by Zalman Shoval
Though the U.S. and Russia have agreed to hold a summit
in Geneva to try to diplomatically resolve the conflict in Syria and
establish an interim Syrian government, it is highly doubtful that
Russia and the U.S. are of one mind as to what the diplomatic resolution
should be. Israel, as we all know, does not have a clear preference as
to which side winds up on top: It is not indifferent to Syrian President
Bashar al-Assad's atrocities, but it is also aware that the rebels, or
at least some of them, may pose no less of a threat.
The Russians have a direct interest in the events in Syria, and the lightning meeting
between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu earlier this month is proof of that. We don't know exactly
what was said behind closed doors in Sochi, but we cannot assume that
Putin initiated the meeting (and he did in fact initiate it) just to
inform Netanyahu that Russia would not cancel its missile deal with the
Syrians due to supposed contractual obligations or commercial reputation
considerations. A regime change in Syria would jeopardize the
strategic, diplomatic and economic interests of Putin's Russia, much
like the interests of the Soviet Union before it.
The Syrian port of
Tartus is the home base of the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean Sea.
Since Moscow wants to preserve its status (at least in its own view) as a
regional superpower in the Middle East, it must carefully consider its
conduct on the day after Assad's fall -- and Israel apparently plays
into Russia's considerations.
It is possible that the
Russians will try to forge ties with whomever rises to power in
Damascus after Assad, but they are also considering the possibility that
Syria will splinter and a small Alawite state will be established in
the northeaster part of the country -- where the port of Tartus is
situated. The Americans, unlike the Russians, are still hoping for a
unified Syria with a democratic leadership that would cooperate with the
West, though they are less confident in the likelihood of this actually
happening.
In the past, Soviet
policy in the Middle East rested mainly on support for the Arabs,
including Arab terror organizations, and hostility toward Israel -- both
because Stalin viewed Zionism as the most dangerous enemy of communism
and because of Israel's relationship with the U.S. in the context of the
Cold War. In this regard, things have changed, and thankfully so.
Currently, Russia isn't
entirely in love with Assad either. Russia's support for Assad is a
default policy. But much like Israel, Russia is worried that if Assad
falls, a fundamentalist-Islamist hub will arise in his place. In this
regard, Jerusalem and Moscow share a common future interest (even if it
is for different reasons). In the meantime, Israel expects Russia to
convince Assad that it has no intention of attacking him as long as he
prevents the transfer of advanced weapons to Hezbollah. Israel also
wants Russia to make it clear to Assad that if he should violate this
expectation, or provoke Israel other ways, there will be a response.
There is currently more than one
game being played at the Syrian card table. One player is playing poker
while another player is playing bridge. The players and partners are
also inconsistent. At this point, it is not yet clear which player is
holding the winning card, or even if such a card exists. In any case,
Israel has to play its cards close to the chest and refrain from
unnecessary chatter. And of course Israel must not forget that specific
or temporary interests, as important as they may be, are no substitute
for the long-term relationship with the U.S.
Zalman Shoval
Source: http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_opinion.php?id=4459
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
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