by Arel Segal
On the one hand, Meir Dagan said
again this week that in 2010 Netanyahu issued instructions to prepare the systems
for an attack on Iran and that he, as head of the Mossad, prevented a war. On
the other hand, he has said on several occasions that the prime minister lacks
the courage for an attack. Confused? So are we.
This week’s current events were so putrid that the public’s
attention was diverted from the upsetting confrontation that occurred at the
Jerusalem Post Conference in the United States between the moderator,
journalist Caroline Glick, and previous head of the Mossad Meir Dagan and
former chief of staff Gabi Ashkenazi. From this mud-slinging battle the raw truth
emerged: the head of the Mossad had refused to carry out the order of the prime
minister.
Sometime in 2010, Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense
Minister Barak issued instructions to Dagan and Ashkenazi to prepare for the
possibility that a decision would be made to attack Iran. Dagan objected,
claiming that such preparation would mean war, so a decision from the cabinet
was required. Since there was no decision of the cabinet, such an order was
illegal, from his point of view. Ashkenazi said in the meeting that there had
been no such order.
This was not the first time that the story was revealed. On
the television program “Uvdah” in November 2012, Dagan brought the accusation
that “Netanyahu and Barak tried to enter into war in an underhanded way”.
According to Uvdah’s investigation, during the meeting in question, Dagan said
to Netanyahu and Barak: “You might be taking an illegal decision about going to
war. Only the cabinet is authorized to do that”. In the program, Barak, relating
to the plan, claimed that the army did not at that time have the operational
capability to carry it out. The amazing part of the story, beyond the fact that
the more senior you are, the more you prattle on, is that there are actually
three different versions here. Exactly like Rashomon. Dagan says: there was an
illegal order; Ashkenazi says: there was no order; Barak says: professional factors
prevented the command from being carried out.
An ideal summer for an attack
As far as the harm that was done to democratic hierarchy, I
can only cite my friend Ro’i Sharon, who suggested the following mental exercise in the program
Makor: “For anyone who needs help in visualizing this, I suggest considering
another order, let’s say, to evacuate a settlement. Ten years after the
disengagement, imagine what would have happened if the chief of staff had postponed
the military preparations until an approval from Knesset was obtained. Not
because he didn’t feel like doing it, just because he was not sure that it was
the proper procedure and the Knesset or prime minister had not yet met on the
matter. The morning afterward, a war of Gog and Magog would have started against the chief of staff, and
rightly so. However, instead of being shocked by Dagan, we will continue with
our polite behavior like a bunch of Republicans. Because Meir Dagan skewered
Netanyahu in the public square. Meir Dagan is one of the best”.
Before the elections, Dagan made the rounds in the media.
The high point was a speech in Rabin Square, a high point that very quickly sank
in a puddle of droppings left by Garboz’s speech of that same meeting. In an
interview for Ulpan Shishi, Dagan criticized Netanyahu’s speech in Congress,
and said that “the speech caused damage and did not achieve any goal”. In an
interview with Nahum Barnea and Shimon Shiffer in Yediot Aharonot, Dagan said
that “the one who caused the greatest strategic damage to Israel in the Iranian
matter is the prime minister”.
“All of the professional organizations objected to an Israeli
military attack on Iran”, explained the previous head of Mossad. “Netanyahu did
not want to go to a dramatic decision against the heads of the system because
he knew that ultimately the responsibility would fall on him. I have never seen
him take responsibility for something. I have seen leaders who made decisions
and later admitted that they had been mistaken. No one is immune from making
mistakes. The difference between him and others is the willingness to take
responsibility. He is good at talking, not at taking action”.
Now I will try to restrict myself to a few insights. On one
hand, Dagan says that Netanyahu issued instructions to prepare the systems and
that he, Dagan, prevented a war. A war that he is still determined to prevent unless
all other alternatives have failed. On the other hand, Dagan has said on
several occasions that Bibi lacks the courage to attack. Hold it. Wait a minute.
There can be no such scenario in a democratic country where a leader takes
dramatic military steps against the opinion of the entire professional echelon.
This argument does not hold, says Dagan’s side; it was exactly the right time
for Netanyahu.
I assume that there is no need to explain why Ben Kaspit
would be the right person to justify the above statement, so I will quote him
from Ma’ariv this past week: “The real opportunity for Netanyahu to attack the
Iranian nuclear system was actually in 2012. At that time the heads of the
branches were novices and lacked confidence (Gantz, Pardo, Cohen, Kohavi), he
still had a hawkish defense minister (Barak) and he did not have an effective
president, because Obama was then at the end of his reelection campaign, and
from his point of view Israel could even have attacked Washington. The summer
of 2012 was ideal to attack the Iranian nuclear system; it was asking to be
attacked. So why didn’t he attack? Perhaps because he was busy attacking Obama
and trying to remove him from office by gambling on Mitt Romney? Perhaps
because he was simply afraid (as usual)”?
Getting down to the nitty gritty
Got that? The summer of 2012 – ideal. Why didn’t they attack? Because Netanyahu
was afraid. I did some checking into events of that time and I found out a few
interesting things. December 2011. Meir Dagan, in the first interview with
Uvdah (surprised?) after leaving his post, he cautions that if Israel attacks
Iran she would be endangering herself from a response that would include a
three-pronged missile attack from Iran, Hamas and Hizb’Allah. Eleven months
later, November 2012, on Uvdah, the incident from 2010 is exposed, including
the vociferous objections of Dagan and Ashkenazi to an attack. The public is apprised
of the fact that the professional echelon objects to an attack. During those
same days, according to the autobiographical book written by Leon Panetta, the
American defense minister at the time, the Americans were taking the Israeli
threats to attack very seriously. And take note: during the time when Netanyahu
supposedly had the best time to act, the Israeli public can see for the first
time, the drama playing out behind the scenes, the inner workings involved in
the process of making strategic decisions. It is no longer an abstract threat,
it’s the real thing.
That same year, there was one remark after another. The admired
head of the Mossad and the popular chief of staff think that the military
operation is absolute madness. They do not trust the prime minister and the
defense minister. There is still time, they suggest. The attack must be put off
and used only as a last resort. Okay, if this entire production was a sham
intended to beef up the sanctions, then I take my hat off to them. But if all of
this striptease is going on in real time and the Iranians hear it and see it,
then Allah save us! Houston, we’ve got a problem.
In June, 2010, on Channel 2 News, Amnon Abromovitz announced
the end of Dagan’s tenure. “Meir Dagan is ending his role and his service will
not be extended further, despite his desire to continue”. I don’t think that it
is “despite his desire” and not because of some group of advisors close to the
prime minister. I do not believe that a celebrated fighter and commander, whose
contribution to Israel’s security is so great, would be motivated by ego and a
desire for revenge. I think that Dagan has become addled. In his view, to
attack would be disastrous and he was determined to prevent it. But here is his
mistake. Netanyahu and Barak are elected by the public. Perhaps he was right
and perhaps he was wrong, but the reality of the hierarchy dictates that he is
subordinate to them, and not the opposite. After his tenure had ended, Dagan made
a determined decision to impose his world view by going to the media. You know
what? It may be that Dagan was right and is still right, but by the same
measure, it could be that he was wrong and is still wrong. This is exactly why
we go to elections – to choose those who will make decisions for us. Civil
servants are not elected officials. No one can appoint himself as the decision
maker, that’s what elections are for.
Arel Segal
Source: Makor Rishon, June 12, 2015, Tzedek section of Yoman, pg. 30
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
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