by Gabi Siboni , A. G.
The organization’s leadership realized that the number of tunnels it had built and the extent to which they were used came as a surprise to Israel. For this reason, the offensive tunnels became a key element of Hamas’ fighting doctrine.
Despite
the heavy price paid by Hamas in Operation Protective Edge, it is not
wasting any time preparing for the next war. For the organization, war
against Israel is a tool for strategic change to entrench its rule in
the Gaza Strip and establish itself as a key player in the
Israeli-Palestinian arena and surpass the power base of the PA, headed
by Fatah and Mahmoud Abbas. In order for Israel to postpone the next
conflict with Hamas for as long as possible, two main efforts are
necessary. One is to prevent the organization’s arming itself with
standard and advanced weapons and raw materials liable to be used to
manufacture such weapons. The second is the economic lever, namely,
improving the dire economic and humanitarian situation in the Gaza
Strip. Easing the plight of the local population will reinforce Hamas’
sense of governmental sustainability in the area. In this context,
however, the unstable and hostile relations between Hamas and the PA,
particularly concerning the distribution of the money promised for
rebuilding the Gaza Strip, play a key role in blocking any progress
toward the vital reconstruction.
Hamas
emerged bruised and battered from the 50 days of fighting in Operation
Protective Edge, and programs for reconstruction in the Gaza Strip have
not progressed at the pace expected by the leadership. The severe
economic situation and the ensuing humanitarian crisis in Gaza are
liable to be a catalyst for public protest that could threaten the Hamas
government. Furthermore, as of now no political horizon is in sight,
and the armed struggle against Israel remains a key element in the
organization’s political Islamic ideology. As such, the development of
another round of warfare between Israel and Hamas appears to be only a
matter of time. The return to center stage of Mohammed Deif, commander
of Hamas’ military wing, increases the urgency of the questions
concerning the organization’s operations in a future conflict with
Israel.
Iron Dome in Operation
Protective
Edge, July 8, 2014.
Photo: Israel Defense Forces,
licensed under CC BY
2.0
via Wikimedia Commons
|
Since the end of the conflict in the
summer of 2014, Hamas has concentrated on rebuilding its system of
offensive tunnels from the Gaza Strip into Israel. The organization’s
leadership realized that the number of tunnels it had built and the
extent to which they were used came as a surprise to Israel. For this
reason, the offensive tunnels became a key element of Hamas’ fighting
doctrine. In the end, the yield from the tunnels during Operation
Protective Edge was not directly proportionate to the decisive weight
Hamas had assigned to them and their potential damage was not fully
realized; their most significant achievement relates to the functional
survival of the command echelon. Nonetheless, the organization will
almost certainly rebuild the damaged tunnels and continue to dig new
ones, given that almost all of Hamas’ senior chain command and political
leaders survived Operation Protective Edge. Hamas will presumably try
to surprise Israel again using the tunnels in order to exact a heavy
price. The efforts might focus on a small number of axes of potentially
high effectiveness in order to achieve a supreme Hamas objective –
kidnapping live soldiers or civilians. The infrastructure tunnels dug as
an extensive network throughout the Gaza Strip are also a key element
in Hamas’ ability to withstand a prolonged conflict.
Hamas and the other armed groups in
the Gaza Strip launched over 4,500 rockets of various ranges against
Israel during Operation Protective Edge. Hamas believes that even if the
effectiveness of the Iron Dome system prevented large numbers of
casualties among the civilian population in Israel, the very necessity
of sending millions of Israeli citizens to shelters continually on a
daily basis and the disruption of their daily lives constituted an
important achievement. Its ability to disrupt Israel’s civil aviation
(foreign airlines suspended flights for two days during Operation
Protective Edge) and the resulting potential economic and morale damage
to Israel are also likely to encourage rocket production efforts,
including increasing the number produced, improving their accuracy, and
lengthening their range. The frequent trial launches in the Gaza Strip
support this assessment. In addition, and as a result of the increased
number of Iron Dome batteries, Hamas realizes that in the future, it
must disperse its launch targets as much as possible in in order to
force Israel to spread out the batteries deployed and focus on defense
of vital infrastructure, thereby increasing Hamas’ chances of
penetrating the defense envelope. To this end, Hamas might solicit
assistance from Hizbollah forces in Lebanon or Syria, Palestinian
organizations in southern Lebanon, or extremist Islamic organizations in
the Sinai Peninsula, which with their rocket arsenals could open
additional fronts against Israel.
During Operation Protective Edge,
Hamas employed a variety of tactics prematurely, but presumably these
tactics will be improved and used again, this time with more
effectiveness. Such tactics include commando incursions into Israeli
territory and the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), whose main
purpose is to create a conscious deterrent among the population in
Israel. At least some of these operations might also cause casualties or
property damage. Indeed, use of UAVs is one of the areas in which Hamas
can make its biggest advances, particularly given the ongoing
technological developments in this field. Iran, which has advanced
capabilities in the development and production of UAVs, has already
granted Hamas assistance is this area, and this aid is expected to
continue. UAVs can constitute an alternative to rocket fire, and even
increase the damage through “suicide” UAVs propelled by manual or
automatic guidance. The organization is also expected to make efforts to
procure land based anti-ship missiles and improve its air defense
system, even though the Israel Air Force is clearly superior, because if
Hamas succeeds in downing an airplane or helicopter or in damaging an
Israeli naval vessel, it will obtain the victory photograph it has long
been seeking.
The recent rapprochement between Iran
and Hamas has an additional facet: Hizbollah. Hamas and Hizbollah have
learned from one another for years: Hamas implemented many of
Hizbollah’s successful processes, while for its part Hizbollah is likely
to study Hamas’ insights about the IDF’s military moves and methods of
operation during Operation Protective Edge. Following Operation
Protective Edge, lessons will likely be traded among Iran, Hizbollah,
and Hamas. Indeed, Hamas’ units and tactics in Operation Protective Edge
were more effective than in previous conflicts with the IDF. Together
with the use of advanced weapons, operations by the organization’s
military wing indicated an understanding that even a standard weapon and
basic methods of warfare could be extremely effective and deadly. The
use of snipers, machine guns, and mortar shells or improvised bombs and
mines on dense battlefields, combined with attempts to draw IDF forces
into a killing zone, succeeded in exacting a high number of victims from
Israel – more than in any other conflict between the parties in the
preceding eight years.
An effective media strategy has been
integrated in Hamas’ military concept, described as the “victim
doctrine,” based on using civilians as human shields. This consists of
shooting rockets and weapons from within densely populated areas in
order to force Israel to respond, thereby hitting the non-involved
Palestinian population. This strategy is designed to generate political,
public relations, and international legal pressure on Israel, detract
from its legitimacy to use force, and isolate it with accusations of
using disproportionate force. It is almost certain that Hamas’ success
in delivering its “victim” message during Operation Protective Edge will
lead it to behave in similar fashion in the next conflict as well,
despite the suffering and enormous destruction this method brings on the
Gaza population.
Despite the heavy price paid by Hamas
in Operation Protective Edge, it is not wasting any time preparing for
the next war. For the organization, war against Israel is a tool for
strategic change to entrench its rule in the Gaza Strip and establish
itself as a key player in the Israeli-Palestinian arena and surpass the
power base of the Palestinian Authority (PA), headed by Fatah and
Mahmoud Abbas.
In order for Israel to postpone the
next conflict with Hamas for as long as possible, two main efforts are
necessary. One is to prevent the organization’s arming itself with
standard and advanced weapons and raw materials liable to be used to
manufacture such weapons. The second is the economic lever, i.e.,
improving the dire economic and humanitarian situation prevailing in the
Gaza Strip. Easing the plight of the local population will reinforce
Hamas’ sense of governmental sustainability in the area. In the absence
of a concrete threat to its rule, it will likely be in no hurry to pick a
fight. In this context, however, the unstable and hostile relations
between Hamas and the PA, especially the dispute between them concerning
the distribution of the money promised for rebuilding the Gaza Strip,
play a key role in blocking any progress toward the vital
reconstruction. Gabi Siboni , A. G. is a senior research fellow and head of the Military and Strategic Affairs Program at INSS. A.G. is at the Prime Minister’s office.
Source:
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
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