by IsraelDefense
Hassan Rouhani made his first official visit to Russia on March 27-28, 2017, accompanied by Foreign Minister Mohammed Javad Zarif and Iran’s Communications Minister, as well as a large economic delegation. The highlight of his visit was the meeting with President Vladimir Putin, during which the leaders discussed options for strengthening bilateral economic ties, trade, and investments. Noting the 70 percent growth in bilateral trade last year, President Rouhani stated that economic relations had moved from the stage of ordinary relations to long term projects. In a joint statement, Rouhani and Putin mentioned treaties in the fields of oil and gas, media and information technology, nuclear energy (construction has already started on one of two additional power stations in Bushehr), construction of a thermal power station in Bandar Abbas, and tourism. Indeed, an agreement was already signed eliminating the need for visas for tourist groups from Russia to Iran, concluded in discussions about possible full elimination of the need for visas to Iran by individual Russian visitors.Following President Rouhani’s visit to Russia, Senior INSS researchers Sima Shine and Zvi Magen discuss the strategic significance of Iran's growing closeness to Russia, and the implications for Israel
At a joint press conference, Putin stressed that "Iran is a
good and reliable neighbor, as well as a stable partner for Russia,"
and was careful to mention the valuable cooperation of the two countries
in the international arena. He underscored the joint achievements of
Russia and Iran in the struggle against the Islamic State and Jabhat
al-Nusra, the efforts to stabilize the Syrian arena by means of a
ceasefire in wide areas of the country, and the fact that Iran,
alongside Turkey and Russia, is a guarantor of the ceasefire. Finally,
Putin announced that the intention is to bring the relations between
Iran and Russia to the level of a "strategic partnership."
As to the sensitive issue of the nuclear agreement, the
joint statement emphasized that the JCPOA is an international treaty
adopted by the Security Council. It also stressed the commitment of all
parties involved in the treaty to its full implementation, fulfillment
of its requirements by Iran, and the fact that according to the NPT,
Iran is permitted to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. In
addition, the parties rejected the use of sanctions against countries
and defined the measure as illegitimate – reflecting their opposition to
the existing sanctions against Iran and Russia. In a loosely veiled
hint to Israel, they asserted their support for the Middle East becoming
a nuclear free zone. These statements, which were particularly
important to Iran, are directed against President Trump, who even before
he entered the White House raised ideas about canceling the JCPOA or
reopening it in renewed negotiations, and should be seen as clear
indications that Russia will not support such moves.
At the international level, Iran and Russia have similar
views on many important issues. They have common geopolitical interests,
both in the Middle East and in the Russian Commonwealth (CIS) – in the
Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Caspian Sea region. In the international
arena Russia identifies Iran as its main partner on the anti-Western
front, where they share an interest in challenging the existing order.
Thus, Rouhani’s visit marks the high point of a process of upgrading
relations between these countries, which gained momentum after the
nuclear treaty, when it was possible for the two countries to renew
their military cooperation.
The first and most important expression of this development
was the supply of the S-300 air defense missile system, which was
suspended for a decade due to pressure from Israel and the United
States, and has already become operational in Iran. Russia and Iran are
also in talks about the purchase of other weapon systems, including
Sukhoi-30 fighter plans and T90 tanks. Both states have been involved in
the Syrian civil war from the start, and are cooperating in supporting
the Bashar al-Assad regime. Since Russia's military involvement in the
war (September 2015), they have worked as a military coalition, sharing
the management of the fighting on the ground. This also explains why
Russia sees Iran as an important component in any future settlement in
Syria.
Rouhani's visit to Moscow (which followed visits by the
President of Turkey and the Prime Minister of Israel) took place in a
significant context: the joint military effort in Syria, which is the
first of its kind for both Iran and Russia, has changed the military
balance in favor of Assad, their ally. The talks to formulate a
settlement in Syria, underway in Astana under Russian leadership,
brought the representatives of the rebels against the Assad regime to
agree to a ceasefire for the first time. Iran, alongside Turkey and with
Russian leadership, was defined as a guarantor of the ceasefire. This
status is extremely important for Iran, since it establishes its role in
Syria, which it wishes to leverage to further its hold over the country
– if and when an arrangement is reached that ends the civil war. In
addition, with the entry of the Trump administration into the White
House, and against a background of talks about strengthening American
cooperation with Russia, Iran was worried by the possibility that Moscow
would be ready to trade its relations with Tehran as a bargaining card
with Washington. Therefore, the agreements reached during the visit
regarding Iran's role in Syria, and in particular the strengthening of
its relations with Russia, should in Tehran's view, reinforce Russia's
commitment not to "trade in" its relations with Iran.
Rouhani's visit to Moscow, two months before the Iranian
presidential elections and his prospective reelection to a second term
of office, helps him against his domestic opponents. Rouhani has been
the target of severe criticism in recent months, as the one who
spearheaded the nuclear treaty and who saw the removal of sanctions and
the opening of the Iranian market to Western investments as the main way
of saving the Iranian economy. Critics point to the limited
contribution of the lifting of sanctions to the Iranian economy, and to
the Trump administration and the possibility discussed in Congress of
imposing new sanctions against Iran as proof of this policy's failure.
Rouhani’s visit to Moscow and the several economic treaties signed there
thus balance the picture and undermine the accusations that he prefers
the "non-credible" United States and Western countries over their
allies. In other words, the visit to Moscow allows Rouhani to present a
balanced policy and concrete achievements. Moreover, the Rouhani
government was aware of the Russian complaint regarding the absence of
significant economic projects benefiting Moscow, compared to the effort
made to promote projects with European countries. The agreements
achieved during Rouhani’s visit take the economic relations between Iran
and Russia to a higher, long-term level.
There is thus no doubt that Rouhani's visit to Moscow is a
positive and important milestone in the developing relations between
Iran and Russia. However, it appears that ultimately, the driving force
behind Russia's ties to Iran is opportunistic more than strategic.
Moreover, the more it appears that the civil war in Syria is nearing a
decision, the more disputes may emerge: Russia and Iran are partners in
the effort to save the Assad regime, but they have different perceptions
regarding the future shape of Syria. Also, the rebels against Assad,
mostly Sunnis, recoil from a future Iranian presence in Syria, and this
hampers progress toward peace.
Within Russia there are conflicting attitudes to
cooperation with Iran. Supporters see Iran as the main partner in the
struggle against the West and praise the regime for its strong stance
against the challenges posed by the West. They also clearly uphold
Iran's right to promote its nuclear program and strengthen its position
as a power. This camp includes portions of the security establishment,
particularly nationalist, anti-Western elements that support the return
of Russia to its status as a world power. On the other hand, others
argue that the presence of Hezbollah and other Shiite militias, which
were brought to Syria by Iran, does not serve the Russian interest.
In addition, Russia is experiencing some concern due to
Israel, which has become a regional player of influence, particularly
given its activity on Syrian soil against weapon shipments to Hezbollah,
and a player that sees the intentions of Iran to remain in Syria as a
threat to its security. Israeli conduct challenges Russian leadership,
which is now looking for a suitable response. Iran for its part is
suspicious of Russia's stance in this context, and in recent weeks
criticism has been voiced in Iran of the Russian position, which
continues to ignore what are allegedly Israeli attacks in Syria. This
issue was likely discussed during Rouhani's visit to Moscow, in a
Russian attempt to persuade the Iranians to make some concessions that
could be presented to Israel as a basis for future understandings
between Jerusalem and Moscow.
For Israel, stronger ties between Iran and Russia represent
a significant development with many uncertain future implications,
assuming that Russia continues to see its relations with Israel as an
important asset in connection with its role in the Syrian arena, and in a
range of other contexts. In any event, Israel will have to consider its
actions in Syria in light of the relations between Iran and Russia.
This article was originally published on the INSS website.
IsraelDefense
Source: http://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/node/29202
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