by Yoram Ettinger
The idea that the enemy
of my enemy is my potential ally underlies the 2014 Western policy
toward Iran, the enemy of Islamic State. It underlay U.S. policy toward
Iraq's Saddam Hussein -- the enemy of Iran -- until his occupation of
Kuwait on Aug. 2, 1990.
The reckless policy
toward Iraq in 1990 triggered a conventional conflict, a $1.25 trillion
cost to the U.S. taxpayer, 4,500 U.S. military fatalities, a surge of
anti-U.S. Islamic terrorism, and a dramatic destabilization of the
Persian Gulf. The misguided characterization of Iran could produce a
nuclear conflict, a mega-trillion dollar cost to the U.S. taxpayer, an
unprecedented level of fatalities, a tidal wave of global anti-U.S
Islamic terrorism, and tectonic eruptions of insanity throughout the
globe.
During 1989-1990, upon
the conclusion of the Iraq-Iran war, the U.S. administration portrayed
Iraq's Saddam Hussein -- the enemy of America's enemy, Iran -- as a
potential ally, enhancing Baghdad's strategic capabilities through an
intelligence-sharing agreement, supplies of sensitive dual-use systems
and the extension of $5 billion loan guarantees. Instead of constraining
Saddam's regional maneuverability and inherent, violent, megalomaniac
expansionism, the U.S. administration chose to ignore Saddam's core,
imperialistic, rogue, radical, anti-U.S. ideology, which triggered the
Iraq-Iran war.
The larger, historical,
ideological, complex context was overtaken by a narrowly and
simplistically designed policy du jour. The recklessness of "the enemy
of my enemy is my potential ally" was underlined by an intense U.S.-Iraq
diplomatic traffic. For example, Saddam's meeting with Ambassador April
Glaspie on July 25, 1990, which convinced Saddam that he could invade
Kuwait with impunity.
Thus, an erroneous U.S.
policy led to Iraq's plunder of Kuwait, and consequently to the First
Gulf War (1991), the devastatingly costly Second Gulf War (2003-2010)
and possibly the third Gulf war.
The victory of wishful
thinking over reality was also the basis for Israel's 1993 policy toward
the PLO -- the enemy of Hamas -- which was gullibly expected to align
itself with Israel's war on Palestinian terrorism, in return for the
unprecedented Israeli territorial concessions of the Oslo process.
Instead, since 1993, Israel has been a victim of an unprecedented wave
of PLO/Hamas anti-Israel terrorism, reinforced by daily hate education
and incitement in Mahmoud Abbas' schools, mosques and media, as well as a
surge of terrorism from 2000-2003, the 2006 Hamas takeover of Gaza and
the 2008-2009, 2012 and 2014 wars against Palestinian terrorism in Gaza.
The assumption that
"the enemy of my enemy is potentially my friend" underestimates the
following endemic, unique features of Iran's ayatollahs and mullahs: the
compulsive, core, Islamic, supremacist, megalomaniac, anti-infidel,
anti-U.S. ideology; the perception of the U.S. as the "Great Satan" and
the chief obstacle to an imperial Islamic Iran; the intimate military
ties with America's enemies and adversaries; the sponsorship of global
anti-U.S. jihadist terrorism, including in Iraq and Afghanistan; a
30-year track record of non-compliance and deceit in their negotiation
with the West; Iranian President Hassan Rouhani's key role in misleading
the West; the clear and present danger posed by a nuclear Iran to the
survival of Saudi Arabia and other pro-U.S. oil-producing Arab regimes
and to global and homeland security, national security and economy; the
impact of Iran's occupation of Iraq's Shiite section upon the stability
of the Gulf; the egregious violations of human rights by Iran's
minority, tyrannical, ruthless regime which sent 500,000 children to
clear minefields during the Iraq-Iran War; and the ineffectiveness of
sanctions, and any diplomatic option, when applied to rogue regimes,
bent on domination, and the rejection of peaceful coexistence.
"The enemy of my enemy
is my potential ally" worldview has been nurtured by the same foreign
policy establishments that have systematically misread the Middle East:
misjudging the rise of Islamic State; overestimating the will of the
U.S.'s Arab allies to fight and the capabilities of Iraq's military;
underestimating the developments in Syria; welcoming the Arab tsunami as
an "Arab Spring" transitioning toward democracy; crowning the
Palestinian issue as the core cause of the Middle East turbulence and
the crown jewel of Arab policy-making; encouraging the toppling of
pro-U.S. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and the rise of the anti-U.S.
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood terror organization; giving Egyptian
President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi the cold shoulder; jumpstarting the 2006
Hamas takeover of Gaza; legitimizing Yasser Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas in
1988 and embracing them as a messengers of peace in 1993;
underestimating Palestinian/Iranian hate education as the most effective
manufacturing line of terrorism and the most authentic reflection of
the respective leadership; courting Saddam Hussein in 1990; punishing
Israel for destroying Iraq's nuclear reactor in 1981, which spared the
U.S. a nuclear confrontation in 1991; the abandonment of the pro-U.S.
Shah of Iran, and welcoming the rise of anti-U.S. Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini; initial opposition to Prime Minister Begin's 1977 direct peace
negotiations with Egypt, and so on.
The deficient threat
assessment of a nuclear Iran has crowned Teheran's ayatollahs and
mullahs as the top beneficiaries of the confrontation with Islamic
State, rewarding them with what they want most: additional time required
to obtain nuclear capabilities.
Reality checks and
common sense indicate that the U.S. does not have a potential ally in
the battle between Iran and Islamic State. Both are sworn enemies
(amenable to tactical, provisional negotiations and truces) bent on
Islamic supremacy, terrorism and "Death to America."
The nature of the ayatollahs and
mullahs on the one hand, and the assumption that they are potential
allies of the U.S. on the other hand, constitutes a self-destruct
oxymoron, which could entail a devastating nuclear cost.
Yoram Ettinger
Source: http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_opinion.php?id=10147
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
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