by Efraim Inbar
Israel is now an informal member of the moderate Sunni camp.
Originally published under the title "Where Is the Middle East Headed?"
The Middle East has been transformed by state collapse in (clockwise from upper left) Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.
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Since
the Middle East events of 2011 (mislabeled "the Arab Spring"), the
region has been in turmoil. The inability of the Arab statist structures
to overcome domestic cleavages became very clear. Even before 2011,
Lebanon, Iraq, Somalia, as well as the Palestinian Authority failed to
hold together. After 2011, Syria and Yemen descended into a state of
civil war. Similarly, Egypt underwent a political crisis, allowing for
the emergence of an Islamist regime. It took a year for a military coup
to restore the praetorian ancient regime. All Arab republican regimes
were under stress. While the monarchies weathered the political storm,
their future stability is not guaranteed.
Growing
Islamist influence put additional pressure on the Arab states. The
quick rise of the Islamic State group in Syria and Iraq was the most
dramatic expression of this phenomenon that spread beyond the borders of
the Middle East. Despite its expected military defeat, the ideology
behind the establishment of an Islamic caliphate and variants of radical
Islam remain resonant in many Muslim quarters. Therefore, the pockets
containing ISIS and al-Qaida followers, as well as the stronger Muslim
Brotherhood are likely to continue to challenge peace and stability in
the Middle East and elsewhere.
The Sunni-Shiite divide has come to dominate Middle Eastern politics.
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The
Sunni-Shiite divide, a constant feature of Middle Eastern politics, has
become more dominant as Iran becomes increasingly feared. The 2015
nuclear deal (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) between Iran and
world powers has been generally viewed in the Middle East as an Iranian
(Shiite, Persian) diplomatic victory. Shiite-dominated Iraq (excluding
the Kurdish region) turned into an Iranian satellite as well, while the
military involvement of Iran and its proxies on behalf of Syrian
President Bashar Assad in Syria appears to achieve the completion of a
Shiite corridor from Iran to the Mediterranean. Iran continues its
long-range missile program unabated and makes progress even in the
nuclear arena within the limits of the flawed JCPOA. Its proxies rule
Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, and Sanaa, signaling increasing Iranian
clout.
In
contrast, the Sunni powers display weakness. Saudi Arabia (together
with Sunni Turkey) failed to dislodge Assad, Iran's ally, in Syria.
Saudi Arabian Crown Prince and Defense Minister Mohammed bin Salman
pushed Saudi Arabia into a more muscular posture, but failed to win the
civil war in Yemen -- its backyard. Moreover, Riyadh has not been
successful so far in strong-arming its small neighbor Qatar into
dropping its pro-Islamist and pro-Iranian policies.
Egypt
is an important Arab Sunni state in the moderate camp. Yet the
traditional weight it has carried in the Arab world is lighter nowadays,
primarily because of its immense economic troubles. Providing food for
the Egyptian people is Cairo's first priority. At the same time, Cairo
is fighting an Islamist insurgence at home. This situation, which leaves
little energy for regional endeavors, is hardly going to change any
time soon.
Israel is now an informal member of the moderate Sunni camp.
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Israel
is an informal member of the moderate Sunni camp since it shares its
main concern -- the Iranian quest for hegemony in the region. While
powerful and ready to use force when necessary, Israel, under the
leadership of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, is reluctant to
interfere beyond its borders.
This
prudent approach is based on the understanding that Israel, a small
state endowed with limited resources, lacks the capacity for political
engineering in the Middle East. A growing Iranian presence near Israel's
borders and the reestablishment of an eastern front might become a
serious military challenge.
The
disengagement of the U.S. from the Middle East, accentuated by the
foreign policy of then-President Barak Obama, continues. Under Obama,
the attempts to engage Syria and Iran were generally viewed as weakness,
perceptions that were reinforced by the signing of the JCPOA with Iran.
The obsessive campaign to defeat ISIS, started by Obama and continued
by President Donald Trump, primarily helped Iranian schemes.
The new Trump administration has failed so far to formulate a coherent approach to the Middle East.
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The
new Trump administration has failed so far to formulate a coherent
approach to the Middle East. Moreover, the gradual erosion in the U.S.
capability to project force into the region amplifies the sense that
America has lost the ability to play a role in regional politics.
The
vacuum created by American feebleness has been filled to some extent by
the Russians. The Russian military intervention in the Syrian civil war
saved the Assad regime from defeat. It constrained Turkey's involvement
in Syria and helped Iranian encroachment in the region.
The regional vacuum created by U.S. feebleness invites growing Russian and Chinese involvement.
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We
also see growing Chinese interest. The ambitious One Belt One Road
infrastructure project tries to tie the Middle East to Chinese economic
and political endeavors. China inaugurated its first overseas naval base
in Djibouti in July 2017. Located astride a crucial maritime choke
point, the military installation is symbolic of its growing confidence
as an emerging global power, capable of projecting military force and
directly protecting its interests in the Middle East, Africa and the
western Indian Ocean.
Yet
extra-regional powers can hardly change the political dynamics in the
region. The regional forces are usually decisive in determining
political outcomes. Moreover, Middle East history provides many examples
of external actors being manipulated by regional powers for their own
schemes.
Adopting
such a perspective on outsiders, and in view of the deep crisis in the
Arab world, it stands to reason that the relations between Iran and
Turkey will be a key factor in designing the future trends in the
region. They are the two largest powers and they are both ambitious and
capable enough to play a serious role. Despite the historical rivalry
and the dividing Shiite-Sunni religious identity that could lead to
competition, it seems that they are cooperating. Turkey and Iran have
discussed possible joint military action against Kurdish militant
groups. Both are siding with Qatar. Both are using Islamic motifs and
anti-Israel positions to win hearts in the Arab world. We may well see
an Iranian-Turkish duumvirate in the Middle East, but the statist
interests and the different interpretation of Islam could push the two
former empires into an adversarial relationship.
Efraim Inbar, professor emeritus of political studies at Bar-Ilan University and former director of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, is a Shillman-Ginsburg fellow at the Middle East Forum.
Source: http://www.meforum.org/6883/where-is-the-middle-east-headed
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Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
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