentially in Syria, will have
an important decision to make. They will definitely not become
moderate. There is no doubt that they will institute repressive regimes
at home, harass Christians, and reduce the status of women. They will
also daily trumpet their hatred of the United States and Israel.
But what will they do about that hatred? It is probable that they will,
in practice, permit their territory to be used for cross-border attacks
on Israel. They might well prefer, however to avoid a direct
conventional war. On this point, however, they will constantly be goaded
by the Salafists. To provide a parallel example note that the
Brotherhood generally does not launch violent attacks on Christians in
Egypt but doesn’t lift a finger to protect them. A lot of their energy,
though, will go into battling the Shia and after Syria is settled,
however long that takes, the main battleground will be Lebanon. When
Damascus sneezes Beirut catches cold. A Muslim Brotherhood-dominated
government in Syria would not back the current moderate Sunni Muslim
leadership in Lebanon but instead promote radical Sunni Islamist groups
there. The probability of a Sunni-Shia war in Lebanon would be high.
If one regards Iran as the main threat, the temptation would be for the
West to back the Sunni side. I think this would be a tremendous mistake.
Aside from the nuclear issue, the danger from Iran has been massively
reduced by these changes. Even if Tehran has nuclear weapons, the main
danger in the Arabic-speaking world is going to come from the radical
Sunni forces simply because they constitute a large majority there.
After all, the battle on the ground for control of Arabic-speaking
countries will go on every day whereas Iran can only decide to use
nuclear weapons once (and of course might face an Israeli attack).
Further, and keep in mind that Iran’s regime is less irrational than
many people think, the strategic value of attacking Israel has declined
greatly. Nobody new would rally to Tehran’s side because of such an
attack. The door to the Sunni world has been shut against Iran no matter
how much its leaders scream about Palestine and make threats--or
implement them--against Israel. Will the Sunni and Shia sides cooperate
against Israel? No, not directly. The Turkish regime will give some help
to Hizballah; Iran will give some help to Hamas. Yet there will be no
broader alliance.
We are not just talking here about theological differences but a battle
between individual leaders, organizations, and states for power and
primacy. Of course, though, they will compete in proving that they are
the true leaders in the anti-Israel struggle. And the same point applies
regarding opposition to the United States, too.
This is a complex situation requiring a sophisticated and determined
American leadership that never feels guilty or inferior in the face of
radical hatred or subversion. Only one presidential candidate is capable
of handling this difficult and threatening situation. It is not the
incumbent.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in
International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of
International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His
latest book, Israel: An Introduction, has just been published by Yale
University Press. Other recent books
include The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab
Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley),
and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center and of his blog, Rubin Reports. His original articles are published at PJMedia.
Source: http://rubinreports.blogspot.co.il/2012/11/the-sunni-shia-conflict-will-be-major.html
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
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