by Zalman Shoval
Martin Indyk, the U.S.
administration's special envoy to Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, landed back
in Washington last week and quickly declared that Israel was to blame for the
diplomatic failure. He reiterated the Palestinian claim that Israeli
construction plans and nullification of the fourth phase of the prisoner release
were the cause for Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas' decision,
contrary to all prior understandings, to turn and apply to 15 international
bodies. Indyk's comments came despite Palestinian confirmation, based on
documents acquired by the press, that they made their decision in advance of
said Israeli decisions.
Supposedly to balance his accusation,
Indyk added that both sides "do not feel the pressing need to make the
gut-wrenching compromises necessary to achieve peace," but forgot to mention
that while Israel is prepared to concede large parts of its territory, the
Palestinians refused to concede on any one of their demands. One can wonder why
Indyk ignored the facts when reaching his conclusion (which, incidentally, is
not the same conclusion reached by many other American officials involved in the
talks), but it is more important now to focus on the reality of the situation as
it stands, or could become in the coming months. U.S. President Barack Obama
spoke of a hiatus, but, as evidenced from National Security Adviser Susan Rice's
visit here last week, we can assume it won't last long.
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry
said in the past that it was time for the sides to "take inventory," and he is
right. On the Palestinian side, the picture has become clearer: Abbas'
"reconciliation" deal with Hamas is perhaps the first stage in integrating the
Islamist group into the Palestine Liberation Organization, and testifies to
Abbas' inclination to continue the struggle against Israel rather than come to
terms with it.
In the meantime, the PA president has
repeated his preconditions for renewing negotiations: a complete construction
freeze for three months (in this context, the Palestinians do not distinguish
between Jerusalem and the settlement blocs and other areas of Judea and
Samaria), and completion of the fourth phase of releasing terrorists. However,
even if Israel would agree to these demands -- even if only to test the
Palestinians -- there is no indication that the Palestinians intend to abandon
their present strategic course of bypassing any real negotiations by taking
unilateral steps via the United Nations and other international bodies. Past
experience teaches us that any positive Israeli or American response to their
demands only leads to the Palestinians adding further conditions.
Coincidentally, it is quite possible
that in the coming weeks it will actually be Israel offering proposals for
"kick-starting" negotiations, but for there to be any chance of pulling the
diplomatic wagon out of the mud of Palestinian rejectionism, the U.S. will have
to employ different methods.
Firstly, the serious ramifications
for pursuing his current course of action must be clarified to Abbas. As we have
seen, when Washington wants to apply pressure, it provides results. More
importantly, the Americans need to re-examine many of their basic assumptions.
Kerry at the time delineated a rigid time frame for reaching a comprehensive
agreement to resolve the conflict entirely, but even if he had doubled or
tripled this allotted time frame the results would not have been any different.
Not only is there no concrete possibility of bridging the fundamental gaps on
the core issues of the conflict, but as long as the Palestinians believe that
time is on their side (and comments like Indyk's only encourage them to maintain
this belief), they will continue to drag their feet and make a mockery of
American efforts.
The Talmudic idiom "if you have
seized a lot, you have not seized" also applies to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. A comprehensive deal to "end the conflict," which Washington declared
as the immediate objective and which we would also prefer in principle, is
simply not within reach.
The necessary conclusion, therefore,
is that to make progress we must borrow from the wisdom of Winston Churchill:
"Be quick, but don't be in a hurry" -- and outline a strategy of partial
arrangements on issues such as security, economic cooperation, the establishment
of more effective and fair governmental and judicial institutions for the
Palestinians -- without repeating the mistake of hitching a wagon with no wheels
before the horse.
The Palestinians must be told: "While you are
not required to give up on your dreams of being independent, if you continue
pursuing your current course, you will simply never attain
them."
Zalman Shoval
Source: http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_opinion.php?id=8373
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
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