by Chuck Schumer
In making my decision, I examined this deal in three parts: nuclear restrictions on Iran in the first ten years, nuclear restrictions on Iran after ten years, and non-nuclear components and consequences of a deal. In each case I have asked: are we better off with the agreement or without it?
Every several years or so a
legislator is called upon to cast a momentous vote in which the stakes
are high and both sides of the issue are vociferous in their views.
Over
the years, I have learned that the best way to treat such decisions is
to study the issue carefully, hear the full, unfiltered explanation of
those for and against, and then, without regard to pressure, politics or
party, make a decision solely based on the merits.
I
have spent the last three weeks doing just that: carefully studying the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, reading and re-reading the
agreement and its annexes, questioning dozens of proponents and
opponents, and seeking answers to questions that go beyond the text of
the agreement but will have real consequences that must be considered.
Advocates
on both sides have strong cases for their point of view that cannot
simply be dismissed. This has made evaluating the agreement a difficult
and deliberate endeavor, and after deep study, careful thought and
considerable soul-searching, I have decided I must oppose the agreement
and will vote yes on a motion of disapproval.
While
we have come to different conclusions, I give tremendous credit to
President Obama for his work on this issue. The President, Secretary
Kerry and their team have spent painstaking months and years pushing
Iran to come to an agreement. Iran would not have come to the table
without the President’s persistent efforts to convince the Europeans,
the Russians, and the Chinese to join in the sanctions. In addition, it
was the President’s far-sighted focus that led our nation to accelerate
development of the Massive Ordinance Penetrator (MOP), the best military
deterrent and antidote to a nuclear Iran. So
whichever side one comes down on in this agreement, all fair-minded
Americans should acknowledge the President’s strong achievements in
combatting and containing Iran.
In
making my decision, I examined this deal in three parts: nuclear
restrictions on Iran in the first ten years, nuclear restrictions on
Iran after ten years, and non-nuclear components and consequences of a
deal. In each case I have asked: are we better off with the agreement or
without it?
In the first
ten years of the deal, there are serious weaknesses in the agreement.
First, inspections are not “anywhere, anytime”; the 24-day delay before
we can inspect is troubling. While inspectors would likely be able to
detect radioactive isotopes at a site after 24 days, that delay would
enable Iran to escape detection of any illicit building and improving of
possible military dimensions (PMD) — the tools that go into building a
bomb but don’t emit radioactivity.
Furthermore,
even when we detect radioactivity at a site where Iran is illicitly
advancing its bomb-making capability, the 24-day delay would hinder our
ability to determine precisely what was being done at that site.
Even
more troubling is the fact that the U.S. cannot demand inspections
unilaterally. By requiring the majority of the 8-member Joint
Commission, and assuming that China, Russia, and Iran will not
cooperate, inspections would require the votes of all three European
members of the P5+1 as well as the EU representative. It is reasonable
to fear that, once the Europeans become entangled in lucrative economic
relations with Iran, they may well be inclined not to rock the boat by
voting to allow inspections.
Additionally,
the “snapback” provisions in the agreement seem cumbersome and
difficult to use. While the U.S. could unilaterally cause snapback of
all sanctions,
there will be instances where it would be more appropriate to snapback
some but not all of the sanctions, because the violation is significant
but not severe. A partial snapback of multilateral sanctions could be
difficult to obtain, because the U.S. would require the cooperation of
other nations. If the U.S. insists on snapback of all the provisions,
which it can do unilaterally, and the Europeans, Russians, or Chinese
feel that is too severe a punishment, they may not comply.
Those
who argue for the agreement say it is better to have an imperfect deal
than to have nothing; that without the agreement, there would be no
inspections, no snapback. When you consider only this portion of the
deal — nuclear restrictions for the first ten years — that line of
thinking is plausible, but even for this part of the agreement, the
weaknesses mentioned above make this argument less compelling.
Second, we must evaluate how this deal would restrict Iran’s nuclear development after ten years.
Supporters
argue that after ten years, a future President would be in no weaker a
position than we are today to prevent Iran from racing to the bomb. That
argument discounts the current sanctions regime. After fifteen years of
relief from sanctions, Iran would be stronger financially and better
able to advance a robust nuclear program. Even more importantly, the
agreement would allow Iran, after ten to fifteen years, to be a nuclear
threshold state with the blessing of the world community. Iran would
have a green light to be as close, if not closer to possessing a nuclear
weapon than it is today. And the ability to thwart Iran if it is intent
on becoming a nuclear power would have less moral and economic force.
If
Iran’s true intent is to get a nuclear weapon, under this agreement, it
must simply exercise patience. After ten years, it can be very close to
achieving that goal, and, unlike its current unsanctioned pursuit of a
nuclear weapon, Iran’s nuclear program will be codified in an agreement
signed by the United States and other nations. To me, after ten years,
if Iran is the same nation as it is today, we will be worse off with
this agreement than without it.
In
addition, we must consider the non-nuclear elements of the agreement.
This aspect of the deal gives me the most pause. For years, Iran has
used military force and terrorism to expand its influence in the Middle
East, actively supporting military or terrorist actions in Israel,
Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, and Gaza. That is why the U.S. has labeled
Iran as one of only three nations in the world who are “state sponsors
of terrorism.” Under this agreement, Iran would receive at least $50
billion dollars in the near future and would undoubtedly use some of
that money to redouble its efforts to create even more trouble in the
Middle East, and, perhaps, beyond.
To
reduce the pain of sanctions, the Supreme Leader had to lean left and
bend to the moderates in his country. It seems logical that to
counterbalance, he will lean right and give the Iranian Revolutionary
Guard (IRGC) and the hardliners resources so that they can pursue their
number one goal: strengthening Iran’s armed forces and pursuing even
more harmful military and terrorist actions.
Finally,
the hardliners can use the freed-up funds to build an ICBM on their own
as soon as sanctions are lifted (and then augment their ICBM
capabilities in 8 years after the ban on importing ballistic weaponry is
lifted), threatening the United States. Restrictions should have been
put in place limiting how Iran could use its new resources.
When
it comes to the non-nuclear aspects of the deal, I think there is a
strong case that we are better off without an agreement than with one.
Using
the proponents’ overall standard — which is not whether the agreement
is ideal, but whether we are better with or without it — it seems to me,
when it comes to the nuclear aspects of the agreement within ten years,
we might be slightly better off with it. However, when it comes to the
nuclear aspects after ten years and the non-nuclear aspects, we would be
better off without it.
Ultimately,
in my view, whether one supports or opposes the resolution of
disapproval depends on how one thinks Iran will behave under this
agreement.
If one thinks
Iran will moderate, that contact with the West and a decrease in
economic and political isolation will soften Iran’s hardline positions,
one should approve the agreement. After all, a moderate Iran is less
likely to exploit holes in the inspection and sanctions regime, is less
likely to seek to become a threshold nuclear power after ten years, and
is more likely to use its newfound resources for domestic growth, not
international adventurism.
But
if one feels that Iranian leaders will not moderate and their unstated
but very real goal is to get relief from the onerous sanctions, while
still retaining their nuclear ambitions and their ability to increase
belligerent activities in the Middle East and elsewhere, then one should
conclude that it would be better not to approve this agreement.
Admittedly,
no one can tell with certainty which way Iran will go. It is true that
Iran has a large number of people who want their government to decrease
its isolation from the world and focus on economic advancement at home.
But it is also true that this desire has been evident in Iran for
thirty-five years, yet the Iranian leaders have held a tight and
undiminished grip on Iran, successfully maintaining their brutal,
theocratic dictatorship with little threat. Who’s to say this
dictatorship will not prevail for another ten, twenty, or thirty years?
To
me, the very real risk that Iran will not moderate and will, instead,
use the agreement to pursue its nefarious goals is too great.
Therefore,
I will vote to disapprove the agreement, not because I believe war is a
viable or desirable option, nor to challenge the path of diplomacy. It
is because I believe Iran will not change, and under this agreement it
will be able to achieve its dual goals of eliminating sanctions while
ultimately retaining its nuclear and non-nuclear power. Better to keep
U.S. sanctions in place, strengthen them, enforce secondary sanctions on
other nations, and pursue the hard-trodden path of diplomacy once more,
difficult as it may be.
For all of these reasons, I believe the vote to disapprove is the right one.
Chuck Schumer
Source: https://medium.com/@SenSchumer/my-position-on-the-iran-deal-e976b2f13478
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