by Omer Einav
It appeared that the prestige enjoyed by Hizbollah in the preceding decade, mainly due to its campaign against Israel in the 2006 Second Lebanon War, had dissipated, with the organization’s legitimacy undermined both inside and outside Lebanon. The principal charge was that Hizbollah’s actions would cause the Syrian civil war to spread to Lebanon.
In recent months there have been clear
signs, along with much discussion in the public discourse, of
Hizbollah’s legitimacy rebound in Lebanon’s political and civilian
spheres. Given Lebanon’s delicate sectoral and community balance, any
fluctuation in the public mood is likely to steer the entire country in
general and Hizbollah in particular in a new direction, with potential
changes in policy on a host of issues, including vis-à-vis Israel.
Over time, Hizbollah began to see
successes on the Syrian battlefield. In May-June 2013, about a month
after Nasrallah first publicly admitted that the organization was
operating in Syria, Hizbollah, together with Assad’s forces, scored a
victory against the rebels in al-Qusayr in the Homs district, a
strategically important location. This victory strengthened the
Iranian-Syrian axis fighting to preserve the regime, whose forces had
been hit hard by the rebels in the months preceding the battle.
Hizbollah also took part in the fighting in the Qalamoun Mountains, in
Damascus, and on other fronts, achieving much while garnering prestige
and military experience. These and other operational successes helped
Shiites on Syrian soil stand tall, which in effect give Hizbollah a
symbolic achievement.
Nonetheless, Hizbollah’s leadership
was hard pressed to persuade the Lebanese public that the organizational
and military benefits of fighting in Syria were necessary for the
country’s security – until unexpected help came in the form of Salafi
Sunni Islam. Under direct influence from Syria, where the civilian
rebellion began to assume a Salafi-jihadi tone and diverge from the more
moderate tendencies, many supporters of Sunni terrorist organizations
operating in Syria began to appear in Lebanon. This phenomenon was
especially pronounced in the refugee camps in northern and southern
Lebanon and in Tripoli, where strife was rampant. Against this
background, Lebanon experienced a series of severe security-related
developments, including car bomb attacks, which aroused much anxiety in
Beirut. The atmosphere intensified with the emergence of the Islamic
State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in the summer of 2014, whose extreme
jihadist ideology won many admirers among the Sunni population in
Lebanon, combined with growing sympathy for the Jabhat al-Nusra
organization – the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda.
The kidnapping of Lebanese security
personnel in the border town of Arsal in August 2014 – an incident that
has not yet been concluded – and the conflicts in Tripoli in October
clearly highlight the challenge facing Lebanon. The border with Syria
has become a porous area marked by anarchy. Salafi Islam has asserted
its power, and is threatening to subvert the political order at a time
that the Lebanese political system is essentially paralyzed by its lack
of a president and the lack of a parliament in session. This
governmental vacuum suits Hizbollah well. Moreover, Lebanon’s army is
trying to portray itself as the country’s defender and a unifying force,
although it has never been capable of standing up to the challenging
array of threats facing the country, and certainly not on this scale.
On the other hand, Hizbollah is
standing steadfast against the external threat. Ironically, Hizbollah
played a role in creating this threat, yet has since become the most
effective means of dealing with it. For example, Hizbollah is a mediator
in the negotiations with the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra for
release of hostages, and has helped restore quiet to Tripoli, at least
temporarily. In their despair, more than a few Lebanese are looking to
Hizbollah to rescue the country from the dangers threatening to
aggravate the already prevailing instability.
Fortified by this new backdrop,
Hizbollah is openly demonstrating growing confidence, claiming that its
contentions that it had a duty to intervene as Lebanon’s defender
against external threats have been validated. Hizbollah continues to
justify its fighting in Syria, while at the same time not neglecting its
original purpose – defender of Lebanon and leader of the resistance
(muqawama). In a speech in Beirut on Ashura Day on in early November
2014, Nasrallah stressed the importance of the fighting in Syria and
defense against “takfiris” (a derogatory term for apostate used by
Muslims, in this case against Salafi Islam organizations, especially the
Islamic State).
At the same time, against the
background of last summer’s escalation between Israel and Hamas and the
increased tension in Jerusalem, Nasrallah unveiled his traditional
perspective on the expected conflict with Israel. The clear message is
that Hizbollah, together with the Lebanese defense forces, is part of
Lebanon’s national defense. Senior Hizbollah official Nabil Qaouk said,
“Thanks to the all-inclusive formula of the people, the army, and the
resistance, Lebanon has become the most invulnerable country in the
region to the two threats: the takfiri threat and the Israeli threat.”
This rhetoric has been accompanied by a change in operational policy. In
October 2014, Hizbollah staged an operation against IDF forces in
Shab’a farms (Har Dov) – rare activity since the 2006 war. This measure
does not indicate deliberate escalation, but it is a clear statement of
intention on the organization’s part with respect to its capabilities.
Perhaps the recent airstrikes – attributed to Israel – against the
weapons stockpiles in Damascus will figure in Hizbollah’s strategic
considerations that encourage escalation along the border with Israel.
Hizbollah’s experience echoes the
processes occurring elsewhere in the Middle East. In both Syria and
Iraq, the Alawite and Shiite regimes, respectively, were marked early in
the confrontations as troublemakers that should be neutralized in order
to restore quiet. Yet once a worse threat emerged, these regimes were
no longer punching bags for either the local populations or the West,
but became possible partners in blunting the threat, even if not
publicly.
The situation in Lebanon, however, is
distinguished in several ways from the events in the neighboring
countries. At present it is not certain that Hizbollah is capable of
drawing widespread support from the Lebanese public and political
systems, and a great deal must occur before the organization can claim
the victory it seeks. As of now, it can take comfort in the fact that
given the immediate dangers facing Lebanon, many among the population
regard Hizbollah as the most stable and reliable element. At the same
time, it is difficult to assess whether Hizbollah is capable of moving
another step forward toward the national consensus. One indication of
this design could be its role in the effort to end the presidential
crisis in Lebanon. In the near future, Hizbollah is scheduled to
negotiate with its rival party, al-Mustaqbal, led by Saad al-Hariri, for
the purpose of resolving the crisis and selecting a president
acceptable to all factions. If Hizbollah’s candidate, former General
Michel Aoun, is chosen, it will be a foothold for Hizbollah in the very
heart of the Lebanese national consensus and will signify its return to
the status of the unofficial defender of Lebanon. In turn, Hizbollah’s
freedom of action, including on the border with Israel and in the Golan
Heights, would be greater. Israel will then have to reexamine its
assessment of the organization’s intentions and readiness for a military
confrontation in the near future, and weigh how this escalation might
best be prevented.Omer Einav
Source: http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=8363
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
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