by Erez Striem
The Muslim Brotherhood’s desperate state has led to far reaching changes in its structure, ideology, and nature of activity by the movement and its supporters in Egypt.
The
violent conflict between the Muslim Brotherhood and Egyptian state
institutions escalated after Mohamed Morsi and his government were
overthrown in July 2013. The crackdown on the movement since then has
included the killing of thousands of its supporters, the arrest of tens
of thousands of Islamist opponents of the regime, the banning of the
movement, its classification as a terrorist organization, and the
elimination of its economic and social infrastructure. The Muslim
Brotherhood’s desperate state has led to far reaching changes in its
structure, ideology, and nature of activity by the movement and its
supporters in Egypt. The process of Muslim Brotherhood members slipping
into various types of violent action is clear, and it is believed that
at least some of the small terrorist cells operating in the Nile Valley
region were founded by former Muslim Brotherhood activists. It is also
known that a number of former activists have joined the Islamic State
branch in the Sinai Peninsula over the past two years. This dangerous
process is likely to have momentous consequences not only for the
stability of Egypt, but also for regional security.
The
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is one of the most influential political
movements in the modern history of the Middle East. Until the summer of
2013, when the Egyptian military toppled the Muslim Brotherhood-led
government, the movement was considered to be the biggest winner of the
“Arab Spring” and was expected to continue to lead Egypt, the most
populous state in the Arab world, for many years. More generally,
political Islam was regarded as an ideology expected to take the Arab
world by storm following the collapse of the old dictatorships.
Egyptian Judge Adel Shorbaji (c) during the
Muslim Brotherhood trial in Cairo, October 15,
2015. Photo: Andalou / Gettty Images
The violent conflict between the
Muslim Brotherhood and Egyptian state institutions escalated after
Mohamed Morsi and his government were overthrown. The crackdown on the
movement since then has included the killing of thousands of its
supporters during demonstrations, the arrest of tens of thousands of
Islamist opponents of the regime, the banning of the movement, its
classification as a terrorist organization, and the elimination of its
economic and social infrastructure, ranging from charity organizations
and hospitals to mosques and schools, which the regime either closed or
nationalized. The Muslim Brotherhood’s desperate state has led to far
reaching changes in its structure, ideology, and nature of the activity
by the movement and its supporters in Egypt.
Structural Changes: Weakened Leadership and a Severed Hierarchal Structure
The centralized nature and inflexible
hierarchy that characterized the Muslim Brotherhood throughout its
history are no more. Decision making in the organization has become
decentralized, so that the cells operating in the field enjoy greater
freedom of action. The movement’s leadership, which is almost entirely
in prison or exile, is incapable of enforcing its decisions among the
operatives responsible for carrying out policy. The movement’s youth are
experiencing a sense of helplessness and a lack of vision, and the
shock of being confronted with the regime’s repressive measures have led
to changes within the leadership, a deepening internal rift, and severe
criticism by the youth of the older, isolated generation of leaders –
leaders who sit comfortably in Turkey or Qatar and call on young
operatives to sacrifice themselves in hopeless street clashes against
the security forces. The objections among parts of the leadership to
violent actions and its adherence to the nonviolent struggle, despite
the continual failure of this path to challenge the regime, also arouse
severe criticism. In part, the movement’s centralized character is being
deliberately dismantled in order to adapt its activity to the current
limitations and constraints, and to reduce tensions between field
operatives and the leadership. The pressure exerted by the regime and
the rift between the leadership abroad and activists and leaders in
Egypt itself do not suit the traditional hierarchal structure that
characterized the movement for many years.
Ideological Changes: Salafi Influence and Despair about the Nonviolent Struggle
The switch to less centralized
activity has exposed the Muslim Brotherhood, formerly a closed and
relatively homogeneous movement, to external influences of Salafi
operatives and religious figures holding more extreme attitudes toward
the Egyptian state in general and the current regime in particular.
Cooperation between the movement’s operatives and Salafi activists began
during the protests in Rabaa al-Adawiya against Morsi’s overthrow, and
became more extensive as the tension between the regime and the
opposition mounted. Many religious figures preaching in favor of violent
resistance to the regime on television broadcasts sponsored by the
Muslim Brotherhood in Turkey are Salafi sheikhs not traditionally
identified with the movement. The common denominator of repression by
the security forces is blurring the lines of separation between the
various Islamic groups.
With the increase in pressure by the
regime, the rhetoric of the movement’s leaders themselves has undergone a
process of escalation. In January 2015, the movement’s website
published a statement, although it was removed shortly afterwards,
calling on its activists and supporters to prepare for “a prolonged and
continuous stage of jihad.” In June, the leadership adopted a
provocative declaration signed by 159 Muslim clerics, some identified
with the movement, calling to overthrow the regimeand encouraging
attacks against the regime and its supporters. In addition, many of the
movement’s leaders assert that despite their opposition to violence,
they understand “those who look for vengeance” against the security
forces for injury to their relatives, and are unable to prevent it. On
more than one occasion, the movement’s leaders have argued that
“anything below bullets is peaceful resistance” – which lends approval
for destruction of property and the throwing of stones and Molotov
cocktails.
The Muslim Brotherhood leaders are
presumably aware of the consequences of an official declaration
concerning an armed struggle against the el-Sisi regime. A turn toward
this strategy will limit the movement’s ability to act in the
international arena, provide further justification for the regime’s
opposition to it, and is liable to alienate a considerable portion of
its traditional members. The movement is therefore officially
reiterating that it does not advocate violence, but in view of the
growing frustration among the young people, adherence to nonviolent
struggle jeopardizes the little remaining control exercised by the
movement’s leadership over its members. The movement is therefore
adopting an intermediate path, depicted as “revolutionary” – a
deliberately vague term whose meaning changes and is subject to
different interpretations. These interpretations range from protest and
popular uprising to sabotage operations such as burning utility poles
and blowing up transportation infrastructure to targeted terrorist
operations against the security forces.
Involvement in Terrorism: Implications for Israel and the Region
It is difficult to estimate the extent
of the Muslim Brotherhood’s involvement in the wave of terrorism in
Egypt and the attacks that have become almost a matter of almost daily
routine, and have cost a significant number of lives among the security
forces, judges, politicians who support the regime, and others. Most of
the Islamist operatives in Egypt are not actually members of any
organization, and Islamist terrorism therefore does not necessarily
denote a direct connection to the Muslim Brotherhood. Nevertheless, the
process of Muslim Brotherhood members slipping into various types of
violent action is clear. It is believed that at least some of the small
terrorist cells operating in the Nile Valley region were founded by
former Muslim Brotherhood activists. It is also known that a number of
former activists have joined Ansar Bait al-Maqdis – the Islamic State
branch in the Sinai Peninsula – over the past two years.
This dangerous process is likely to
have momentous consequences not only for the stability of Egypt, but
also for regional security. Global jihadi groups affiliated with the
Islamic State and al-Qaeda are making strenuous efforts to penetrate the
vacuum left by the decline in Muslim Brotherhood power and influence.
Although a significant ideological gap separates the Islamic State and
al-Qaeda on the one hand from political Islam movements on the other,
the weakening of the Muslim Brotherhood, combined with severe repression
by the Egyptian regime, added to the loss of faith that change can be
achieved using nonviolent methods and the growing Salafi influence, have
narrowed this gap. The loss of the power attained by the Muslim
Brotherhood through democratic means stands in stark contrast to the
Islamic State’s success in consolidating Islamic rule through
belligerency in various areas in Syria, Iraq, and Libya.
The reported consolidation of Islamic
State cells in recent months in the Cairo area and close to the
Egyptian-Libyan border indicates an effort to expand the Islamic State’s
activity beyond Sinai to Egypt itself. The extreme political
polarization in Egypt, combined with the loss of direction by the Muslim
Brotherhood, has left a huge reserve of angry and frustrated young
people eager to take revenge against the regime. Global jihadi
organizations aim to fill this space, and they have a great deal to
offer the regime’s Islamist opponents, including financing, a supply of
weapons, training, and a high level of media and online propaganda. The
downing of the Russian passenger jet in Sinai is an example of the
destructive potential of the Islamic State’s rising power in Egypt. For
Israel, the potential threat lies in the consolidation of groups
identified with the Islamic State near its southwestern border, further
penetration by the Islamic State and other jihad groups in the Gaza
Strip, and the destabilization of Egypt. From a broader perspective, the
spread of the Islamic State in North Africa will also be affected to a
large extent by its ability to exploit the crisis of political Islam
caused by the Muslim Brotherhood’s decline in Egypt.
Erez Striem
Source: http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=11150
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
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